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This book is quite exceptional. It is 100 per cent the result of junior professionals‘ 
dedication to the global field of development studies. The idea for the conference in which 
most of the following papers were presented, the organisation of the conference and the 
editing of the book – all came from a dedicated group of young professionals. Most of 
them were pursuing graduate work in Europe, using their field research from their home 
countries in the Global South. 
Doing a doctorate degree abroad is a risky business. The authors reduced this risk by 
forming a European network of junior scholars who exchange field experiences and 
theoretical insights through an annual Development Dialogue, held at the Institute of Social 
Studies of Erasmus University (ISS) in The Hague. The 2008 Dialogue brought together a 
unique group of junior and senior scholars who questioned, among other things, the very 
concept of participation in development processes. They query the notions of ownership 
and participation espoused by most development agencies, and examine the real processes 
underneath. Is participation a gentle way of imposing donor-views, or does it generate 
authentic social change in the best interest of the various actors? 
The authors question donor-stimulated forms of participation as self-evidently positive, 
both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, they address the need of the academic 
community to recalibrate its concepts given the emergence of post-colonial forms of 
analysis and the radical review of neo-liberal globalisation policies. Empirically, the authors 
have found that actor-rationalities are often simplified and not predictable. Their mix of 
theoretical and empirical innovation makes the book exciting reading. The reader is likely to 
have the same sense of discovery as the participants at the ISS 2008 Development 
Dialogue.  Many thanks to the next generation of development scholars – and thanks to the 
senior staff who helped in getting the focus clear for this book, and Oxfam-Novib, which 
kindly supports the annual ISS Development Dialogue.    
 
Louk Box 
Emeritus Professor of International Cooperation, ISS 
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Preface 
 
I participate 
You participate 
He/She participates 
We participate 
But.. 
They decide 
These phrases were written not long ago on a chalkboard in Bolivia by an informant who 
wanted to explain the adverse effect of the Law of Popular Participation. It suggests that 
participation as a concept is meaningful, whilst in practice it can become hollow because 
decision making processes are often dominated by elites.  
Participation of local communities and civil society groups in intervention strategies are 
considered key in development practice. It has even reached a certain inviolable status since 
the development sector was criticized for carrying out top-down policies. Consequently, a 
certain discomfort exists about the questioning of content and use of participatory 
methods and approaches. However, participation for whom, by whom, for what, and how? 
These remain vital questions for moving forward in building new narratives and generating 
appropriate development strategies.  
In order to contribute to debates on Civil Society Building (CSB), Humanist Institute for 
Co-operation with Developing Countries –Hivos, and the International Institute of Social 
Studies (ISS) in 2005 created the Civil Society Building Knowledge Programme. The aim 
was to better understand and improve the contribution of Civil Society Building efforts to 
bring about changes in the unequal balance of power in favour of vulnerable and 
marginalized groups. At the core of this collaboration is the interaction between 
practitioners, researchers, and social activists to facilitate the generation, dissemination, and 
application of knowledge. By integrating these various forms of knowledge, new insights 
can be created and strategies formulated that contribute to the development of new policies 
and practices. 
As participatory approaches play an important role in our programme, we are also keen to 
rethink these. One way to do so is to stimulate knowledge generation by supporting 
innovative research publications. The present publication contains contributions by a 
variety of young scholars from the Global South who critically examine current 
participation discourses and their application in practice. We believe this provides new 
challenging perspectives and ideas for the debate. But we would agree with the Bolivian 
practitioner: the reader decides.  
 
Marlieke Kieboom 
Kees Biekart  
(Hivos-ISS Civil Society Building Knowledge Programme) 
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction: Participation between Tyranny 
and Emancipation 
Erhard Berner 
 
 
PARTICIPATION DISENCHANTED 
The struggle for participation is over, its opponents – never numerous or vocal anyway – 
have unconditionally surrendered. Together with the related concepts of decentralization, 
good governance, empowerment and self-help, participation has become a buzzword in 
development debates and practice. Participatory approaches that were once considered 
radical and controversial have been incorporated into mainstream management theory 
(Taylor 2001) and are being routinely applied, at least in theory, by each and every 
development agency. Mobilizing local knowledge and capacity and harnessing self-help 
potential is the central element of sustainable livelihoods and rights-based approaches, 
among others. Properly ‗empowered‘, or at least ‗enabled‘, the poor are assumed to be able 
to overcome unequal distribution of resources and government neglect. The case for 
participation is a strong one: As documented by their very survival, poor people are experts 
in making the most of scarce resources under adverse circumstances. To acknowledge and 
strengthen their capacities and institutions is both an obvious and a sensible approach to 
community development. Building interventions on the skills and knowledge of low-
income communities makes it possible to reduce dependency and outside control, fine-tune 
policies according to people‘s needs, reduce costs and improve cost recovery. In the 
perspective of this new orthodoxy, no ‗top-down‘ policy or project can possibly be any 
good. 
Indeed top-down solutions have often been inappropriate – incompetent, mis-targeted, 
insouciant and even brutal. That the reverse assumption – all participatory interventions are 
efficient and beneficial for the recipients – is far from reality has been almost ignored for a 
long time. There has been regular criticism against incompetent and inappropriate use of 
the participatory toolbox, not the instruments themselves. Following Arnstein‘s (1969) 
famous ‗ladder of citizen participation‘, various typologies were proposed to distinguish 
mere information and consultation from ‗real‘ participation in decision making and, 
eventually, the transformation of society (Mayo and Craig 1995, Cleaver 1999, Botes and 
van Rendsburg 2000).  
The promise of emancipation and empowerment was radically negated by Bill Cooke and 
Uma Kothari‘s collection Participation: the new tyranny?, a question the editors firmly 
answered in the affirmative: ‗… tyranny is the illegitimate and/or unjust exercise of power; 
this book is about how participatory development facilitates this‘ (Cooke and Kothari 2001: 
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4). In this perspective, mainstreaming has depoliticized participation and made it a 
technical instrument. Three years later, Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan (2004) responded 
with an effort to reaffirm the transformative and emancipatory potential of participation. It 
is within this field of tension between radical pessimism and cautious optimism that the 
contributions to this book position themselves. 
Before summarizing the main points of critique it is useful to take a close look at the main 
propositions that underlie participatory approaches. Compared with professionals, 
beneficiaries are assumed to have important and complementary information on their needs 
and capacities, to be competent, and reliable. These three factors may become causes of 
improved effectiveness of development projects, the more so if participation goes beyond 
‗listening to beneficiaries‘ towards their active role in decision making. That legitimacy and 
acceptance of interventions is enhanced by the process is a welcome side effect. 
Participation is argued for on three further grounds: 
 As an end in itself. According to Sen‘s work (especially Sen 1999) the freedom to 
make meaningful choices between various options is the essence of development 
and a precondition for personal well-being. 
 As a means to ensure quality, appropriateness and durability of improvements. 
The key word here is ownership: By being involved in the design and production of 
facilities poor people would feel (more) responsible for their maintenance. 
 As a means to increase efficiency and cut costs by mobilizing communities‘ own 
contributions in terms of time, effort, and sometimes money. 
All three rationales, most obviously the last, make tough additional assumptions about both 
the unutilized resources and capacities of the poor, and the skills and capacities of 
intervening agencies. Little attention is paid to the requirements and costs of community 
participation. Only practitioners can appreciate the time required to reach a consensus on 
vital issues, and time in turn is the most scarce and precious asset for poor people and 
notably women. If all that development agencies have to offer in return are cosmetic 
changes with designs their engineers have drawn up in advance, they are guilty of short-
changing the poor. 
The points of departure for a critique of participatory theory and practice can be 
summarized in four main categories, namely ritualistic, exploitative, exclusive and substitute 
participation. 
Ritualistic participation  
There is often little willingness on the part of development agencies and experts to share 
effective decision-making power, and consultative meetings become mere rituals to 
legitimize preconceived plans and to manipulate rather than facilitate the process: ‗They 
(the developers) arrived already knowing everything. They come here and look around, but 
they see only what is not here.‘ (Indian villager quoted by Botes and van Rendsburg 2000: 
42). Indeed the donors‘ and policymakers‘ frame of reference (fixed timeframe, tangible 
and measurable results, output indicators known in advance) is not compatible with any 
real influence of beneficiaries on relevant decisions. Grassroots organizations, then, 
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become ‗the human software through which investments can be made with least local 
opposition‘ (Hildyard et al. 2001). 
Why, then, do the poor patiently play their role in the participatory rituals? The answer 
probably lies in the hidden transfers that even ‗cost-neutral‘ interventions entail. 
Transaction costs, for instance in credit programmes, are almost never recovered, and then 
there are ‗remunerations‘, ‗kick-off finance‘, free training in hopefully useful skills, and 
travel to (sometimes international) events. 
Exploitative participation 
Under the heading of ‗creating ownership‘ and with the thinly disguised goal of cutting 
costs and improving efficiency, development agencies often require beneficiaries to 
contribute work and money. In Nepal, for instance, local systems of corvée labour have been 
incorporated in flood control projects (Masaki 2004). In Indonesia partisipasi, much abused 
under the New Order regime, is still generally known to signify a burden in terms of 
extracted labour. A less grave variant is the collection of information through participatory 
appraisals which is then used according to the priorities of the policy makers. 
Exclusive participation  
In practice, development projects critically depend on ‗key informants‘, ‗multipliers‘ and 
community leaders who supposedly articulate everybody‘s needs: ‗Much of what is 
considered ‗participatory‘ is more a process whereby large numbers of people are represented 
by a relatively small number of participants. … this is primarily about the organized 
interaction of leaders than members per se (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 19, original emphasis).  
The concept of ‗the‘ community is fashionable to the point of ubiquity, but remains deeply 
problematic. It merges the administrative, the spatial and the social, it oversimplifies reality, 
and it can act as an obstacle to the proper examination of local power systems (Guijt and 
Shah 1998). When NGO activists and social scientists talk of how ‗a community‘ lobbied 
local government, built a well, borrowed money, or decided on a development strategy, 
who are they talking about? Do they mean everyone in the community, or just the majority, 
the older ones, the richer ones, or the men?  
All too often it is self-styled leaders who monopolize the meagre benefits of development 
projects, leaving at best crumbs for the weak and marginalized. They seek vertical links 
with NGO personnel just like with politicians, administrators and other power brokers 
(Mosse 2001, de Wit and Berner 2009). An autocratic style of leadership based on 
patronage reinforces the prevailing inequality of the existing social structure. In addition to 
issues of outright corruption, most projects have also produced significant inequalities 
along gender and other lines (Cornwall 2003). Bottom-up approaches to development need 
to start from the recognition that exploitation and marginalization also take place inside the 
slums and poor villages. The inclusion of structurally disadvantaged groups – be they 
women, ethnic or religious minorities, disabled people, tenants, landless workers or the 
poorest of the poor – would require NGOs and governments to reach out for them 
actively rather than listening to just a few community leaders and prominent figures. 
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Substitute participation 
The intervention chain is hierarchical and far more complex than the bipartite picture of 
‗development agencies‘ and ‗beneficiaries‘ suggests, from donors and governments via 
NGOs, community organizers, local leaders and community-based organizations down to 
‗the people‘. For the latter‘s voice to be heard at the top, it has to be transmitted across all 
the interfaces without selection, manipulation or distortion. Such deep participation is rare in 
practice, and representative mechanisms lack transparency and legitimacy. Enthusiasm for 
participation within international organisations and donors has forced governments 
worldwide to involve stakeholders from ‗civil society‘ in the preparations of major plans 
and programmes. As the grassroots organizations of the poor do not possess the required 
knowledge and skills, their place at the negotiation tables is taken by NGO professionals 
who, in theory, have explored beneficiaries‘ needs and preferences and speak on their 
behalf. However, NGOs develop organizational self-interest; they aim at their own survival 
and expansion and therefore prioritize good standing with donors and governments. As a 
result, not even community leaders may have much of a say in relevant decisions.  
THE CONTRIBUTIONS 
A showcase of ritualistic, substitute and ultimately tyrannical participation is presented by 
Rose Namara in her analysis of Uganda‘s Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) process. 
Government and donors, in particular the World Bank, were keen to prevent the 
conflictive process and disastrous outcomes of top-down structural adjustment. NGOs 
were tasked to consult people across the country through workshops, conferences, radio 
programmes and advocacy activities in order to facilitate their participation in research and 
policy negotiation dialogues. However, time pressure and a mismatch between grassroots 
inputs and the perceived needs of policy makers led to a rushed and unresponsive 
consultation process. Driven by the need to produce high-quality position papers in order 
to be taken seriously at the negotiation table, the NGOs resorted to desk studies rather 
than trying to transmit the voices of the poor. This pre-emptive obedience did not do them 
much good, however, and they remained subordinate to external donor-driven policy 
prescriptions. The strong focus on economic growth and market-led strategies, de-
emphasizing redistributive measures, was considered non-negotiable anyway. But even on 
‗soft‘ issues like pastoralism, children‘s poverty and gender, the NGOs achieved little more 
than cosmetic changes to a technocratic agenda set from above. 
Still at the macro level of national anti-poverty policymaking, Mikael Wigell‘s contribution 
on Chile after democratization in 1990 paints a much more positive picture despite an 
absence of participation in decision making. The transition to democracy had ushered in a 
new emphasis on pluralism and state–NGO cooperation in social policymaking: ‗Clearly, 
the new anti-poverty approach has contributed to social modernization through increased 
state-civil society collaboration‘. However, social policies have remained highly centralized 
and technocratic, restricting NGOs and popular organizations to an implementing role and 
leaving little space for collective political action of the lower classes. On the positive side, 
strong mechanisms of accountability have effectively curtailed the diversion of targeted 
funds by populist politicians for the purpose of building clientelist networks. The social 
programmes were largely successful in redistributing resources for productive development 
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to the poorest strata, but arguably served as an instrument of social control rather than 
empowerment. 
Georgina Gomez‘s account of neighbouring Argentina demonstrates that the unintended 
consequences of a non-participatory approach at macro level are the rule rather than the 
exception. Reacting to the resounding failure of protectionist economic policies before 
1990 and encouraged by a convincing election victory, the government imposed neoliberal 
structural reforms in a top-down manner. Economic agents were expected to adapt rapidly 
to the new institutions and rules, innovate production, invest in state-of-the-art technology 
and become internationally competitive. What happened in reality was the emergence of an 
‗institutional gap‘: Having not been properly informed or even involved in the reform 
process, entrepreneurs adopted a wait-and-see attitude, leading to a sharp countrywide 
recession. The argument is not that more participation would have led to more appropriate 
reforms, but that it would have instigated a reflective learning process and thereby 
supported the reorganization of economic life. 
Another case of non-participation, now at the meso and micro levels, is presented by Jamie 
Furniss. In an effort to ‗privatize‘ solid waste management in Egypt (which has never been 
public), the government contracted foreign companies and excluded the Zabbaleen, the 
traditional informal garbage collectors. Ironically, the herald of neoliberalism, the World 
Bank, pushed for the involvement of and support for this indigenous system of service 
provision – after all, it was part of the private sector. The government, however, displayed 
a rare degree of steadfastness vis-à-vis the donor and insisted that ragged paupers with 
donkey carts should disappear from the modern urban landscape. What disappeared, 
however, were not the Zabbaleen but several of the foreign companies who failed to make 
the expected profits. The former managed to reclaim their role in the system by the use of 
Scott‘s ‗weapons of the weak‘, acts of everyday resistance, certainly benefitting from the 
Egyptian state‘s weak implementation power. They were disinvited to participate, but 
nevertheless they did. 
Manohara Khadka takes the reader to the assumed realm of genuine grassroots participation, 
the micro level of local communities. According to her, the forest user groups established 
by Nepal's community forestry (CF) programme have assumed a strong role in forest 
management, allocation and distribution of resources, control of forest encroachment and 
illegal felling, and prevention of forest fires. Significant funds for forest and community 
development were provided, leading to considerable benefits for the communities 
involved. However, the programme ignored local inequalities and power relations and was 
thus prone to elite capture. User groups were firmly controlled by high-caste, well-educated 
and relatively wealthy men and restricted women, dalits and the poor to a marginal position. 
The groups found willing allies in the forest bureaucracy, which was dominated by the 
same elites and adhering to a technocratic perspective on forest management. Exclusive 
and partly ritualistic participation and inequitable distribution of benefits were exacerbated 
by donors‘ environmental rather than social priorities. 
A very important observation is added by Mariana Cifuentes: It is not so much the design of 
an intervention that determines the quality of participation, but the way the stakeholders 
position themselves and interact during implementation. The programme she analyses, 
participatory service delivery in Nairobi‘s informal settlements, suffered initially from the 
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familiar flaws of African public service reforms; non-transparent procedures, bureaucratic 
inertia, collusion and rent-seeking by politicians and officials. With the support of the 
action researchers around Cifuentes, the residents of one ward mobilized collective agency 
and demand-making power. Policy makers were forced, first, to inform them properly 
about their rights and entitlements, and second, to respond by fulfilling at least some of 
their priority needs. The case provides evidence that demand-driven (‗claimed‘) 
participation has a much higher emancipatory potential than supply-driven (‗invited‘) 
participation.  
The last two papers bring the reader back to Latin America and support a cautiously 
optimistic outlook. Larissa Barbosa da Costa observes widespread enthusiasm about 
participation in a water management project in Rio de Janeiro state, and reports that it ‗has 
generated empowerment and change to a great extent‘. Some groups stayed out of the 
process, but exclusion appears to have been largely voluntary; the supremacy of techno-
scientific knowledge and a preference for doing over learning are also critically noted. Da 
Costa‘s main disappointment, however, is with the bread-and-butter demands of 
participants who are blind to the need for social transformation towards equality and 
justice.  
Eventually, Eloisa Berman Arevalo introduces the case of a district in the Colombian Amazon 
where territorial protection, natural resource management and consolidation of indigenous 
self-government were integrated in a dynamic partnership process. The actors in the 
intervention chain, from government and aid agencies via a strong indigenous umbrella 
organization down to the local communities, have established reliable communication links 
and fairly democratic mechanisms of decision making. Certain ambivalences and 
contradictions remained, such as the donors‘ priority on environmental protection that was 
considered alien at the grassroots level. However, partnership requires compromises, and 
the Matavén process can hardly be considered substitute participation. Not only were 
several concrete objectives accomplished, but the creation and legal recognition of a 
indigenous governing body has to be recognized as a major achievement of effective 
empowerment. 
The message of this book is that meaningful participation is an eminently political process, 
struggled for from below much rather than granted from above. It has to be much more 
than a ritual to legitimize top-down policies or a technical instrument in the development 
professionals‘ toolbox. It has to deal with local power structures instead of reinforcing 
them, and constantly make a strong effort to reach out to the marginalized. It has to be 
based on mobilization and collective action at the grassroots level, sensibly supported by 
committed NGOs, academics, the media and other elements of civil society. It cannot 
compete with or even replace democratic and accountable government institutions but has 
to make demands of  them, engage with them and complement them. Participation is costly 
in terms of time and effort, particularly for the poor; participants thus rightfully expect 
considerable and, at least initially, tangible benefits. The experiences in these small and 
simple struggles must be positive if they can possibly be mobilized for a transformation 
towards a more equitable and just society. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Mouthpieces of the Poor or Dancing  
to the Tunes of Government and Donors?  
NGOs in Uganda‟s Poverty Reduction 
Programmes 
Rose B. Namara 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Participation is regarded as a central condition in the current poverty reduction policy 
processes and the new aid architecture. A major benefit associated with participation is its 
alleged ability to challenge the top- down model of development. The objective of 
participation is to transform existing development practices radically, including social 
relations, institutional practices and capacity gaps which cause social exclusion (Hickey and 
Mohan 2004: 13). Hence many actors have claimed or have been invited to be part of the 
poverty reduction policy-making process.  
The participation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in poverty reduction 
programmes is regarded as particularly important because it could lead to the three related 
results of broad-based ownership, pro-poor effectiveness and accountability (Molenaers 
and Renard 2006). It is expected that the participation of NGOs would make policies more 
effective by raising poor people‘s concerns on the policy agenda. The NGOs are assumed 
not to meet any resistance because they are regarded as representatives of the poor. The 
participation of NGOs is also expected to increase the accountability of governments 
towards the population. The insistence on accountability is a result of the loss of 
confidence in the role of governments, which are often accused of being inefficient and 
protecting the interests of the non-poor. Therefore NGOs are expected to put pressure on 
governments to deliver on their promises through monitoring Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS) and budgeting processes. The other reason is that NGOs are expected to enhance 
the participation of poor and marginalised people and civil society organisations in 
decision-making processes and ensure their voices are incorporated in poverty reduction 
policies (Gaventa 2005, Eberlei, 2007). The participation of the poor and their 
organisations increases the possibility of enabling the poor to control the poverty reduction 
agenda. NGOs are supposed to achieve this by engaging in mobilising people to participate 
in decision making and engaging in research to document poor people concerns so as to be 
able to push for pro-poor policies through advocacy and negotiation.  
This paper focuses on this last idea and analyses how NGOs have enabled people to 
participate in policy-making processes. How do NGOs engage the people in PRS 
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processes? What explains the way in which NGOs engage the people? This paper attempts 
to answer these questions using data from Uganda. Empirical evidence is drawn from 
interviews with staff members of NGOs, donors and government officials. The paper 
focuses on analysing the roles of NGOs in mobilising the people and enabling them to 
participate in research and policy negotiation dialogues. The paper argues that NGOs are 
used in the political coordination system whereby even those NGOs that claim to work for 
the interests of the poor inevitably remain loyal to the techno-managerial control system. 
The technical criteria of the PRS become handy to converge actors and reduce risks of 
resistance but do not necessarily lead to the goal of enhancing people‘s participation. NGO 
participation has been mainly a low-path of participation. The principal concern of policy 
makers (donors and governments) is to retain social control. Therefore participation is 
pursued not because it benefits the people but because it provides potential for control. 
THE REALITIES OF NGO ENGAGEMENT WITH PEOPLE  
This section examines NGOs‘ roles in enabling people and their leaders to participate in 
the Ugandan PRS processes since 1997. It shows that NGOs tried to consult the public 
through workshops, conferences, radio programmes and advocacy activities, but people 
remained largely ill mobilised and in the background of the change process.  
Organising local populations to engage in policy processes 
Although NGOs are assumed to be in the business of mobilising communities, the 
processes of formulation of the 1997 Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) reflect 
limited evidence on how NGOs mobilised their constituents to participate. The 
government arranged the community consultations. The President invited NGOs and 
donors to tour and listen to communities in the poverty-stricken areas of Luwero (1) . The 
exercise was the first consultative process in Uganda bringing together several stakeholders 
to deliberate on poverty issues. As such the government consolidated its authority in 
mobilising people, soliciting further support in the Luwero area and financial support from 
NGOs and donors. Ssewakiryanga (2005: 34) referred to it as a unique experience within 
the domestic political project around poverty reduction because poverty received a 
significant political push. However, significantly the first PEAP addressed people‘s 
concerns because it addressed primary health care and education, rural feeder roads, safe 
water and modernisation of agriculture; and brought together key stakeholders at one table. 
Although NGOs were practically not prepared to deliberate on policy issues, the PEAP 
1997 opened up spaces for a number of them who had been struggling to gain acceptance 
at the policymaking table. Some NGOs were included in the PEAP drafting committee and 
different working groups to collect inputs from their constituents, but there were no 
systematic consultations with the public. The PEAP formulation also gave more 
recognition to the advocacy role of NGOs as key in influencing policy. However, at the 
same time the process gave an opportunity to multiple interests to gain entry into public 
policy making. The donors, especially the World Bank, used the opportunity to convince 
the government of the supremacy of market-led economies in poverty reduction and the 
need to have multi-party democracy. The government was ordered to open up more space 
for NGOs in policy formulation. Eventually during the formulation of the Poverty 
 PARTICIPATION FOR WHAT: SOCIAL CHANGE OR SOCIAL CONTROL? 
10 Rose B. Namara 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in 2000, the World Bank took control of the PEAP by 
adopting it as a global debt relief instrument. In this case it can be said that the PEAP was 
used to organise and allocate influence between different actors; henceforth, the 
government lost the opportunity to control the local development planning function.  
In terms of consultations, the 1999/2000 revision exercise lasted less than two months 
with minimal consultation of the communities. There was limited time because the PEAP 
was to be used as a PRSP intended for debt relief. The Uganda Debt Network (UDN), one 
of the advocacy NGOs that had successfully collaborated with the government in the 
International Jubilee 2000 campaigns for debt reduction, led the Civil Society Task Force 
comprised of ten organisations (3). The media information and dissemination conferences, 
talk shows, information materials and public debates on PEAP/PRSP were organised and 
644 people were consulted. NGOs launched eight regional consultative meetings to discuss 
the draft of the revised PEAP with communities between March and April 2000 (CSO 
Task Force 2000: VI). The consultation workshops were hasty, with a risk of excluding 
some categories of people. Gariyo (2002: 8) noted that the process was at best consultative. 
With limited time and rushed consultations, the chances that the poor would have 
significant influence on policy development were minimal. However, the revision exercise 
was important for NGOs to use it as opportunity to show donors that they were reliable 
partners. 
In addition, the basis for the consultation was the already conceived draft and it was more 
of a sensitisation exercise rather than a deliberate effort to get commitments from the 
people on local poverty issues. There was no clear arrangement to deepen local 
consultation. It seems the aim of the regional workshops to inform the population of what 
PRSPs are and creating consensus about the PRSP approach. Indeed the participation of 
the people was aimed at reducing resistance against the unpopular macro-economic 
market-based policies of liberalisation and privatisation. It is not surprising that during the 
2000 PRSP formulation process, the macro-economic policies were a no-go area for 
NGOs because they were regarded as not negotiable (Nanna et al. 2002). A number of 
scholars (Cornwall and Brock 2005; Grant and Marcus, 2008: 102; Hickey and Mohan 
2008: 246) have criticised PRSPs for depoliticising poverty, participation and 
empowerment and for being insulated in technocratic bubbles. Although NGOs would not 
mobilise people to challenge the dominant international poverty agenda, their presence at 
policy dialogue tables served the purpose of demonstrating participation to donors and the 
media.  
The approval of the PEAP in May 2000 led Uganda to access debt relief under the Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) II scheme where it obtained US$ 46 million in debt relief 
for the financial year 2001-2. The use of the PEAP as an instrument of debt relief diverted 
it from its original purpose because it became a fundraising tool adhering to the rules of the 
donors rather than a political decision-making tool. The debt relief brought increased 
funding for social sectors such as education and health in Uganda. However, it also 
brought about new conditionalities and controls. The donors seized the opportunity to put 
more influence on both the content and process of poverty reduction policy formulation. 
In terms of content, the PEAP 2000 emphasised the creation of an enabling environment 
for sustainable economic growth and transformation, promotion of good governance and 
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security, increasing the ability of the poor to raise their incomes and improving their quality 
of life. The focus of the poverty reduction agenda shifted towards legitimising development 
funding rather than redistribution of growth which was the original aim of the poverty 
action plan in 1997.  
The NGO Forum (2004) maintained that there was a more comprehensive consultation 
process in the later round of PEAP in 2003 and 2004. However, it appears that the 
production of quality inputs, rather than systematically deepening connections with the 
grassroots, became a preoccupation of actors including NGOs. The PRS review used a 
five-strand approach including processes led by the central government, the local 
government, the private sector, civil society consultations, and a team focusing on cross-
cutting issues such as gender. The 2003 revision exercise also saw donors being represented 
at every level of policy design including the final decision-making body. The government 
concentrated on coordinating donor activities through the special poverty reduction 
secretariats in the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development. The donors 
financed thousands of policy and governance consultants to produce policy blueprints, 
poverty reduction strategies and manuals on good governance (Shivij 2007), thereby 
eroding popular civic development processes (Boyte 2008: 123). The people‘s political 
representatives were not involved in the earlier processes of soliciting contributions to the 
policy. Members of Parliament were only involved at the stage of approving the policy 
document. On the other hand, NGOs that were supposed to support the people‘s 
participation merely increased the numbers of those participating in consultation 
committees. Led by the NGO Forum, NGOs were organised in eleven subcommittees to 
contribute to different government sector (ministry) discussions. There were also some 
efforts to maintain contact with the public, with the numbers of those participating almost 
quadrupling, from 644 in 2000 to 2449 in 2003 (NGO Forum 2004: ii). Given that the time 
for the revision was a bit longer and the number (2) of NGOs was higher than in the 
previous revision exercises, it is likely that many more people participated. However, 
NGOs leaned towards utilising previous studies to identify the people‘s voices and 
priorities. The PEAP/PRSP revision increasingly became more of a technical project 
compared to the previous consultation exercises where NGOs mainly engaged in 
awareness seminars and workshops.  
NGOs changed their strategy to concentrate on exploratory desk research to produce a 
high quality input into the PRSP rather than deepening the participation of the poor, their 
organisations and their leaders. The change of strategy to concentrate on literature-analysis 
was because the input expected from them by other policy makers was technical. As 
explained by one NGO official:  
We organised few consultative meetings but concentrated on analysing available studies. 
We know that seminars would only lead to a list of wishes without analysis. We studied the 
Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment reports (UPPAP) and the SAPRI studies. We 
commissioned a few studies on children, pastoralists, disabilities and held different focus 
group discussions with the media, in northern Uganda (Dan, Executive Director - NGO4). 
The change in strategy was not accidental, but was made in response to donor insistence on 
quality policy proposals with measurable indicators, and also to recurrent criticism of 
NGOs‘ failure to make research-based alternative proposals (Court et al. 2006). The NGOs 
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produced a 131-page document reflecting proposals on different kinds of poverty 
reduction, including issues of redistribution, social protection and empowerment strategies 
of the poor. The NGOs proposed the delivery of quality and equitable social services to be 
the overriding goal of the PRSP. They also proposed that the PRSP should adopt a rights-
based approach to create social transformation and improved quality of life for all 
Ugandans (NGO Forum 2004). Despite the pro-poor proposals, the mobilisation of the 
people was deficient and was only reduced to NGO technical input. Thus the technical 
participation that would guarantee NGO legitimacy and further their recognition as 
efficient players continuously overrode the expected political participation. 
As highlighted earlier, since 1997 the PRS process has sidelined the representatives of local 
political institutions, such as parliaments and local government leadership. Including the 
local leaders in policy discussion seminars would have provided an opportunity to capture 
some of the poor people‘s concerns. In Uganda the democratically elected leaders were not 
mobilised by NGOs to participate. For instance, Gariyo (2002: 24) notes that ‗to make the 
workshops truly civil society… invitations excluded local governments and local political 
leaders‘. (Piron and Norton 2004: 27) concluded that the Ugandan PEAP had limited 
impact on parliamentary developments, as Members of Parliament rarely debated the 
PEAP/PRSPs although they play an important role in discussing the budget processes. 
Excluding local politicians in discussion on local poverty reduction is a missed opportunity 
to gain commitment to policies. Establishing linkages with parliament and local leadership 
increases the possibilities of owning and defending policy suggestions that address the 
needs of the poorest or pay adequate attention to local priorities. NGOs cannot assume 
responsibility for making politically binding decisions but the presence of NGOs at the 
policy-making table seemed to be a palatable compromise to other policy makers which 
unfortunately left  ‗people‘ out of the equation. 
NGOs, policy research and advocacy  
While some scholars (Vincent 2004, Dijkzeul 2006) have criticised NGOs as not truly 
representative of the people, donors insist that NGOs can contribute towards making pro-
poor policies. The PRSPs give prominence to the research and advocacy roles of NGOs. 
NGOs were able to walk freely in the corridors of government. However, the major 
assumption was that NGO participation is not problematic because governments will 
unconditionally accept their role as representatives of the poor, donors will abandon 
control and align with country priorities and NGOs will automatically push for pro-poor 
issues. This section does not engage in discussions on whether NGOs truly represented 
people at the negotiating tables, but it explains how they engaged in policy researches and 
advocacy activities.  
In terms of research, NGOs tried to strike a balance between upholding local poverty 
knowledge and making technical suggestions that would be acceptable by donors and 
government actors. Although NGOs spearheaded the Uganda Participatory Poverty 
Assessments (UPPAP) in which they captured the voices of the poor, the areas of 
emphasis for PEAP 2000 reflected the dominance of the international poverty strategies 
rather than the local poverty agenda. Even the assessments were top-down crafted research 
projects to justify participation. They were largely an information-gathering exercise rather 
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than a decision-making or negotiation process on poverty. The focus of NGOs was on 
gathering as much information as could be appreciated by fellow policy makers. Similarly, 
in 2003-2004 NGOs produced a 131-page document through research, which Larok (2006) 
insisted was very similar to the 2004 PEAP document.  Generally the Ugandan 2004 PRS 
document is said to be a highly technical, comprehensive, general and somewhat complex 
plan to reflect the local contextual knowledge of poverty (Canagarajah and Diesen 2006).  
Through their research, NGOs attempted to appreciate the multifaceted nature of poverty 
as reflected in the consolidated input to the PEAP revision exercise in 2003, where they 
proposed redistribution, social protection, economic growth, security and other pro-poor 
strategies. NGOs specialising in areas like gender, children, literacy and conflict resolution 
management were often invited by other policymakers to make inputs and thus often met 
limited resistance. However, NGO specialisations are still weak and the involvement of 
people in deep analysis and understanding of the poverty situation still minimal. As one of 
the government officials noted:  
In one case on the security and conflict resolutions pillar, NGOs interviewed about 500 
people, which is a very huge sample. The report was saying the situation is bad, things 
are so hard, but no solution. So I gave the document to Civil Society Organisations 
representatives to synthesise and come up with major messages but they also failed… I 
said, you are going to blame me that I never put anything in the PEAP from your 
research but what can I put? In such cases if we [government] think it is a useful issue, 
we take it further and analyse it. For instance, we picked the issues of pastoralism, 
children‘s poverty and gender. We produced papers and discussed them for 
incorporation in the PEAP. (Joy, Ministry Staff NC13). 
The PRS processes seemed to be engulfed in the practice of gathering information that 
may not necessarily change the poverty situation because powerlessness remained 
downplayed as a major cause of poverty (Eberlei 2007). Therefore even with input from 
NGOs, the 2004 PEAP/PRSP maintained a strong focus on economic growth and market-
led strategies. No matter whether people participate in poverty research and highlighting 
poverty issues through NGOs, the government could only pick up some aspects from such 
studies.   
At the policy discussion tables, umbrella networks of urban-based NGOs were more 
present in policy dialogues than other organisations. This is because such organisations had 
experience and connections with policy circles (McGee et al. 2002). Also donor 
organisations preferred networks because they were considered stronger and better able to 
withstand government pressure. In Uganda there are all kinds of NGO networks, the 
major ones being thematic/sectoral networks for women, children and education; 
specialised associations, coalitions or platforms for anticorruption, governance, monitoring 
and capacity-building; and national networks or umbrella bodies such as DENIVA and 
NGO Forum. There are also mirror images of national networks at district level such as 
the Soroti Development Association Network and Kumi Network of Development 
Organisations. DENIVA (2006: 24) suggests that about 72 per cent of NGOs belong to 
umbrella organisations at district or national levels. During the 2003 PRSP formulation a 
number of NGO networks tried to consult the people. Some NGOs such as the Uganda 
Joint Christian Council organised consultations in the districts of Lira, Gulu, Luwero, 
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Nakasongola, Masaka, Rakai, Tororo, Busia Mbale and Kapchorwa, and group discussions 
were held in conflict-affected districts of Gulu, Pader, Lira and Soroti by district NGO fora 
(NGO Forum 2004). In 2003, one of the district-based NGO networks in northern 
Uganda is said to have influenced the 2004 PEAP outlook on conflict resolution because it 
brought in research-based information. However, the majority of the national NGO 
networks worked independently of their members. As an NGO official explained:  
The assumption is that our member organisations participate. I cannot say that such 
numbers participated in a certain district… I can only speak for the secretariat because 
we did not have the resources and a clear mechanism to involve them. (Kristin, 
Executive Director-NGO3.2).  
The limited involvement of members of the networks at the policy discussion tables was 
attributed to the absence of streamlined communication mechanisms and resources. 
However, in Uganda there is a mismatch between umbrella organisations and the principles 
of networking such as fostering synergies and collectivism (NGO Forum 2007). The 
Ugandan umbrella NGOs have been criticised for ‗sleeping in the same bed‘ with 
government and failing to represent alternative development strategies (Piron and Evas 
2004).  Therefore closing the gap between NGOs and popular organisations would 
increase opportunities for mobilising local communities but NGOs appeared to engage in 
advocacy and negotiations before mobilising the people.  
Discussions with NGOs show that they have had some incremental results through policy 
dialogue, especially on issues of interest both to the government and to donors such as 
governance and security.  NGO networks claim that the government appreciates their 
contribution. For instance, it was raised that in one seminar, the Ministry of Finance 
Planning and Economic Development likened NGOs to a policeman who traverses a high 
crime area regularly without arresting anyone, but crime is nevertheless reduced. The 
continuous participation of NGOs provides independent feedback on neglected issues 
such as slum dwellers and pastoralism (Larok 2006: 1). NGOs also managed to sustain 
certain policy issues on the political agenda, although many NGO expectations still 
remained unmet. An NGO official explained: 
Without NGO participation, you would not imagine pro-poor issues like pastoralism, 
concrete ideas for conflict resolution and more recently, the chronic poverty/social 
protection agenda getting the attention that they do now. (Dan, Executive Director-
NGO4).  
Another NGO official echoed:  
To be fair to that process, there have been some changes that took place but when you 
look at it, they are so small; I think our expectations were much higher. But if you look 
at these things mentally and if you are to compare them with before, you would find a 
positive difference (Jane, Executive Director NGO5).  
However, NGOs believed that their contribution to refocus the poverty policies on social 
dimensions was still small. Besides, the PRSPs revision exercise occurred within a harmony 
consensus-based model (Fowler, 2005) where implicitly NGOs had to accept the 
agreements made at the dialogue table. This is not to say that umbrella organisations can 
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not present divergent people‘s voices, but NGOs would prefer to stay in ‗good books‘ with 
policy makers instead of undertaking antagonistic discussions.  
There has been a general criticism that poverty is discussed in workshops from which the 
poor are absent (Shivij 2007). Even then some NGOs appeared to engage in policy 
dialogues when they are not well prepared.  As expressed by a donor official: 
I think in many cases that they [NGOs] do not bring in as much as they should. I think 
they need to have more skills for analysing the issues. They need to be more forceful, 
based on facts rather than emotions and other things. (Lawrence, Donor official - DO3).  
Related to the above, some policymakers tended to listen more to some personalities in the 
NGO world than to others.  Reportedly, some NGO officials were tongue-tied during 
sessions, waiting for the ‗darlings‘ to talk. The most highlighted examples were discussions 
on hard economics, natural science and technology, where NGOs opted to be silent in 
meetings. Although the issue of selective listening to certain NGO leaders may not be 
underestimated, poverty reduction policy discussions needed competencies including 
presentation and strategic negotiation supported by research.  Being prepared to negotiate 
with policymakers needed technical research on the side of NGOs and moving with the 
poor on those negotiation tables.  
The policy discussion tables have been an avenue on which the powerful show control and 
co-opt other actors instead of negotiating to incorporate people and their concerns.  
Although NGOs attempted to raise pro-poor issues, they remained subordinate to external 
donor-driven policy prescriptions. Donors determined NGO contributions and what is 
eventually approved as the PRSPs content. This came out in several interviews with NGO 
officials as exemplified by the quote below.  
I participated in the last review and I observed it as a told story hard to believe… the 
politics were very interesting. The NGOs of course are always on their message – we 
want results this time, poor people are suffering. The government is also there at the 
table and then the donors claim they must seek the political role of ensuring that the 
things that the people actually want in terms of services are more liberalised and services 
like agricultural extension do not get a clear path… So, I remember we had a meeting – 
the agricultural group with the government and donors. Of course, the donors are much 
more intellectual, they use big words and the rest of us are using quite simple words. We 
sat down and said communities are telling us that we need to review the extension 
services provided… But one of the donors rose up and said we cannot go back to the 
old days of government-supported subsidies. You are taking us back to the ancient days 
that will not bring development to this country. I think we are being quite combative. 
And when they heard combative, the government backed down and the NGOs kept 
saying that is wrong, this is a PRSP process, it‘s about Uganda, it‘s about the poverty 
eradication action plan… You could say it is a process of participation of course because 
NGOs said what we wanted to say, but donors would not listen. The government was 
saying these are our donors, we can‘t criticise them. The NGOs said, we don‘t care, we 
will criticise them, but you can see that was the dynamic. (Jane, Executive Director - 
NGO5).  
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NGOs had an opportunity to present their proposals, there were frank discussions between 
NGOs and stakeholders, but counteracting it was what Igoe (2005) called running against 
the ‗rock of western donors‘. Those NGOs that tried to raise poor people‘s issues 
sometimes encountered resistance from donors that pretended to know better than other 
institutions how to help the poor.  Larok (2004: 8) indicated that even with advocacy, the 
government and development partners could deliberately refuse to accept useful 
submissions from NGOs for unclear reasons. Technocracy was widespread, and policy 
makers ignored local knowledge and people‘s capacities (Boyte 2008): NGOs had to back 
down from fundamental pro-poor issues and settle for less. ‗This is what happens when 
powerful financial institutions hijack the existing new ideas‘ (Brown 2004: 249). Donors 
holding onto decision-making and approval of decisions made by other stakeholders 
contradicted the true essence of their insistence on participation in poverty policies.  
Negotiating policy changes in countries like Uganda seems to be a tricky exercise requiring 
NGO advocates to take risks on behalf of the people. NGOs in Uganda have not been 
denied a seat at the policy table outright.  However, advocacy NGOs are sometimes afraid 
to confront the government with people‘s views. For instance, some NGO networks chose 
to exclude themselves from negotiations on National Research Policy Formulation because 
they did not want the government to perceive them as questioning it. This is consistent 
with Robinson and Friedman (2005: 19) who argued that NGOs in Uganda attach 
secondary priority to true policy advocacy activities because of the fear of being 
controversial. Also NGOs express interest in advocacy not because they are deeply 
committed but because aid donors favour this approach as a response to criticism on aid 
failure (Bazaara 2003: 18; Robinson and Friedman 2005: 20).  
Discussions with NGOs showed that donors and governments held onto the PRSPs so 
dearly that they found it hard to accept divergent views which in most cases were the real 
concerns of the poor. As an NGO official observed;  
You see the problem with PRS is that somebody has built a house, and then for us, we 
come and say this window should not be here, it should be there, this room should face 
that way. The owner would be grateful of course, you will influence its looks, but it‘s not 
the same as coming up with a new structure… Demolishing PRS now will be attacking 
the real spinal cord of the NRM government… You can‘t fight PRS because you will be 
fighting a big battle. PRS is also the lifeblood of donors. Here, you can only amend a 
house but if its foundation is wrong what can you change? (Else, Executive Director-
NGO3.1) 
The PRSP was mainly an externally driven policy directed by government. NGOs and 
other actors were participating in a game with pre-determined outcomes.  
CONCLUSION 
Although there were some attempts by NGOs to consult with the poor in the Ugandan 
PRS process, these consultations were either hurriedly done, ad hoc or on already 
formulated policies, and excluded local leaders and the majority of district-based 
organisations. As much as the NGO policy proposals prepared through research reflect the 
desire for social change, there is a weak link between NGOs and the people. NGOs joined 
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policy-making discussions, engaged in technical policy making activities and lost out in 
favour of the technical consultations. The paper demonstrates that the participation of 
NGOs in these PRS processes has not led to better linkages with the people. In reality, the 
anticipated and desired deep connections with the poor and the painstaking participation 
through PRS hardly existed. The PRS process reduced the participation of people in policy 
dialogues practically to the participation of NGOs. The outcome of this participatory 
process was no public participation, or mere participation of NGOs. 
The practice of consultative participation in reality rendered the PEAP process and its 
content vulnerable to external control and compromised the expected upstream planning 
and decision-making. Donors decided the content of PRSPs, in some instances the 
processes of its formulation and directed by the Government. Thus social control occurred 
through externally predefined rules with which NGOs complied. NGOs gained an 
opportunity to sit at the policy dialogue tables but they did not move with the people. 
NGOs sacrificed people‘s participation in favour of their own, but remained structurally 
disadvantaged vis-à-vis donors and government. 
Endnotes 
1. The Luwero triangle provided ground and support to the NRA guerrillas to fight the war with 
the former Obote government. 
2. The task force included international NGOs, local NGOs, research institutions and church-based 
organisations (Gariyo 2002: 19). 
3. Leading NGOs included the NGO Forum (overall coordination), the UDN, Water Aid, Uganda 
Water and Sanitation Network, Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Organisations, 
Uganda Child Rights NGO Network, Civil Society for Peace in Northern Uganda, Uganda 
National Health Consumer Organisation, Council for Economic Empowerment of Women in 
Africa, VECO-Uganda, Coalition for Sustainable Development and Panos Eastern Africa. The 
CSO analysis team was composed of Warren Nyamugasira (NGO Forum), Frank Muhereza 
(Centre for Basic Research), Margaret Akello (SNV) and Sarah Ossiya (Panos Eastern Africa). This 
review team included Monica Naggaga (Oxfam), Jane Ocaya (Action Aid), Judy Kamanyi 
(Associates for Change), Fred Muhumuza (EPRC) and Jane Alowo (Makerere University) (NGO 
Forum 2004: ii). 
References 
Bazaara, N. (2003) ‗From subject to citizen in Uganda‘s local governments: An analysis of the nature 
of and potential for participation‘. Paper presented at a Logo-Link Workshop on ‗Enhancing 
Citizen Participation in Local Government in East Africa‘, held at Hotel Triangle Annex, Jinja, 
Uganda. 
Boyte, C.H. (2008) ‗Civic driven change and developmental democracy‘, in A. Fowler and K. Biekart 
(eds), Civic driven change: Citizen’s imagination in action. The Hague, the Netherlands: Institute of 
Social Studies. 
Brown, D. (2004) ‗Participation in poverty reduction strategies: Democracy strengthened or 
democracy undermined?‘, in S. Hickey and G. Mohan (eds), Participation from Tyranny to 
Transformation: Exploring new approaches to participation in development. London: Zed Books,  
Canagarajah, S. and A. Van Diesen (2006) ‗The poverty reduction strategy approach six years on: An 
examination of principles and practices in Uganda‘, Development Policy Review 24(6): 647-667.  
Cornwall, A. and K. Brock (2005) ‗What do buzzwords do for development policy? A critical look at 
participation, empowerment and poverty reduction‘, Third World Quarterly 26(7): 1043-1160. 
Court, M.E., D. Osborne and J. Young (2006) Policy engagement. How civil society can be more effective. 
London: Overseas Development Institute.  
 PARTICIPATION FOR WHAT: SOCIAL CHANGE OR SOCIAL CONTROL? 
18 Rose B. Namara 
CSOs Taskforce for PEAP Revision (2000) Civil society regional consultations on the Poverty Eradication 
Action Plan (PEAP): A summary and analysis of the participants’ views. April 2000. Kampala, Uganda. 
DENIVA (2006) Civil society in Uganda: At the cross road, summarised version of the CIVICUS Civil Society 
Index for Uganda. Kampala, Uganda. 
Dijkzeul, D. (2006) ‗Book Reviews‘. Undermining Development: The Absence of Power among 
Local NGOs in Africa edited by Sarah Michael Poverty Alleviation Strategies of NGOs edited 
by D. Rajasekhar NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards in World Politics edited by 
William E. DeMars Between a Rock and a Hard Place: African NGOs, Donors and the States 
edited by Jim Igoe and Tim Kelsall Autonomy or Dependence? Case Studies of North–South 
Partnerships edited by Vicky Mancuso Brehm with Emma Harris-Curtis, LucianoPadrăo and 
Martin TannerNGOs and Organizational Change: Discourse, Reporting, and Learning edited 
by Alnoor Ebrahim. Development and Change 37(5):  1137-1143.  
Eberlie, W. (2007) Accountability in poverty reduction strategies: The role of empowerment and participation in social 
development papers. Discussion Paper 104, May. 
Fowler, A. (2005) ‗Development for security? A critical review of counter-terrorism measures, 
international aid and civil society‘. Paper presented at the State and Society Seminar series, on 
24 October 2005. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. 
Gariyo, Z. (2002) Participatory Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: The PRSP process in Uganda. Discussion 
Paper 5, December 2002. Kampala: Uganda Debt Network. 
Grant, U. and R. Marcus (2008) ‗A desk study on chronic poverty and PRSPs‘. Background paper for 
the Chronic Poverty Report 2008-2009, Chronic Poverty Research Centre. 
www.chronicpoverty.org. 
Hickey, S. and G. Mohan (2008) ‗The politics of establishing pro-poor accountability: What can 
poverty reduction strategies achieve?‘, Review of Political Economy 15(2): 234-258. 
Igoe, J. (2005) Preface, in Jim Igoe and Tim Kelsall (eds), Between a rock and a hard place. African NGOs, 
donors and the state. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.  
Larok, A. (2004) ‗Is civil society effectively representing the views of the poor in policy processes? an 
analysis of the CSO input into the PEAP Revision Process 2003/04‘. Paper presented at the 
National Poverty Forum held in December 2004. Kampala, Uganda: International Conference 
Centre. 
Larok, A. (2006) Has our engagement in the PRSP process helped deepen the democratic culture-civil society experience 
from Uganda? Kampala, Uganda.  
McGee, R., J. Levene and A. Hughes (2002) Assessing participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A 
desk based synthesis of experience in Sub-Saharan Africa. IDS Research Report 52.  
Nanna, T., N.A. Makubuya and M. Nakirunda (2002) Report of a study on the civil society in Uganda for the 
Royal Norwegian Embassy in Uganda. Kampala, Uganda. 
NGO Forum (2004) In search of a new development path for Uganda: Civil society input into the 2003/4 PEAP 
Revision Process. Kampala, Uganda. 
Piron, L.H. and A. Norton (2004) Politics and the PRSP Approach: Uganda case study. London: Overseas 
Development Institute.  
Robinson, M. and S. Friedman (2005) Civil society, democratization and foreign aid in Africa. IDS Discussion 
Paper 383. London: Institute of Development Studies. 
Shivji, I. (2007) Silences in NGO discourse: The role and future of NGOs in Africa. Nairobi, Fahamu. 
Ssewakiryanga, R. (2005) ‗The politics of revising the PEAP/PRSP in Uganda‘. Paper presented at the 
International Conference on Political Dimensions of Poverty Reduction, Mulungushi 
International Conference Centre, 9–11 March 2005. Lusaka, Zambia.  
Vincent, S. (2004) ‗Participation, resistance and rroblems of the ―local‖ in Peru: Towards a new 
political contract?‘, in S. Hickey and G. Mohan (eds). Participation from Tyranny to Transformation: 
Exploring New approaches to participation in development. London: Zed Books. 
 
 
 19 
CHAPTER THREE 
Curtailing Clientelism or Restricting 
Participation? Anti-Poverty Policymaking in 
Chile 
Mikael Wigell 
 
 
INTRODUCTION¹ 
Following democratization in 1990, Chile adopted a new anti-poverty policy approach 
that actively sought to reshape state-society relations. The background to this new 
approach was the neoliberal transformation implemented by the Pinochet dictatorship 
that effectively dismantled old forms of corporatist and clientelist links between the state 
and the popular sectors. At the time of re-democratization, the labour movement had 
been disempowered and was unable to articulate strong bottom-up pressure for 
redistributive and universalistic social reform. Instead, the incoming democratic 
government envisaged a new anti-poverty strategy that put emphasis on social integration 
through participation and the promotion of local self-help efforts.  
This chapter looks at the formulation and implementation of this new anti-poverty 
strategy in Chile. It shows how, despite the participatory discourse and the new 
mechanisms for incorporating civil society actors in the administration of anti-poverty 
projects, the political outcome of the new anti-poverty approach has been a mode of 
social governance with a strong technocratic bent through which the state is able to 
control social-demand making and set the terms for popular participation in anti-poverty 
policymaking. Societal participation mainly revolves around project implementation. 
NGOs and community organizations are invited to submit project proposals and 
compete for anti-poverty funds on the highly technical terms set by the welfare 
bureaucracy. The aim with these project competitions is to develop innovative and cost-
effective programmes of social development. At the same time, by introducing 
competitive tendering as a major mechanism for allocating anti-poverty funds, civil 
society organizations are provided with strong incentives to adjust their agendas so as to 
be able to compete for these funds. In the process, they often come to downplay some 
of their earlier political functions as advocacy groups for the subaltern sectors and reduce 
their demands on the government. As such, these new ―participatory‖ structures serve to 
depoliticize the linkages between state and society, and help deflect popular mobilization 
away from encompassing political activity towards grassroots social efforts. By inviting 
NGOs and community groups to take over responsibility for welfare provision and 
incorporate them into funding relationships in which they mainly acquire the role of 
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implementers of social programmes, the state is thus able to impose greater political 
discipline upon civil society.  
The chapter is organized in two sections. The first section discusses the new anti-poverty 
strategy in Chile. It shows how the transition to democracy ushered in a new emphasis 
on pluralism and state-NGO collaboration in social policymaking. This new emphasis 
represented a shift among the political parties of the centre-left governing coalition from 
their former reliance on centralized administration and corporatism. Two sets of factors 
explain this shift towards a pluralist policy approach among the parties of the 
Concertación (i.e., the governing coalition). First, the process of ideological redefinition 
that the parties of the Concertación underwent during military rule had an important 
effect on the formulation of the anti-poverty strategy. Second, the authoritarian legacies, 
including the institutional constraints and social dislocations left behind by the military 
regime, shaped the anti-poverty strategy of the Concertación in important ways. The 
implications of these factors were the preclusion of radical redistributive reform and, 
instead, a strong emphasis on poverty alleviation and social integration through 
participation. Hence, while the new anti-poverty policy approach did not constitute a 
fundamental reversal of the military regime‘s principles of privatization, decentralization 
and targeting, it did incorporate a strong emphasis on social participation and state-NGO 
cooperation. 
The second section looks at the implementation of the new anti-poverty approach. It 
shows how the new Ministry of Planning and Coordination (MIDEPLAN), which was 
inaugurated to assume a leading role in implementing and coordinating the anti-poverty 
strategy, failed to assume the role of a powerful social authority capable of implementing 
an integrated and coordinated approach to poverty alleviation. MIDEPLAN was not 
given sufficient backing by President Aylwin to assume a coordinating role, largely 
because of the fear among Aylwin‘s advisors and the finance minister, Alejandro Foxley, 
that it would become a new target for demand-making and rent-seeking that could come 
to jeopardize macroeconomic stability. Instead, the president opted to protect the 
authority of the Ministry of Finance, while MIDEPLAN was left to fight poverty chiefly 
by overseeing a set of targeted social investment funds.  
Nevertheless, these social programmes were important means in the attempt to channel 
resources for productive development projects to the poorest strata. The chapter looks 
particularly at the FOSIS programme. FOSIS is an illustrative example of the targeting 
approach introduced by the Aylwin administration that sought to replace the paternalistic 
welfare measures of the military regime in order to make way for a more participatory 
and demand-driven approach. The analysis shows how the operation of FOSIS has 
remained in the hands of the techno-bureaucracy within MIDEPLAN. While these social 
technocrats have managed to shield FOSIS from political interference and clientelism, 
the implication has been strong technocratic control that gives little room for articulating 
bottom-up pressure on the decision-making process. Thus, rather than providing a 
vehicle for popular empowerment, FOSIS chiefly functions as a cost-effective 
mechanism for implementing targeted funds and as a means for social control.  
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The explanation for this outcome is to be found in Chile‘s political institutions, as they 
were instituted with the transition to democracy. First of all, the strong control exercised 
by the Office of the Comptroller has prevented politicians from capturing anti-poverty 
funds. Secondly, the centralist structure of the Chilean political regime gives technocrats 
within the central state welfare bureaucracy strong control over the policymaking 
process. As such, the chapter shows how the particular institutional configuration in 
Chile paves the way for technocratic control of the process of anti-poverty policymaking.  
The research for this chapter was conducted in Chile during 2006. The bulk of the data 
comes from 20 in-depth interviews with government officials, policy consultants and 
NGOs in Chile. The interviews served several purposes. First of all, they provided an 
understanding of the goals and motives of key policymakers. Secondly, they helped 
situate the strategic interactions of policymakers and participatory organizations in the 
context of structural, ideological and institutional constraints. Finally, by providing 
tentative evidence for an assessment of the political outcome of the new anti-poverty 
approach, the interviews helped detect the causal mechanisms that connected initial 
reform impulses with the particular mode of social governance that resulted from the 
process of implementation. 
A NEW ANTI-POVERTY APPROACH: REFORM IMPULSES 
Transition to democracy 
With the return to democracy in 1990, anti-poverty policy took on a new look in Chile. 
Shortly after taking office, the government of Patricio Aylwin created the Ministry of 
Planning and Cooperation (MIDEPLAN), entrusted with designing policies aimed at 
overcoming poverty and coordinating social programmes geared towards vulnerable 
groups in society (Law 18.989). Central to the new anti-poverty policy strategy was the 
emphasis on social integration.² The new government stance put emphasis on mitigating 
the exclusion of the poor and vulnerable through social participation and the promotion 
of local self-help efforts.  
This represented a significant shift from the military government‘s approach of giving 
individual aid for basic needs. Progressive experts argued that providing social welfare to 
individual applicants, as the military government did, had contributed to stigmatizing the 
poor. Instead, the focus should be on promoting social investment – social and human 
capital – that would strengthen opportunities for social integration. The new anti-poverty 
approach sought to provide the poor with a voice and means to participate in solving 
their own problems. It was argued that the poor do not represent a homogeneous group 
but face a variety of distinct situations and that the state needs to ―respond with more 
flexible, decentralized, and participatory programs‖ (Raczynski 2000: 132). The state 
would only set priorities and define programmes that would then be implemented 
through decentralized bodies, municipalities, private entities and, particularly, NGOs and 
community organizations. Transferring programme implementation to intermediary 
institutions such as NGOs was seen as essential for incorporating the participation of the 
poor and helping build new pluralist links to the popular sectors.  
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The foundation for the new anti-poverty strategy had been laid during the deliberations 
over the Concertación‘s programme for the 1989 elections.³ Following the successful 
plebiscite in 1988 that set the stage for the transition to democracy, the Concertación had 
gathered into a number of ―policy commissions‖ that started elaborating on an electoral 
platform. Progressive elites, who after the military coup had taken refuge in international 
agencies such as the Inter-American Development Bank and various UN organizations 
as well as a variety of NGOs and research institutes, served as the base for these working 
groups. During the process a broad consensus emerged on the new anti-poverty 
strategy.4 Technical training and professional experience within the auspices of these 
NGOs and international agencies had helped produce an ideological conversion to the 
new anti-poverty approach. Indeed, many of these experts were recruited by 
MIDEPLAN, which immediately in the aftermath of the transition to democracy started 
to implement the new anti-poverty policy.    
Authoritarian legacies, ideological conversion 
The emphasis on pluralism and state-NGO collaboration represented a significant shift 
among the parties of the Concertación from their former reliance on centralized 
administration and corporatism. Various factors account for this conversion. On a 
general level, an important factor was the ideological redefinition among progressive 
forces.  The collapse of the Allende experiment (1970–1973) and the trauma of military 
repression had fostered a process of self-critical reassessment and political learning that 
led to the abandoning of utopian projects and statist conceptions of socioeconomic 
development.5 ―Parties from across the political spectrum expressed a commitment to 
addressing the needs of the poor, while affirming the importance of pluralism, political 
pragmatism, and autonomous social organizations‖ (Oxhorn 1995: 199). At the end of 
military rule there was a general recognition among the parties of the Concertación of the 
need to continue with the decentralizing and targeting approach while reinforcing social 
participation and pluralism.   
Reinforcing this conversion to a pluralist anti-poverty policy approach was the 
professional experience of intellectuals and activists during the military era (1973–1989). 
As political party activity was banned and the activities of unions and community 
organizations were controlled or repressed by the military government, many 
progressives took refuge in research institutes and NGOs. For socialists and Christian-
Democrats, as well as academics and other professionals, the NGO universe provided a 
space for independent activity and a way to ameliorate the effects of neoliberal policies. 
―Provided the NGOs did not overtly engage in politics, the neoliberal model that 
underlay government policies sanctified their activities as part of the principle of 
subsidiarity and the movement toward privatization‖ (Loveman 1995: 133). By the mid 
1980s a rich fabric of private research centres and NGOs had emerged to support 
grassroots efforts to cope with daily subsistence and for initiating civic programmes in 
education, health care, housing and microproduction. These experiences provided 
progressives, who had previously looked to the state as the most appropriate agent for 
social action, with a learning process through which diversity, private action, and local 
initiative in social development came to be appreciated.6  
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Additional impetus for the new anti-poverty approach was provided by aid donors, 
development specialists, and international financial institutions who recommended 
harnessing the creative potential of local and private initiative in anti-poverty projects. 
During the 1980s international agencies such as the Inter-American Development Bank, 
the World Bank, and other UN or regional agencies had harboured Chilean professionals 
and political refugees. These organizations fostered a technocratic creed and helped to 
train experienced researchers and staff familiar with the pluralist policy paradigm 
(Loveman 1995). By the end of military rule, a consensus had emerged among 
economists, social policy experts and the political class on the need to incorporate civil 
society organizations, particularly NGOs, in anti-poverty programmes. In fact, fostering 
a consensus around the new anti-poverty approach proved surprisingly easy during the 
process of elaborating the Concertación‘s programme. Across the policy commissions 
there was broad agreement that NGOs should be incorporated into policy 
implementation. This is clearly reflected in the Concertación‘s programme, which 
harbours an enhanced role for private and local initiative in anti-poverty policy as well as 
collaboration between public-sector entities, private development corporations and 
NGOs (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia 1989).  
However, the new approach adopted by the Concertación was not merely a voluntaristic 
reflection of political learning and ideological re-identification, but also ―a rational 
adaptation to political opportunities and constraints as they were structured by an 
evolving external environment‖ (Roberts 1998: 44). The institutional constraints and 
social dislocations left behind by the military regime shaped the Concertación‘s strategy 
in important ways. Political repression and the major structural changes associated with 
the neoliberal model implemented by the military government had transformed the social 
landscape and dismantled old relationships between state and society based on 
clientelism and corporatism.7 The labour movement which historically had formed the 
backbone of popular organizing strategies especially of the Left had been severely 
weakened. In order to cultivate support it was no longer feasible to build on corporatist 
networks as in the period before 1973. At the same time, however, grassroots social 
organizations engaged in subsistence efforts had proliferated as a reaction against the 
impoverishement of the popular sectors and the retrenchment of the welfare state. The 
locus of political activity had shifted to the base level. A myriad of autonomous social 
organizations emerged in response to the repression of political parties and the labour 
movement as the urban poor attempted to recreate a public space for articulating their 
interests and identity (Oxhorn 1995; Roberts 1998).  
For the Concertación, this civil society activity presented an opportunity to reconnect 
with the popular sectors. Parts of the Left, in particular, viewed grassroots social 
organizations such as neighbourhood organizations, Christian based communities and 
women‘s groups as an opportunity to relaunch a popular project and make inroads to a 
new potential social constituency ―at a time when the political weight of organized labor 
had been diminshed as a combination of political repression, economic crisis, and 
neoliberal reforms‖ (Roberts 1998: 24). For pragmatists. having accepted the economic 
model and the irreversibility of the privatizations, the new anti-poverty policy presented 
an opportunity to strengthen social governance. Anti-poverty programmes and social 
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investment funds administered through collaborative networks between state and society 
provided a means to integrate social organizations and cultivate political support. Also 
economists, who were concerned with fiscal discipline, heralded collective self-help 
efforts as an alternative to direct state action (Boeninger 1997). They recognized that 
these grassroots groups had played a vital role in alleviating poverty during military rule. 
Sustaining these civic networks presented an opportunity to relieve the state from some 
of the burden of social action.  
Moreover, the institutional impediments bequeathed by Chile‘s negotiated transition to 
democracy constrained the Concertación‘s policy options. As several scholars have 
pointed out, the Chilean military was exceptionally successful in controlling the regime 
transition and imposing institutional constraints on the incoming civilian government 
(Linz and Stepan 1996; Munck and Leff 1997). The negotiated accord between the 
military regime and the democratic opposition left in place a set of constitutional 
―protections‖ designed to limit majority rule and protect conservative power. In 
particular, it provided for the designation of nine senators from conservative institutions. 
As a direct result, the Concertación government was deprived of a working majority in 
the Senate after re-democratization, despite winning a solid majority of the popular vote. 
This gave conservatives strong veto power over legislation. To pass any legislation the 
government thus needed to gain the support of some segment of the conservative 
opposition, which remained hostile to redistributive reform. In addition, a binominal 
electoral system had been designed to favour the Right disproportionately. Its impact for 
the post-transition process was that it ―ingeniously overrepresented the political Right in 
congress while excluding the Communist Party and other leftist forces outside the 
Concertación‖ (Roberts 1998: 143). As such, the electoral system helped to marginalize 
radical demands and to disarticulate concerted bottom-up pressure for redistributive 
reform.  
The departing military government also passed a series of laws that were meant to tie the 
hands of the incoming government and prevent it from enacting redistributive social 
reform. Among other things, the new democratic government was prohibited from 
replacing most of the bureaucracy that was staffed by Pinochet appointees. In addition, a 
number of decree-laws were speedily approved to privatize industries and convert the 
Central Bank and the national copper company into virtually autonomous units free from 
governmental control. Coupled with other fiscal decisions Pinochet had made, it left the 
incoming government with few resources for expansionary social policy. This provided 
additional clout to arguments advocating the outsourcing of programme implementation 
to social organizations. 
Finally, the transition to democracy retained a strong ―tutelary‖ role for the military 
which was guaranteed formal representation in the Senate, control of the National Police, 
and a majority in the powerful National Security Council. These tutelary powers 
guaranteed the military a strong political role as ―guardians‖ of the institutional order. In 
this context, it became imperative for the democratic government to avoid stimulating 
social demands and forms of popular mobilization that could endanger the Right‘s tacit 
acceptance of democratization.  
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Crucially, the new pluralist policy approach received backing from leading figures in the 
Aylwin government, who feared that poverty and inequality would prompt a wave of 
popular demands for immediate social benefits that would endanger economic and 
political stability. Especially within the Christian Democratic Party there was 
preoccupation with the potential radicalization of the popular sectors as a result of their 
poverty. For prominent Christian Democrats the spectre of social mobilization 
constituted one of the primary threats to the consolidation of a democratic regime. The 
divisive practices that had led to the breakdown of democracy in 1973 needed to be 
avoided.8 Bearing in mind the tutelary role the military had reserved for itself during the 
negotiations over the transition to democracy, it was important to pre-empt populist 
appeals and social mobilization so as not to provoke the military and other conservative 
forces. The new anti-poverty policy was part of the strategy to control social demands 
and pressures. By reinforcing self-help efforts as an alternative to direct state action, the 
Aylwin government sought to moderate popular expectations. A crucial aim was to pre-
empt popular pressures that could come to threaten macro-economic stability. 
Supporting private and local initiative would serve to relieve the state from such 
pressures. By building new pluralist links to the popular sectors through associative 
welfare networks in which popular organizations played an active role in implementing 
social projects, the government sought to undercut the attractiveness of populist appeals.  
In sum, the foundation of the new anti-poverty approach lay in the ideological 
redefinition among progressive actors that was reinforced by the structural and 
institutional legacies inherited from the military regime.  
FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY: IMPLEMENTING REFORM 
A new institutional framework 
After taking office in March 1990, the Aylwin government took a series of measures to 
institute the new anti-poverty approach. One of its first initiatives was to convert the old 
National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) into a new ministry: the Ministry of Planning 
and Coordination (Law 18.989). MIDEPLAN was entrusted with designing policies 
aimed at overcoming poverty and coordinating social programmes geared towards 
vulnerable groups in society – children, youth, women, the elderly, the disabled and 
ethnic groups. A number of agencies dependent on MIDEPLAN were created for 
targeting the poor and vulnerable, such as the National Women‘s Bureau (SERNAM) 
and the National Youth Institute (INJ). Later a special fund for financing projects 
benefitting the disabled (FONADIS) was also set up (Law 19.284), as well as the 
National Council for Indigenous Development (CONADIS) responsible for 
coordinating and implementing special projects benefitting indigenous peoples (Law 
19.253). From the perspective of anti-poverty policy the most important agency was the 
Social Investment and Solidarity Fund (FOSIS) inaugurated together with MIDEPLAN.   
In line with the new anti-poverty policy strategy, these agencies were set up to operate as 
intermediaries – financing projects that originate at the local level, assisting in 
capacitating target groups in finding ways to solve their own problems, and incorporating 
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social organizations into associative welfare networks for fighting poverty and social 
exclusion. Each of these agencies designs programmes for its target group. Their design 
was influenced by international experience with multisectorial investment funds. ―Such 
funds are a response to the decline in state resources, the new emphasis on the role of 
the market in Latin America, and the need for local input in the design of aid or 
antipoverty programs‖ (Graham 1994: 43).  
FOSIS and these other agencies do not execute projects themselves but rely on a 
network of NGOs and community organizations that was set up to act as intermediary. 
The most important mechanism that has been used for outsourcing project 
implementation is competitive bidding.9 MIDEPLAN calls for bids in which NGOs, social 
organizations, the private sector and sometimes municipalities submit project proposals 
that compete in terms of technical quality and cost-benefit ratio. At least in theory, the 
process allows for a participatory and decentralized approach in which anti-poverty 
projects are tailored to local needs. The central government just defines the terms of 
competition in which these public and private agents at the local level compete among 
themselves by presenting proposals that respond to the needs of the population. The 
process should improve efficiency as proposals undergo rigorous evaluation by specialists 
contracted or subcontracted by MIDEPLAN and funding is only granted to the most 
competitive projects.  
The bidding mechanism was formulated as part of the strategy to institute a pluralist 
policy model in contrast to the centralized, paternalistic and corporatist social policy 
model historically applied in Chile. An important impetus was the need to consolidate 
the myriad of autonomous social organizations, particularly NGOs, that had emerged 
during the military era. MIDEPLAN officials recognized that NGOs had played a vital 
role in alleviating poverty during the dictatorship. The aim was to help in sustaining this 
pluralism as well as fostering collaboration with civil society.  
One of the benefits of public-private collaboration was to relieve MIDEPLAN from 
some of the burden of social action, especially in a situation when it had to operate with 
a very limited budget. During its first year in operation, MIDEPLAN took over the 
austere budget of ODEPLAN that had been fixed by the military government. Since 
then, however, the Ministry of Finance has been reluctant to raise MIDEPLAN‘s budget 
significantly. Guided by economic orthodoxy the Ministry of Finance has argued that 
economic growth coupled with low inflation, not social programmes, is the best remedy 
for poverty. Also, as a new ministry, MIDEPLAN has been weak in the intra-
bureaucratic struggle over budget resources in comparison with the established service 
ministries (Repetto 2001).      
From the beginning, MIDEPLAN had a close relationship with NGOs. Professional 
staff from NGOs and research institutes were appointed to key positions in 
MIDEPLAN and to its dependent agencies such as FOSIS, as well as being called upon 
as consultants, part-time employees and informal advisors. Many of them also had years 
of experience in international agencies and had strong contacts to international support 
networks (Loveman 1995). Most of them were economists and poverty specialists who 
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had a common understanding of the anti-poverty policy strategy, not least since many of 
them had collaborated in formulating the new approach before taking office. They were 
well aware of the need for fiscal constraint. By increasing collaboration with international 
development agencies and focusing on facilitating associative networks, through which 
responsibilites for programme implementation could be transferred to NGOs, 
MIDEPLAN could ―do more with less‖. Within MIDEPLAN the Agency for 
International Cooperation (ACI) was set up to negotiate agreements with international 
donors and development agencies. These external resources have proved instrumental in 
sustaining associative networks and for channelling investment into anti-poverty projects.  
Hence, despite limited budgetary resources, MIDEPLAN assumed a central role in 
implementing the government‘s targeting approach. It can be stated that the most 
important changes made by the Concertación to the social institutional framework were 
concentrated in this new ministry.10 MIDEPLAN also inherited important functions 
from its predecessor, ODEPLAN, with regard to evaluating social policies. Crucially, 
MIDEPLAN is in charge of the National Socio-Economic Characterization Survey 
(CASEN), a survey of households that provides information on the coverage of social 
programmes and an in-depth study of the magnitude and characteristics of poverty in 
Chile. MIDEPLAN is also responsible for the technical supervision of the social 
stratification measurement system or CAS card used for selecting beneficiaries of 
targeted subsidies (such as housing benefits and family allowances). In addition, 
MIDEPLAN plays an important role in evaluating social investment projects from all 
ministries and public agencies and in monitoring specific social programmes for its pro-
poor impact (see Molina 1996).  
Nevertheless, despite MIDEPLAN‘s leading role in anti-poverty policymaking and, 
especially, in implementing the targeting approach, it bears emphasizing that 
MIDEPLAN failed to assume the role of a powerful social authority in charge of 
planning and coordinating social policies, as envisioned by parts of the Concertación. In 
the preparatory stages such a plan received important backing from President-elect 
Patricio Aylwin. Before taking office, he had asked Sergio Molina to prepare an initiative 
on how to convert ODEPLAN into a powerful social ministry. Molina argued that in 
order to fight poverty effectively it was essential to plan and coordinate social spending 
between the different social ministries. His aim was to give MIDEPLAN, in addition to 
its targeting role, considerable authority to direct social spending and control for its pro-
poor impact.  
By appointing Molina to take charge of MIDEPLAN, President Aylwin signalled the 
high priority his government reserved for the issue of instituting the new ministry. 
Molina was a highly respected Christian Democrat who had served as finance minister in 
the Frei government during the 1960s and who commanded considerable political clout. 
During the transition to democracy he had coordinated the campaign for the plebiscite in 
1988 and played a leading role in the negotiations over the Concertación‘s electoral 
platform. However, despite initial backing from President Aylwin and the high profile 
the governing alliance vested in MIDEPLAN – with some socialists, in particular, 
nurturing a vision of the new ministry acting as a counterweight to the Ministry of 
 PARTICIPATION FOR WHAT: SOCIAL CHANGE OR SOCIAL CONTROL? 
28 Mikael Wigell 
Finance – MIDEPLAN never gained the political weight necessary to assume a leading 
role in planning and coordinating social policies. The new ministry quickly came up 
against bureaucratic opposition from the traditional social ministries, which did not want 
to cede any control over policymaking or budgetary resources to MIDEPLAN – a 
struggle that continued under the governments of Frei (1994–2000) and Lagos (2000–
2006).  
Another source of opposition has been the Ministry of Finance. During the government 
of Aylwin, Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley was instrumental in undermining the 
authority of MIDEPLAN. Foxley argued that in order to preserve macroeconomic 
stability it was essential to protect the authority of the Ministry of Finance over all 
budgetary matters. He and his aides were concerned over the spectre of corporatist 
influence. Ceding any control over social spending to MIDEPLAN risked opening up a 
new target for demand-making, political pressure and rent-seeking that could come to 
jeopardize fiscal responsibility. He received important backing from Aylwin‘s advisors at 
the Secretariat of the Presidency who agreed on the importance of building a ―wall of 
contagion‖ against populism and corporatist influence. Centralizing authority at the MoF 
was the best insurance against political and social pressures. Crucially, President Aylwin 
himself also came to side with his finance minister against Molina.  
The powerful role of the Ministry of Finance was reinforced in the inter-ministerial 
committee that was set up to coordinate economic and social policies. The committee 
included the ministries responsible for social action as well as various public services with 
responsibilities in the social area. To the disappointment of Molina and MIDEPLAN, 
however, the chairmanship of the inter-ministrial committee was given to Finance 
Minister Foxley, to whom MIDEPLAN would function as a technical secretariat. Given 
Foxley‘s lack of time and lack of interest in social policies, the committee only came to 
function on an irregular basis ―devoting its time to discussing a few specific problems 
rather than systematically analyzing and coordinating social policies‖ (Molina 1996: 160). 
On the whole, then, the issue of coordinating social programmes remained unsolved 
under the Aylwin government. President Aylwin‘s cabinet opted for shielding the power 
of the Ministry of Finance and was not prepared to vest MIDEPLAN with sufficient 
power to become a leading social authority for fear of corporatist influence over social 
policymaking. Hence, having failed to institutionalize an integrated and coordinated 
approach to poverty alleviation, MIDEPLAN was left to fight poverty chiefly by its own 
means. 
Targeting the poor 
The most important social programme to emerge from the new anti-poverty strategy was 
the Fund for Solidarity and Social Investment (FOSIS). FOSIS was established to 
channel targeted resources for productive development projects among the poorest 
strata. It does not directly implement projects, but operates as an intermediary agency 
providing financial resources and technical support to social investment projects that 
originate at the local level or incorporate the participation of the most deprived sectors in 
finding ways to solve their own problems. As such, FOSIS embodies the new targeting 
Chapter Three 
Curtailing Clientelism or Restricting Participation? Anti-Poverty Policymaking in Chile 29 
approach introduced by the Aylwin administration that sought to replace the paternalistic 
welfare measures of the military regime.  
―The idea of FOSIS took shape in 1989 among the technical teams responsible for anti-
poverty measures in the preparation of the government‘s program‖ (Raczynski 1995: 
216). During the process of deliberation, several alternatives for organizing the anti-
poverty effort were discussed. One proposition, mainly supported by economists, 
advocated a more centralized structure with subsidies targeted to the poorest groups. The 
proposition according to which FOSIS started operating, however, argued that it was not 
enough to increase targeted subsidies, but that to combat poverty required ―a new way of 
doing things‖. Its organization was inspired by international experience with social 
investment funds in the 1980s. The creators, such as Alvaro García and Nicolas Flaño, 
were technocrats with years of experience in international organizations or research 
institutes in Chile. In the words of Flaño, ―el origen del FOSIS se vincula con lo que 
estaba pasando en América Latina a fines de la década de los 80, donde para enfrentar la 
crisis de esos años se dio inicio a este tipo de fondos como una herramienta de 
emergencia, como instituciones que tendían a paliar los efectos de esa crisis‖ (interview 
with Flaño, quoted on the website of FOSIS).11 In that, FOSIS is representative of the 
wider anti-poverty approach formulated by the Aylwin administration which was heavily 
influenced by the new pluralist conception of the state‘s welfare role in Latin Ameria at 
the end of the 1980s.  
From the beginning, FOSIS has remained small in personnel and budget. By 1992, the 
organization had a total personnel of 37 officials. This number remained more or less 
constant during the 1990s (Repetto 2001: 257). During its first four years in operation 
(the Aylwin era) its budgetary resources equalled $100 million, never exceeding one per 
cent of social public spending per year (Raczynski 1995: 217). The Ministry of Finance 
has been reluctant to commit more budgetary resources for much the same reasons as it 
has not wanted to raise the budget of MIDEPLAN.  
Initially, the conservative opposition was worried that FOSIS would be used for setting 
up a clientelist network of loyal NGOs. Clearly, these worries were unfounded as FOSIS 
has remained under strict technocratic control, a fact that will be discussed in more detail 
below. Nevertheless, given the strong role of conservative forces in Chile‘s restricted 
democracy, the government intially took great care to accomodate opposition interests as 
well as to please international financial institutions. This led the government to protect 
the authority of the Ministry of Finance which did not want FOSIS to become a drain on 
the treasury‘s coffers. In addition, the sectoral ministries were not interested in giving up 
any turf to FOSIS. Despite limited financial resources, FOSIS quickly established a 
reputation for innovation and effectiveness in carrying out anti-poverty projects. 
Administrative costs for the programme did not exceed 7.5 per cent of total costs during 
the initial stages (Schkolnik 1995: 51). Towards the end of 1993, FOSIS had supported 
more than 5200 projects – mostly small and short-term – selected from more than 
12,000 project proposals of around 3000 organizations (Raczynski 1995: 217). During 
these four years, these projects had in turn generated an additional $130 million from 
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contributions by the beneficient organizations themselves, private foundations and 
foreign donors (ibid.). 
FOSIS finances projects in three areas: microproductive enterprises, mainly in the 
informal urban sector and among small rural producers; social development, through 
technical training and empowerment of social organizations; and sectoral programmes, 
through collaboration with sectoral ministries in targeting the poorest households 
(Raczynski and Romaguera 1995: 326). As mentioned before, FOSIS does not execute 
projects, but signs agreements with subcontractors and sponsors contests in which social 
organizations, NGOs, municipalities and private enteprises bid for project resources. Its 
sectoral programmes (the third area), however, are formulated through negotiations 
between FOSIS and the specific sectoral ministries. The idea is that FOSIS would 
complement sectoral social policies, not substitute for them, in order to reach the very 
poor better. Through its more flexible and demand-driven structure FOSIS could offer 
innovative solutions to social problems the traditional sectoral ministries could not 
because of their centralized structure and heavy bureaucracy. Such collaboration between 
FOSIS and sectoral ministries would create synergies and assure that the socially 
excluded would actually come to enjoy access to social programmes. 
In practice, however, FOSIS had some difficulties in establishing a relationship with the 
sectoral ministries, and to some extent these problems of intra-sectorial coordination 
have continued well into the new millenium. This reflects the failure to institute a 
coordinating unit at inter-ministerial level, as discussed above. Bureaucratic opposition 
from the traditional ministries effectively underminded FOSIS‘ efforts to carve a role for 
itself in complementing sectoral social policies. Given that MIDEPLAN had been denied 
an authoritative role in coordinating social policies, FOSIS was on the defensive in 
relation to sectoral social policies. Neither did the Ministry of Finance come to its 
support, but opted instead to maintain its bilateral relationships with the sectoral 
ministries in order to preserve its authority and influence over social spending. From the 
perspective of the Ministry of Finance, as well as the Presidential Office, FOSIS was a 
small programme not worth picking a fight for that could open up new lines of division 
within the administration and possibly endanger the more general consensus on the 
government‘s programme of ―growth with equity‖. Hence, most of the projects 
supported by FOSIS during the Aylwin administration were in the first two areas; 
supporting microenterprises and social development in poor communitities.  
Technocratic governance 
From the beginning, the administration of FOSIS was in the hands of reform-minded 
experts. These technocrats had been recruited mostly from NGOs and research institutes 
as well as from international agencies. They shared a commitment to using technical 
criteria in administering and distributing anti-poverty resources. The structure of FOSIS 
is typical of demand-driven social investment funds, not only in Chile but in other 
countries as well. It is an automomous entity set up within the planning ministry and led 
by an executive director directly appointed by the president of the republic and 
accountable to him/her. These social investment funds usually operate outside the 
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traditional service ministries in order to avoid bureaucracy and corporatism (see Graham 
1994). Experience has shown, however, that there is a real danger of targeted social 
investment funds ending up being captured by politicians for clientelist purposes, 
thwarting the efficiency and equity goals that these funds are projected to further 
(Dresser 1991, 1994; Roberts 1995; Piester 1997; Penfold-Becerra 2007). By most 
accounts, however, the targeting of social programmes in Chile has been efficient and 
clientelism has not been a problem (Graham 1994; Raczynski 1995; Repetto 2001). 
According to my own findings with regard to FOSIS, partisan and political criteria have 
not entered into programme operation. FOSIS has remained under firm technocratic 
control and its operations criteria have been technical rather than political.  
How did the reform-minded experts manage to shield FOSIS from political interference? 
An important factor was the structure of the political regime at the time of 
democratization. Chile‘s regime institutions promote technocratic governance, 
hampering some of the participatory objectives of anti-poverty policy. Its centralist-
unitarian regime in conjunction with strong liberal-constitutional institutions helps 
prevent politicians from capturing social programmes for populist goals. In fact, unlike in 
many other Latin American countries where institutions for ―horizontal accountability‖ 
(O‘Donnell 1994, 1998) are weak, politicians in Chile have neither many opportunities 
nor much incentive to capture anti-poverty programmes. A closer look at the functioning 
of FOSIS will illustrate how the explanation has to do with Chile‘s regime institutions as 
they were instituted with the transition to democracy: (1) a centralized-unitarian regime; 
and (2) strong institutions of horizontal accountability.     
In Chile, local democracy is extremely underdeveloped. Chile‘s centralized-unitarian 
regime structure does not provide much room for political manoeuvring at the local 
level. To a large extent, municipal governments depend on the central government both 
financially and administratively (Nickson 1995). The role of municipalities is more that of 
functioning as service agencies for central government policy than as autonomous 
political entities in their own right. This reflects Chile‘s centralist political traditions that 
deconcentration during the military regime did not fundamentally alter (Valenzuela 1977; 
Graham 1994; Raczynski and Serrano 2001). During the military regime, municipal 
governments assumed some new functions in social policy. Before, local government had 
played no active role in the social sector – social programmes were handled directly by 
the national ministries (Raczynski and Romaguera 1995). Nevertheless, these new legal 
responsibilites were not intended to strengthen the political autonomy of municipal 
governments vis-à-vis the central government. Instead, devolving responsibilites for 
managing education and health establishments, increasing the number of positions for 
professional and technical staff while reducing the number of service personnel, as well 
as applying the centrally defined poverty screening test (CAS card) were envisaged to 
―technify‖ local government, strengthening the technical capabilities of municipalities for 
implementing centrally designed social policy (Castañeda 1992). Indeed, decentralization 
was envisaged as a means to depoliticize state and society.  
When the Aylwin administration took office most mayors had been directly appointed by 
Pinochet and municipal elections were not held until 30 June, 1992. In 1988 hundreds of 
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mayors in some of the poorest communities had been appointed by the military regime 
in an attempt to control the transition to democracy at the local level (Graham 1994: 46). 
According to Graham (1994), this explains why FOSIS initially found it difficult to 
stimulate collaboration between community organizations and municipalities. In her 
view, FOSIS needed to bypass municipalities as relationships between mayors appointed 
by the military regime and community organizations often were antagonistic. However, 
even after the introduction of direct municipal elections, the role of municipal 
government in the formulation and implementation of FOSIS‘ programmes has been 
limited.12 This reflects the deep suspicion held at the apex of central government about 
the technical capabilities of municipalities to administer targeted social programmes. 
FOSIS officials have been reluctant to cede responsibility for anti-poverty programmes 
to municipalities, preferring instead to work directly through NGOs or by subcontracting 
technical personnel to administer collaboration with community organizations. This has 
prevented local ―capture‖ of FOSIS, but at the same time, ―associative networks‖ at the 
local level have rarely been formed or performed well (Chalmers et al. 1997). In some 
cases there was even open antagonism between FOSIS, the municipalities and NGOs, 
particularly as mayors felt excluded from projects.  
The central state also has the possibility of collaborating with the heads of regional 
government or the district governors, bypassing mayors that do not share its objectives 
concerning technical efficiency and social equity. In stark contrast to many other cases in 
Latin America where social programmes have been withheld from municipalities 
controlled by the opposition, no such partisan criteria were allowed to enter into the 
operation criteria of FOSIS. In fact, in those cases where FOSIS ended up excluding 
mayors from taking part in networks for administering FOSIS projects, they were mayors 
belonging to the governing alliance (Concertación) but who had refused to accept the 
operations criteria of FOSIS, or who had been found by the Comptroller General or the 
internal auditing mechanism not to comply with the rigid rules for managing projects.    
A crucial factor is that FOSIS has not been subject to pressure from the central 
government to include political criteria in the way it manages its programmes. The 
Chilean president has no need to engage in ―territorial politics‖, fighting over local 
political turf or seeking the loyalty of provincial governors in order to get things done. In 
Chile, the heads of regional government are appointed by the president. Thus, he/she 
need not worry about commanding the loyalty of regional governments, and as a result 
there is no need for using social programmes as bargaining chips in negotiations with 
heads of regional government or doling them out to mayors in order for these to be able 
to build a political base independently from and against the regional caudillo. Indeed, the 
lack of real political clout of local government in conjunction with the binomial electoral 
system, which has the effect of making elections highly uncompetitive, makes for a 
system that is immune to local political pressure to a much greater extent than in many 
other countries in Latin America. In Chile, poor people‘s links to intermediary political 
institutions such as political parties, that could help articulate and formulate local 
demands more effectively, are very weak. 
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The limited political role of local government is reflected in how FOSIS and other social 
programmes work – technocratic governance characterizes the administration of FOSIS 
at all levels. Programme design and management of FOSIS funds have remained heavily 
centralized. A typical example is the Entre Todos programme. Raczynski (1995) explains 
how it was designed in 1991 by a professional team within FOSIS that earlier had worked 
in the third sector with social development projects. ―The team was relatively small, came 
from the private sector – principally NGOs – and initially was unfamiliar with public 
sector procedures‖ (Raczynski 1995: 248). The programme built on the earlier experience 
of the professional team supported by policy studies and a detailed technical preparation 
within this subgroup of FOSIS. Raczynski concludes that ―the program shows some 
success in the extension work but did not achieve links with the municipalities‖ (ibid.). In 
general, collaboration in programme design between FOSIS and municipalities has been 
extremely rare.  
The various programmes set up by FOSIS have been formulated in a top-down manner 
by FOSIS officials, without much input from local government or lower administrative 
units. In this process, information systems and policy studies carried out by poverty 
specialists contracted by FOSIS or MIDEPLAN play an integral part. An advisory board 
for FOSIS composed of professionals and academics in the field was also constituted in 
order to strenghten expert-input in the process of designing programmes. Its role has 
remained limited, however, functioning more as a deliberative forum for approving 
decisions already taken by FOSIS officials. In any case, local government has had a very 
limited role in programme design.13 According to Raczynski, ―programs are designed by 
the central government, are top-down, and arrive at the local level in search of 
predefined beneficiaries. The local level is a mere recipient for programs‘, (2000: 139). 
The effect of Chile‘s regime institutions on anti-poverty policy can further be seen in 
how the project competition mechanism works. Once a programme has taken shape, 
FOSIS calls for bids in which social organizations, NGOs, the private sector and 
municipalities present project proposals that compete on the selection criteria that were 
formulated during the process of design. Project proposals are subjected to technical 
evaluations and selected on the basis of their quality. The criteria are highly technical, 
having been formulated by FOSIS officials and poverty experts. Evaluation of proposals 
is carried out by FOSIS or subcontracted to private sector consultants.  
At first, the opposition feared that political criteria would come to steer the selection 
process. These worries quickly subsided while even the opposition conceded that the 
process of selecting projects was done technically rigorously without political 
interference. After that, the main critique concerned the lack of decentralization that, 
according to the opposition (and, indeed, many social policy specialists), has rendered it 
difficult to adjust programmes to local needs. As local governments have no discretion in 
selecting projects or beneficiaries, the anti-poverty approach has remained inflexible and 
bureaucratic. That is the other side of the coin – rigid rules formulated by central level 
technocrats and rigorously monitored for adherence by a strong and fiercely independent 
Comptroller General as well as carefully designed internal control mechanisms. But while 
the opposition readily admits that mechanisms of horizontal control, such as the Office 
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of the Comptroller as well as the Parliament, have been effective in curtailing corruption 
and preventing the discretionary use of anti-poverty funds, it maintains that vertical 
mechanisms at the local level for articulating particular needs and monitoring results are 
weak. This critique has been mounted most sharply by the conservative Independent 
Democratic Union (UDI) and should be understood against the backdrop that UDI, 
partly thanks to the favoured position it came to enjoy amongst poor communities 
during the military regime, has remained strong at the municipal level and would, 
therefore, like to see more power over targeting social programmes being transferred to 
the local level.  
Notwithstanding, the opposition‘s critique about unsufficient decentralization is shared 
by prominent social policy specialists (Razynski and Serrano 2001). In their view, the lack 
of decentralization has hampered community participation and the formation of 
associative welfare networks at the local level. Ultimately, this makes it difficult to 
respond to the various situations of poverty and social exclusion. As the analysis of eight 
social programmes carried out by Concha and colleagues affirms: ―los programas son 
estandarizados, rígidos, definen soluciones homogéneas y muestran poca flexibilidad para 
responder a la diversidad de situaciones de pobreza‖ (Concha et al. 2001: 187).14  
The Concertación has not been deaf to this critique. Indeed, in the mid-90s, democracy 
at the regional level was somewhat strengthened by creating regional governments and 
transferring some functions of social policy to these.15 The regional level continues, 
however, to be led by the intendente (i.e., the head of the regional government), who is 
appointed by the president. Also, the counsellors, who make up the regional council are 
only indirectly elected through the municipal governments. The regional extension 
offices of the ministries and central state agencies (such as FOSIS) continue to play a 
dominant role in regional policymaking. For instance, MIDEPLAN has a technical 
secretariat, the SERPLAC, that is in charge of coordinating its policies and programmes 
at the regional and local levels. As some responsibilities for the selection of project 
proposals were devolved to the regional level, SERPLAC was put in charge of the 
technical evaluation and, hence, guaranteeing that the projects selected apply with the 
technical standards formulated by MIDEPLAN (or some of its dependent agencies such 
as FOSIS). In fact, in 1998 it was proposed that SERPLAC would cease to be part of 
MIDEPLAN and instead become dependent on the regional government. However, the 
initiative was blocked by the Office of the Comptroller who was worried about potential 
politicization of SERPLAC. This demonstrated the strong authority the Office of the 
Comptroller commands in enforcing horizontal accountability in Chile. The downside, 
however, has been a technocratization of social policy. 
In sum, at no stage in the process do politicians have much opportunity to use these 
project funds for patronage, as funds are either distributed directly from FOSIS to 
NGOs or the private sector, or are devolved through the technical secretariats at the 
local government level where SERPLAC is in charge of coordinating project execution    
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CONCLUSIONS 
During the 1980s, many governments in Latin America began redefining their social 
welfare policies to emphasize poverty alleviation and create targeted programmes that 
put a strong emphasis on social participation. Targeted anti-poverty programmes were 
promoted as a solution to the crisis of the welfare state model and the dilemma of 
learning ―to do more with less‖ in the wake of the 1980s debt crisis. Scholars disagree 
over the political implications of this new social policy approach, however. Many 
observers argue that targeted social programmes are instrumental for establishing new 
pluralist links between the state and civil society, replacing traditional forms based on 
corporatism and clientelism. They see targeted social programmes as reflecting a new 
mode of social governance that allow for more effective popular participation and 
representation in the social policy arena (e.g. Graham 1994; Chalmers et al. 1997). 
Others, in contrast, have pointed out how targeted programmes have been used to create 
new clientelist links between ―neo-populist‖ leaders and the popular sectors (e.g. Dresser 
1991; Roberts 1995). They argue that the new anti-poverty approach provides ample 
opportunities for politicians to make use of targeted social programmes in order to install 
clientelist networks.  
This chapter shows how in Chile the outcome of the new anti-poverty approach has 
been technocratic governance. Hence, while the new targeted approach has not led to 
neo-populism, neither has it given way to the empowerment and effective integration of 
poor people‘s interests.  
Clearly, the new anti-poverty approach has contributed to social modernization through 
increased state-civil society collaboration. NGOs particularly have become important 
actors in implementing anti-poverty programmes. It is also generally assumed that the 
targeting of poverty programmes has been effective, guided by technical criteria 
emphasizing efficiency in the allocation of funds rather than political expediency. At the 
same time, this technocratic mode of social governance provides few tools for concerted 
lower-class political action. As such, the anti-poverty approach implemented by the 
Concertación government differs markedly from the discourse that connects it with 
participatory governance and poor people‘s empowerment.  
The approach does not exclude participation; indeed, it makes community groups and 
NGOs share responsibility for government policies by devolving welfare tasks to them. 
However, these participatory mechanisms do not empower subaltern sectors to 
effectively articulate encompassing social demands. Participation is structured by the 
technocrats within the welfare bureaucracy who remain in charge of policy design and 
spending priorities. Participation is reduced to the process of programme 
implementation. While these structures allow for the rationalization of anti-poverty 
policymaking by instituting technical criteria into the administration of social welfare, this 
de-politicization concomitantly provokes apathy and de-mobilization among subaltern 
sectors. As opportunities to challenge decision-making are few, subaltern sectors have 
few incentives to mobilize. Also, pluralistic competition between civil society groups for 
access to social benefits often leads to atomization and fragmentation of social 
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organization. Indeed, tentative evidence suggests that the system of contract-based 
funding has helped institute competitive relationships between subaltern sectors as 
community leaders and their organizations compete for the scarce resources offered by 
the welfare bureaucracy.  
These competitive relationships work against social capital formation as some 
neighbourhoods may become included into anti-poverty programmes, while other similar 
and adjacent neighbourhoods are left out. Moreover, because of the highly technical 
requirements for participation, those most in need of assistance, but who lack the 
capabilities of taking advantage of participatory opportunities, remain excluded. Under 
these circumstances, more technically endowed NGOs have aquired advantages in the 
competitive biddings for tendering contracts. In sum, while the approach has provided 
for pluralistic access to social benefits, scarce resources and technocratic control over the 
distribution of benefits has served to de-politicize anti-poverty policymaking making it 
hard for subaltern sectors to demand encompassing social change.   
Endnotes 
1. The author would like to thank Dr Kenneth Shadlen, Dr Kristin Komives, the editors of this 
book, as well as participants at the session ―Institutional Change and Development‖ at the 6th 
Development Dialogue organized by the Institute of Social Studies (The Hague, 5–6 June 2008) 
for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. Financial support from the Academy of Finland 
is gratefully acknowledged. 
2. For a detailed discussion of the Concertación‘s early anti-poverty policy strategy, see Raczynski 
(1995, 2000). 
3. See Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (1989). 
4. The work on the Concertación‘s programme was coordinated by Edgardo Boeninger 
(Christian Democratic Party) and Enrique Correa (Socialist Party) who also saw it as a process of 
identifying candidates for governmental posts (Boeninger 1997). 
5. See, among others, Oxhorn (1995), Boeninger (1997), Roberts (1998). 
6. The literature on the importance of NGOs under military rule is vast. It includes Loveman 
(1995), Oxhorn (1995), Roberts (1998). See also Repetto (2001), who supports the argument that 
the experience provided a crucial impetus for the anti-poverty approach adopted by the 
Concertación. 
7. For an analysis, see Oxhorn (1995). 
8. For a discussion of the breakdown of democracy, see Valenzuela (1978) and Oppenheim 
(1999). 
9. For a discussion of the bidding mechanism, see Raczynski (1995). 
10. For a detailed discussion of these changes, see Molina (1996). 
11. Author‘s translation: ―The origin of FOSIS is connected to what was happening in Latin 
America in end of the 1980s, where in order to confront the crisis of those years this type of 
funds were launched as an emergency tool, as institutions which had to mitigate the effects of the 
crisis‖. www.fosis.cl  (interview with Nicolas Flaño retrieved from 
www.fosis.cl/opensite_det_20060823131127.asp) 
12. For a discussion of the role of local government in anti-poverty programmes, including 
FOSIS, see Concha et al. (2001). 
13. For a discussion of the role of local government in social programmes across the social 
sectors, see Raczynski and Serrano (2001). 
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14. Author‘s translation: ―The programmes are standardized, rigid, define homogeneous 
solutions and show little flexibility in responding to the diversity of situations of poverty‖. 
15. For a discussion of the functions of regional government and how they have been 
strengthened, see Serrano (2001). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Non-Participatory Reform and Institutional 
Gaps: The Re-organisation of Argentina‟s 
Industrial Sector in the Nineties 
Georgina M. Gómez 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: TOP-DOWN CHANGE OF RULES 
A wave of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were implemented throughout the 
developing world during the 1990s, imbued with neoliberal views on how economies 
should work (Smith et al. 1994, Gwynne and Kay 1999). Argentina was part of that wave, 
and after 1990 the government imposed a top-down transformation of the rules and 
structures that organised production and exchange. The government blamed the import 
substitution model for economic stagnation and high inflation. It believed that the strong 
support obtained in the elections granted it the social mandate to implement a massive 
reform of the economic institutions and, consequently, it barely invited the participation of 
the agents whose behaviour it expected to rearrange. For several years there were hardly 
any protests or other forms of resistance against the reforms, but the actions of large 
numbers of agents hardly changed. On the contrary, the top-down changes in the 
regulations disorganised production and exchange, holding back job creation and causing 
numerous bankruptcies. Most explanations for the divergence between the blueprints of 
the policy-makers and the practice of economic life focus on macroeconomic variables like 
the exchange rate and the availability of credit. An explanation that examines the stability of 
economic life is still missing. 
This article adopts the perspective of the Old Institutional Economics to examine the 
problematic of institutional change with a top-down non-participatory manner. It is 
consistent with the understanding of the economy as ―an instituted process‖, as 
characterised by Karl Polanyi (1992[1957]). Institutions are defined as dispositions to 
behave according to certain rules. They structure economic activity by assuring that in 
circumstances X, agents have a disposition to do Y (Hodgson 2006: 2). Institutions mediate 
the relations between governments and agents, both individual and collective, in stable 
patterns that sustain economic life. They relate agents‘ behaviour at the microeconomic 
level to the rules defined at the macro level by policy makers, so they are the crucial link 
that structural adjustment programmes aim to change.   
The understanding that the actions and thoughts of economic agents are regulated by 
deeply engrained institutions that evolve out of regularity casts doubt on how these can be 
effectively changed top-down (Smith and Korzeniewics 1997). In some cases, governments 
 PARTICIPATION FOR WHAT: SOCIAL CHANGE OR SOCIAL CONTROL? 
40 Georgina M. Gómez 
may sanction those that do not abide by their new rules, but they would need a whole 
battery of means of control, which in most developing countries are not available. An 
invitation to participate hence emerges as a critical instance to induce agents to reflect upon 
the new and old rules and understand the likely consequences of translating them into 
practice or not. Participation is understood as a means as well as an end in creating 
democracy, strengthening governance, promoting development and reducing poverty 
(Taylor 1998 Hickey and Mohan 2004).  
This study will draw empirical data from the case of the industrial sector in Argentina to 
illustrate how structural reform policies increase complexity and disrupt economic 
activities. It will refer to the notion of ―institutional gaps‖ to address the situation in which 
habits, patterns of behaviour and expectations no longer match the reality of the reformed 
economy. While agents struggle to understand the new institutions and embrace them as 
rules of action, their resources become unemployed and may even become permanently 
idle. The introduction of the new concept of ―institutional gaps‖ is an effort to take a 
meso-level look at the effects of structural reforms. 
Following this introduction, the article presents an analytical framework within the Old 
Institutional Economics perspective, and then it describes the background of the economic 
reforms in Argentina. Fourthly, it discusses the impact of the structural reforms in the 
industrial sector and the failure of large numbers of entrepreneurs to act according to the 
government‘s expectations. It concludes with reflections on the top-down attempts to 
change institutions and behaviour.  
STRUCTURAL REFORMS AS IMPOSITION 
The fundamental basis of institutional economics is that economic actions are regulated by 
institutions, seen as the ―structured processes by which individuals interact, relatively stable 
in time and recognised as such‖ (Lawson 2003). This definition includes the formal and 
informal organisations, rules, procedures, regulations and practices that structure social 
interactions (Hall 1986). Geoffrey Hodgson (2006) adds that they are the ―stuff‖ that 
structures action, although some social structures are not institutions. For example, 
demographic growth rates are social structures but they are not institutions, which are 
normative and codifiable, and their transgression can be sanctioned. Institutions are subject 
to individual interpretation and have the potential to change agents, including their 
intentions and preferences (Hodgson 1998a). Prices, labour regulations, money, exchange 
relations and responses to similar economic downturns are examples of them. This is the 
approach of the Old Institutional Economics, which was popular in the early twentieth 
century in the United States and whose main referents are Thorsten Veblen, John 
Commons, Clarence Ayres and others (Hodgson, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). 
Following Veblen (2004[1899]), Hodgson (2006) underlines that institutions are a 
disposition to act in a certain manner, which may be different to current behaviour because 
action always contains a degree of individual choice or agency. The distinction is critical in 
top-down economic policy because governments can make laws but they cannot guarantee 
what actions will effectively follow. In turn, most institutions are complied with 
unconsciously, without explicit reflection, being embedded in habits.  
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Not all situations are known and have a rule of action to follow. When there is a new 
situation for which no specific institution is in place, the agents fall into reflexive action to 
formulate a reaction Y to face the new circumstances. After some trial and error, when they 
have been able to achieve acceptable results, the response will be repeated each time the 
situation X presents itself. A new institution hence emerges, and it will subsequently inform 
a disposition to repeat the action by becoming customary (Hodgson 2002, 2004). 
When responses pose conflicting intentions and interests among groups or agents, 
institutions emerge through a considerable amount of deliberate thinking and negotiation 
between groups to solve these conflicts and decide which rule of action to establish. It is 
another type of institutional creation, not by simple regularity, but through a political 
process (Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997). There are two typical situations of distribution of 
power. In the first one, there is an agent with the capacity to impose its rules even against 
the resistance of the others. Effective behaviour following the law depends on the means 
of control to detect transgressions and impose sanctions (Bowles and Gintis 1993). This 
applies to governments that dictate new laws to their constituencies, managers that direct 
workers in enterprises and teachers that educate children at school. In the second situation, 
none of the agents has the capacity to impose rules on others, so agents need to reach a 
consensus, and enforcement relies on social control mechanisms and the commitment of 
those to whom the rules apply. For example, firms in a value chain agree on production 
quality standards that apply to other firms that join. 
Imposition and consensus are the two ways in which new rules are configured. Still, 
Hodgson (2006) argues that for new rules to become institutions, they need to become 
customary and acquire a normative status. Veblen (2004 [1899]) actually contended that 
institutions only work because the rules involved are embedded in shared habits of thought 
and behaviour (Joas 1996). Even when there is substantial capacity to impose new norms 
or there is a strong commitment among those who should abide by them, it is still critical 
that they evolve into habit to reduce the likelihood of being ignored. 
When policymakers attempt to change economic rules top-down, they generate a new Y‘ 
for X. They expect agents to do Y‘ because Y‘ is what they consider more efficient in 
economic terms to achieve the outcome Z‘, their policy goal, even if other agents did not 
participate in the definition of the new Y‘ or do not share the preference for Z‘. They 
impose it top-down based on the legitimacy of their authority. They assume that agents 
would subsequently elaborate on the new rules and adapt to them. However, the process in 
reality is considerably less smooth because they rarely impose the new institutions in an 
empty institutional landscape, what Stark (1992: 6) calls a ―tabula rasa‖. 
The design of institutions to change agents‘ behaviour at the micro level is therefore an 
extremely complex task which cannot ignore the evolutionary nature of how institutions 
emerge.  The new Y‘ may overlap, combine or even conflict with the old Y that agents are 
disposed to do in a situation X. The inertia of institutionalised life inclines agents, by 
default, to continue to do Y. In the end, some agents may do Y, others will do Y‘, others 
will do Y‖ if they consider it an option better aligned with their intentions Z‖. The 
discrepancies between what different agents do cause new uncertainties, new situations in 
which agents are unclear about how to respond. Thus, from a world in which economic life 
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was structured and uncertainty was relatively under control, the top-down reform of 
institutions pushes agents into a world in which there are no clear dispositions to act.  
The concept of ‗institutional gap‘ addresses this situation of an unstructured segment of 
social and economic action that used to be structured before the top-down imposition of a 
new rule (Gomez 2009). It is a gap in the sense that agents do not know how to act, react 
or decide in situations that were previously ruled by practice, norms and habits. Agents are 
pushed into reflection to reformulate what to do in circumstances X to obtain Z, but until 
a tested routine evolves, they will stick to what they know. Arguably, institutional gaps will 
be resolved in the long run, and agents will do Y‘ if policymakers are successful and Y'‖ if 
they are not. The point is that it may take a long time to re-harmonise the organisation of 
the economy, or it may not happen at all. In the meantime, resources – human and material 
– remain unemployed.  
The argument is illustrated in Figure 1, which is a re-elaboration of Geoffrey Hodgson‘s 
graph of the institution-action loop (1998a: 176). The original graph includes only the 
upper part of the one presented here and addresses the permanent interaction between 
institutions and agents. The one presented here adds the role of government attempting to 
reconfigure institutions top-down, hence changing the disposition of the agents to act in a 
certain manner. The arrows of both loops converge on the position of the agents, placed in 
the centre, because it is up to them to make sense of the rules and act. That is, it depends 
on their own reflection whether they will behave according to the old rules (upper loop), 
the new rules (lower loop) or neither. The result is a priori unpredictable, and this increases 
the complexity of economic action.  
 
It is in this stage that participation becomes critical. The participation of those agents 
whose actions are expected to change substantially increase the chances of successful 
reform. Agents that participate in the reconfiguration of rules delve into a process of 
shared reflexion and collective experimentation in the search of an acceptable action. If 
they find that Y‘ is acceptable, they will repeat it each time X appears. If they do not agree 
with Z‘ or do not think Y‘ is conducive to it, they will still gain in terms of awareness of the 
Figure 1: The institutions–action loop, with government 
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consequences of not acting according to the reformed economic structure. Institutional 
change with participation comprises moments of negotiation, resistance, compromise, 
adaptation and the building of the capacities to interpret new rules (Steinmo and Thelen 
1992).  
The theory on participation distinguishes between two main approaches: as means and as 
ends (Nelson and Wright 1995). The former focuses on efficiency arguments for 
participatory processes (achieving better outcomes) and the later centres on issues of 
empowerment (enhancing the capacity of the disadvantaged to achieve social change) 
(Cleaver 1999). The analysis developed so far has addressed the first argument, of 
participation as a means to improve the outcome of structural adjustment programmes and 
to mitigate the costs. However, the second rationale is also relevant. Agents may configure 
Y‖ as a superior alternative in terms of costs or benefits and address power imbalances.  
THE ECONOMY‟S INSTITUTIONAL LEGACY 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Argentina was one of the ten most affluent 
nations in the world. The per capita income was higher than that of other Latin American 
countries and of several Western European countries, including Spain and Italy 
(Gerchunoff and Llach 2005). This success was a result of the abundance of natural 
resources, export staples (meat and grain), slow demographic growth, rapid urbanisation, 
large-scale migration from Europe, and the ―British connection‖ in trade and infrastructure 
investment (Ciria 1992). The country promulgated a constitution as early as 1856, 
assimilated millions of migrants, had a stable society and was an integral part of the 
international division of labour at that time. 
The boom lasted until approximately 1930, when first the Great Depression and then the 
Second World War marked a turning point in Argentine history. Growth then became 
more erratic, with alternating periods of progress and stagnation (Sawers 1996). After 1940, 
Argentina changed its development strategy to a state-directed economy, protecting key 
sectors and implementing other usual ingredients of the import-substitution 
industrialisation model prevalent around the developing world at that time. 
Import-substitution industrialisation was the basis of growth in Argentina for almost fifty 
years. It was more inclusive than the previous model, in the sense that the urban middle 
class grew from 40.7 per cent to 47.8 per cent of the population between the 1940s and the 
1980s (Beccaria and López 1996). The situation of skilled workers in the manufacturing 
sector and blue-collar employees improved substantially (Murmis and Feldman 1993) and 
they enjoyed the highest wages in Latin America, including both employed and self-
employed workers. 
At the same time, with the import-substitution industrialisation model, the Argentine 
economy behaved in what was termed a stop-and-go business cycle (Ferrer 1989, 
Gerchunoff and Llach 2005). There were regular periods of growth, in which wages, 
consumption and imports grew. These led to balance of payments deficits, devaluations 
and rapid price increases. This was followed by recession, an adjustment in the main 
macroeconomic variables, and then an increase in exports that triggered a period of growth 
and rising incomes. The cycle started again when the bottlenecks in the economy pushed it 
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into a new balance of payments deficit and inflation. The stop-and-go trajectory was 
blamed on the dependence of production on domestic demand, weak international 
competitiveness, and the high need for foreign inflows to pay for technological imports 
(Dorfman 1983).  
By the mid-seventies it was clear that the import-substitution industrialisation model was 
running out of steam. High inflation was becoming chronical, while recessions were 
becoming deeper and lasting longer. While economic agents were used to these cycles, to 
the point that they had institutionalised responses to cope with them, the downturns of the 
cycle were more severe each time.  
In the political arena, democratic governments alternated with military dictatorships, and 
between 1929 and 1989 no civilian president was able to complete the six-year-mandate 
period. The first to succeed in finishing his mandate was president Raul Alfonsin, chosen in 
1983 in the first democratic elections after seven years of a military junta. He was sworn-in 
with high expectations of the recovery of democratic governance and economic growth. 
However, his government could not frame a consistent development strategy and in 
economic terms, the eighties were known as the ―lost decade‖. Inflation averaged 300 per 
cent a year between 1975 and 1990, with several years being marked by 1000 per cent. The 
decade ended with hyperinflation. A country that was among the wealthiest in the world at 
the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed looting of supermarkets by the rioting 
poor at its end (Botana 2002). 
A second democratic president, Carlos Menem, took over in 1989 but still faced two 
periods of hyperinflation before he could define a consistent macroeconomic policy. This 
was a programme of structural reforms in conformity with the prescriptions of the 
Washington Consensus (Smith and Korzeniewics 1997). The structural reforms in Latin 
America during the 1990s posed such a challenge that Smith and Korzeniewics compared 
them to the Great Transformation through the nineteenth century, analysed by Polanyi 
(Smith and Korzeniewics 1997). In Argentina the newly sworn-in neoliberal government 
attempted to reform the ways in which the economy was organised at the micro level, but it 
imposed new rules in disregard of institutionalised and resilient economic behaviour. While 
inflation had been regarded until then as a problem that needed to be addressed and 
corrected with specific measures, the new government saw it as an inherent dysfunction of 
the model. It understood that inflation could only be solved by changing the model entirely 
and it intended to do precisely that.  
To end inflation the peso was pegged to the dollar at parity in 1991. This was the 
Convertibility Plan, which also transformed the Central Bank into a currency board and 
imposed fiscal discipline. While the peso was pegged to the dollar, prices in the national 
currency kept rising, so the exchange rate was unusually low throughout most of the 
nineties (Heymann 2000). In turn, one of the most ambitious and swift privatisation 
programmes in Latin America was launched, involving almost all state-owned enterprises, 
public utilities, the pension system, much of the health care and the banking sector. This 
launched the third development model in Argentine history: an open economy and 
deregulated markets (Kosacoff 1993).  
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Figure 2: Argentina‟s real GDP, 1980–2006 
Note: GDP in thousands of 1986 real pesos. 
Source: INDEC, www.indec.gov.ar. 
 
As Figure 2 shows, the structural reforms of 1990 triggered a significant growth rate of 8 
per cent a year from 1990 to 1994. All in all, GDP increased by 27 per cent between 1991 
and 1994, although the crisis of 1999–2001 pushed it down again. In turn, the seemingly 
positive GDP growth and controlled inflation during the 1990s tells only one part of the 
story. There were substantial differences between productive sectors. The industrial GDP 
hardly grew between 1991 and 1994, while the service sector bloomed and with it part of 
the middle class. The economic structure changed: there was less state intervention in the 
economy, a more competitive private sector, lower inflation rates and an open market in 
which foreign goods, technologies and credit were available (Kosacoff and Heymann 
2000).  
The micro and meso level, where individual and collective agents perform their economic 
activities daily, showed another landscape. The new rules of action still had to fit in the 
institutional legacies of a protected economy. While some sectors quickly adapted to them, 
others were in a severe state of disarray. The reform disrupted and destabilised the 
economic action of a substantial segment of the population. A high proportion of agents 
was unable to adapt to the reformed institutional structure and gradually became 
disengaged from the regular economy. Unemployment and bankruptcies rose and a few 
years later the country entered an economic meltdown. The next section examines the 
industrial sector in the light of the framework depicted in Figure 1. 
REORGANISING INDUSTRY 
The Argentine industrial sector dates back more than a hundred years, and for half of that 
time it was ruled by the institutions of import-substitution industrialisation with strong 
state intervention (Barbero 2007). This policy orientation guided routines and expectations 
that organised the industrial sector around certain patterns. The state was central to the 
process, imposing rules, choosing winners and losers, providing subsidies and tax 
exemptions. The industrial sector hence offered fertile ground for rent-seeking activities, 
but there was a significant accumulation of human and physical resources. The learning 
process centred on adapting imported technologies and integrating links within the 
manufacturing process in order to reduce supply uncertainty (Kosacoff and Gomez 2000). 
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The stop-and-go trajectory of the economy defined that investments in foreign technology 
and modern inputs were normally possible during the expansionary phase of the business 
cycle. On the retraction phase, they were restricted to basic repairs and maintenance. The 
stop-and-go trajectory also shaped typical entrepreneurs that were risk-averse due to 
frequent macroeconomic swings and imbalances. Businesses invested only to solve the 
bottlenecks in production that appeared when demand increased and the government 
offered credit incentives. More aggressive modernisation of equipment to gain 
competitiveness was rare and was not perceived as essential to run a firm (Bisang et al. 
1996). 
The manufacturing firms were polarised into two categories. The first was a large number 
of small firms in the hands of local entrepreneurs and with relatively low technological 
needs, linked to European immigrants who had arrived with craft skills. The second group 
were the large public and foreign companies engaging in activities that required higher 
investment and technological complexity (Kosacoff 2000a, Kosacoff and Gomez 2000). 
By the beginning of the 1990s, this type of industry was seen as the mother of all evils. 
Most importantly, Argentine industry was not competitive internationally. The value of 
exports was low while industry depended on imported inputs and technology (Bonvecchi 
2000). The government tried to correct this problem through an institutional reorganisation 
that centred on opening up markets and liberalising trade. The assumption was that, faced 
with competition from cheaper imports, local industry would have to make the necessary 
investments and adjustments to improve its competitiveness. Within the menu of structural 
reforms mentioned in the previous section, the one that had the greatest impact on the 
manufacturing sector was the opening of markets. Average tariffs were reduced sharply for 
all imports, with the extreme that they were completely eliminated for capital goods. 
Export duties and other taxes were also removed. The preference for national firms in 
government purchasing was suspended. Industrial imports went up from 12.4 per cent of 
all imports in 1990 to 34.5 per cent in 1996.  
In the import-substitution industrialisation model, the disposition to act in the situation X 
of low exchange rates and low import barriers (the beginning of the expansive phase of the 
stop-and-go business cycle) was well-tested: increase imports, invest in foreign technology 
to solve specific production bottlenecks, diversify the scope of products and expand the 
distribution network to protect the market share, take advantage of credit incentives. At the 
same time, the rule of action Y included ―wait until a devaluation would correct prices 
again in favour of domestic manufactures‖, which was consistent with a goal Z of staying 
afloat across the business cycle. 
The change in the legal framework reflects the expectation of the government that 
entrepreneurs would change their behaviour to Y‘. In the circumstances of the low 
exchange rates and an opening economy (X), they had designed a rule of action consistent 
with their goal Z‘ of increasing competitiveness and exporting more. The action Y‘ the 
government had in mind included; invest in complete ranges of state-of-the-art technology, 
use foreign credit in a relatively low foreign currency, modernise production techniques, 
raise competitiveness, and increase the scale of production by exporting which implied 
gaining access to markets abroad. 
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The government did not enter any consultations or negotiations with the industrial sector 
on how to achieve this change in behaviour. It believed such invitation to participate was 
unnecessary (Kosacoff and Gomez 2000) as it had widely explained the goal Z‘ it was 
pursuing. The government thought that as soon as entrepreneurs had interpreted the 
signals of an open market economy and felt the pressures of competing with cheaper 
imports in the domestic market, they would change their actions to the Y‘ it had designed. 
In the framework depicted in Figure 1, the government changed the legislation and 
normatives (lower loop), hence it induced economic agents to behave according to the rule 
of action (Y‘) it had designed for the circumstances (X). However, most entrepreneurs 
were trapped in the old institutions of the import-substitution industrialisation and 
continued to act informed by the old rules of action (upper loop). 
The mismatch between the old and new structures resulted in de-industrialisation and 
unemployment. Skilled and unskilled workers of failed companies, with technical and 
managerial skills accumulated over decades, were no longer needed. The main accumulated 
technical capacities were related to manufacturing an article of decent quality for an 
acceptable price to serve a small protected market, which implied reducing the scale of 
expensive imported technology and charging for the labour in the final price. These skills 
had no place in the new economic model (Kosacoff 2000a). Many factory buildings, 
machinery, tools and other physical infrastructure were left idle, although some were 
reabsorbed for other production. 
The difference between what the government expected from the new rules of action it 
imposed, on the one hand, and the old institutions that used to regulate entrepreneurs‘ 
actions until then, on the other, created havoc in the manufacturing sector. Entrepreneurs 
found themselves lost in the quest to compete with the imported goods that flooded the 
domestic market and were frequently cheaper, of higher quality and better designed. Some 
firms left the market and others tried to adapt and increase competitiveness to varying 
degrees (Bisang et al. 1996). The 1994 industrial census registered 6000 firms less than five 
years earlier. In the segment of firms with eleven to fifty workers, 21 per cent exited the 
market (Fiel 1996). They mostly used labour-intensive production methods, so the impact 
on employment was high (Yoguel 2000). Another 20 per cent were sold to foreign owners 
(Kosacoff 2000a). By 1995 the industrial sector produced approximately the same value 
added as two decades earlier, but with significant qualitative differences (Kosacoff 2000b). 
About 80 per cent of all manufacturing firms applied what Bernardo Kosacoff (2000b) 
designated ‗defensive‘ responses. That is, they barely adapted enough to stay in business 
hoping for a policy change. In the framework presented above, they stuck to doing Y in the 
situation X. They incorporated minimum technology to reconvert as post-sale service firms 
for imported goods, increased the assembly or straight sale of foreign inputs, and 
downsized the workforce. Excluding micro-enterprises with fewer than ten workers, the 
25,000 factories comprising the ‗defensive‘ group were responsible for 60 per cent of the 
country‘s total industrial product. In contrast, the remaining 20 per cent of the firms 
adapted, became competitive and could make the most of the market opening. That is, they 
changed to doing Y‘ under circumstances X, following the new rule of action imposed by 
the government‘s policy. They incorporated new technology, reorganised the productive 
process, rationalised employees, subcontracted all non-core business functions, changed to 
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foreign suppliers, and started exporting to niche markets, especially within Mercosur (the 
regional market comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, with Bolivia and 
Chile as associate members) (Kosacoff 2000b). 
State-owned enterprises were closed or privatised. They required substantial investment in 
technology and were often not profitable in the small Argentine market. Therefore they 
were transferred to mostly local conglomerates with a transnational partner. The new 
owners dismissed workers, outsourced non-core functions, disintegrated vertically, 
incorporated state-of-the-art technology, closed non-crucial sections (research and 
development facilities were a regular target) and aligned prices to international levels 
(Kosacoff 2000b). All in all, privatised companies were able to do Y‘. 
Authors like Hodgson (2003) and Hollingsworth et al. (1994) emphasise the double role of 
institutions as enablers as well as constrainers of behaviour. For Argentine entrepreneurs, 
both roles played an equally significant part. On the enabling side, the firms had better 
access to imports, basic inputs and technology. There was a macroeconomic environment 
from which inflation and scarcity of foreign currency, among other uncertainties, had been 
eradicated. Stability made the usual survival toolkit of indexation and financial management 
redundant. On the constraining side, quality and price were no longer under the control of 
the firm. Trade liberalisation acted in practice as a comprehensive list of maximum prices 
and minimum quality standards.  
Agents found that their economic action suddenly became unstructured. That is, they 
found themselves in an ―institutional gap‖. In the framework of this study, it meant that 
they continued to do Y while they should have done Y‘. In Figure 1, the top-down 
reorganisation of the economy posed agents into an unstructured situation. The upper loop 
informs a certain disposition to act. The lower loop (the reforms introduced by the 
government) guides them to a different type of action. Economic agents are thus 
positioned in a complex situation in which the rules of action overlap and do not clearly 
guide them in one clear direction. They cannot define which action to take: they could 
follow the inertia of their economic life until the opening of the market or they could shift 
to the unknown, highly uncertain rules of action designed top-down by the government. In 
other words, managers, entrepreneurs and workers alike did not know what to do, how to 
react to the changes around them resulting from the structural reform policies. In the end, 
many of them were unable to change according to the governments‘ expectations and 
continued to do Y. This uncertainty eventually prevented them from obtaining either their 
goal (remain in business) or the governments‘ aim (increase industry‘s competitiveness).  
CONCLUSIONS 
Argentina is exceptional among the economies of the world. From one of the richest 
countries in the world in 1900, it deteriorated into a developing country a century later. By 
the turn of 1990, three hyper-inflationary periods clearly signalled that the model had to be 
reviewed. A structural reform programme was then launched to reorganise the economy in 
line with the Washington Consensus. 
The government‘s reforms overlooked or misunderstood the institutional framework that 
gave stability to the economy. There was barely any understanding that the structural 
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reforms were not being applied on a tabula rasa but on an institutional legacy that had 
allowed agents to make decisions and take actions in the economy for several decades. 
Many agents continued to follow the rule of doing Y in circumstances X, with the 
unsatisfying result that they did not obtain Z. That is, they did minimal specific 
investments, increased imported components, shed labour and waited for a change in the 
economic policy. In contrast, the government expected that entrepreneurs would change 
their behaviour (Y‘) by making the most of the low exchange rates and investing in 
complete ranges of state-of-the-art technology. They would hence achieve Z‘, which was to 
gain competitiveness and export.  
The discrepancy created institutional gaps; economic action became uncertain and 
unstructured. Entrepreneurs were exposed to a complex situation in which new and old 
rules of action overlapped for the same circumstances X. They could not define which of 
the two actions to follow. This uncertainty eventually prevented them from achieving either 
their goal (remain in business) or the government‘s aim (increase industry‘s 
competitiveness). In the medium term, large numbers of industrial entrepreneurs were not 
able to sustain their businesses in the new economic structure. 
A participation process could have assisted the change in the dispositions to act in at least 
two ways. Firstly, it would have pushed them into a reflexive period on how to reorient 
their behaviour to the expectations of the government. Secondly, the policy would have 
contemplated the needs and demands of the agents whose actions were supposed to 
change in a top-down approach. The government assumed entrepreneurs were able to 
change their actions in line with the expected Y‘. That is, it thought most industrial 
entrepreneurs had the capacity to find state-of-the-art technology, to obtain a foreign credit 
and find buyers for their exports. 
This does not imply that they will agree; the argument is that participation will ensure that a 
reasoning process happens and that agents are given the chance to break the inertia of 
economic life by reflecting, understanding, and eventually accepting or rejecting the 
reforms. It would also have led the government to adapt the policy to the capacities and 
needs of the real agents, while perhaps contemplating support measures for many of them. 
Participation is normally understood as a means as well as an end in creating democracy, 
strengthening governance, promoting development and reducing poverty (Taylor 1998, 
Hickey and Mohan 2004,). Supporting the reorganisation of economic life represents an 
addition. 
The concept of institutional gap contributes to the understanding of why economic actions 
do not result in the expectations of certain policies. Why do agents not respond as policies 
would induce them to? The answer in the light of the new concept coined is: because 
economic behaviour is institutionalised. It is resilient and stable. Agents continue to behave 
in the ways they had been acting for many years, and it takes a period of reasoning and 
adaptation to change their dispositions to act. Alternatively, an invitation for them to 
participate can speed up the process of making sense of the new legal framework and 
acquire the skills to adjust to them.   
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Today, in Egypt, if one encounters ‗participation‘ at all, it is likely to be as a buzzword 
attached to ‗development‘ projects involving foreign donors(1). With its rhetoric of 
inclusiveness and empowerment, a ‗participatory‘ approach promises to help overcome the 
crisis of legitimacy faced by these large, outside agencies that, unlike their ‗grassroots‘ 
counterparts, cannot ensconce themselves in a purported organic oneness with the 
community in which they work, claiming that it is the very soil out of which they have 
sprung and which continues to nourish their roots. Undoubtedly these organizations 
promote what they believe is best, but faith in their magnanimity is a slender guarantee, 
particularly when not so long ago it was the sincere pledge of the colonialist and the 
missionary, come to remake the world in the name of ‗progress‘, ‗civilized standards‘ and 
the good. Meanwhile, the Government of Egypt‘s own much worse crisis of legitimacy is 
not so much overcome as rendered moot, through the use of naked force, political 
repression, and manipulation of information. 
‗Participatory development‘, which is bound up in the work of Robert Chambers, was born 
alongside the ‗Participatory Needs Assessment‘, the ‗Participatory Rural Appraisal‘, the 
‗Participatory Rapid Appraisal‘ etc. (see e.g. Piffero 2009). In other words, like the 
democratic process writ large, of which it is a variant or a constituent, the substance of the 
concept of participation is inseparable from (perhaps we should simply say: the substance 
of the concept is) its form: participatory development consists more of a way of doing than of 
a series of prescriptions about what ought to be done. And since, like apple pie and 
baseball in America, almost no one dares to declare himself against it in principle—though 
many do not espouse it in practice—what conflicts the concept of ‗participation‘ is able to 
generate tend to be low-intensity ones: practical arguments over how it can best be 
achieved. These might turn around which type of local organization should be called upon 
in order to have the best chance of creating ‗real participation‘, for instance: must citizens 
be allowed to participate directly, or is the participation of NGOs and community-based 
organizations sufficient? 
In the meantime, a number of innovative thinkers – we might mention Ferguson (1994), 
Mitchell (2002), and Murray Li (2007) – who perhaps have in common, above all, that they 
are among the Anglophone interpreters of Foucault, have been describing a sea-change in 
the source of legitimacy/power, which they believe is increasingly derived from and 
concentrated in a particular kind of knowledge: expertise. This is accompanied (achieved?) 
by progressive de-politicization and technicalization of decision-making, and appears to be 
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particularly prevalent where distant intervention is involved, making the sites where 
international development agencies, international institutions such as the World Bank and 
IMF, and modernist central governments encounter their objects an exciting field for this 
kind of study. 
Their numerous differences notwithstanding, participation and expertise are the same type 
of concept in the sense that both are bases from which one can derive, rhetorically and 
ethically, legitimacy, and therefore power. They compete – sometimes in a zero-sum 
manner and at other times in a manner that is complementary – with one another and with 
other sources of legitimacy, such as divinely bestowed legitimacy or the paternalistic 
legitimacy of benevolence (‗wanting what is best for the other‘). Each of these is a way of 
constructing an authoritative voice and gaining ascendancy over certain people, places or 
spheres of existence. 
It is the manner in which a problem is framed that determines whether the knowledge 
needed for its resolution is that which comes from having lived one‘s entire life ‗on the 
ground‘ in the community, or from having been educated in engineering or international 
development in distant, elite environments. For the technical voice to acquire authority, it 
is necessary to construe problems as being technical in nature, and therefore requiring 
expert advice. We can easily see, in this context, the manner in which authority and power 
are not merely forces for overpowering objections, but also, perhaps especially, for pre-
empting them, for preventing – through feelings of embarrassment, inadequacy, awe or 
respect – their very formulation and expression. We willingly yield or defer to an expert, 
even in matters of life and death (for example, when we go to the doctor), if we are 
convinced that the problem at hand requires a type of knowledge that we do not possess. 
In such cases, consent, and even the formulation by stakeholders of what are apparently 
their own wishes (which, because of so-called Pygmalion or Abilene effects may in fact 
only be what Mosse (2001) calls a ‗ventriloquizing‘ of stakeholders, that is, a mere 
reformulation of the experts‘ desires) cannot be regarded as a proof that there is no 
coercion, but on the contrary, it testifies to how diffuse and potent the power is. 
However, even when the formal avenues of participation are closed off, stakeholders 
sometimes force their way into these processes as a reaction to their exclusion, or retain a 
degree of creative autonomy to appropriate and inflect global forces even while yielding to 
them. This is what we propose to examine through the case of the garbage collection in 
greater Cairo. 
NEOLIBERAL REFORM 
One ideology, which some call the political creed of the 1990s (e.g. Lee 1997: 139; Post 
1999: 203; Obirih-Opareh and Post 2002: 97), to rise on the swelling tide of expertise and 
typically at the expense of participation, is neoliberalism. Since it is the medical profession 
that popularized the conflict between beneficence and autonomy through its changing 
theories over whether the practitioner can ignore the patient‘s wishes because she feels that 
more good will be achieved by following her expert opinion than by respecting the 
patient‘s own amateurish opinion of their situation, it is perhaps fitting that Egypt‘s 
President, Hosni Mubarak, once publicly likened the IMF to an unqualified doctor 
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prescribing life-threatening dosages of medicine (quoted in Seddon 1990: 96). This is a 
weak form of contestation since it accepts the criterion of expertise and attempts to 
overcome the IMF within the four corners of its own logic: it is implicit that were the 
doctor qualified (i.e., a genuine expert), then Egypt would yield, as it in fact did a while later. 
‗Privatization‘ and, more broadly, neoliberalism, is not new in Egypt, even if it has recently 
taken on new dimensions. Following the 1973 war with Israel, President Sadat famously 
initiated Egypt‘s Infitāḥ (opening or ‗open door‘) economic policy: a series of structural 
adjustments and market liberalizations that made Egypt more ‗friendly‘ to Western 
investment, but which were, economically, ‗no more successful than the Nasserist project‘ 
they sought to reverse, and ended with food riots in 1977 (Bush and Bromley 1994: 202).  
Nevertheless, the policy was drastic enough that in 1986 the World Bank estimated that 
‗Egypt is currently the most open economy of any developing country with a population 
greater than 20 million‘ (World Bank 1986: 1). 
However, in a manner that puts into question openness as a sufficient condition for 
economic success, Egypt still found itself in crisis in the late 1980s. According to Seddon 
(1990), external debts reached US$45 billion in 1987. This was too much for the country to 
keep up with, and repayments basically stopped, triggering a series of responses that 
exacerbated the situation: the World Bank withheld loans, Australia and France refused to 
sell food on credit rather than for cash etc. The bigger problem, however, was that US 
military debt repayments, when 12 months in arrears, trigger an automatic suspension of all 
US civil and military assistance – US$2.3 billion annually, at the time – which Egypt could 
not afford to lose. The country‘s Paris Club creditors made debt rescheduling, which was 
needed to provide some breathing room, conditional on an agreement with the IMF. 
Despite this significant duress, between 1987 and 1990 Mubarak more or less resisted the 
proposed reforms, seemingly in fear of the domestic political backlash they might cause 
and in remembrance of the events of 1977. In 1990-1991 Egypt capitulated, however, and 
an IMF stabilization plan and a World Bank structural adjustment loan were finally agreed 
upon. This set Egypt on a new course. In contrast to the earlier gradualism or outright 
resistance, Mitchell‘s (1999) reading of the events is that the IMF plan, once it was finally 
agreed to, was followed even more eagerly and fully than was required. This led Egypt to 
achieve a reduction in the government deficit that the IMF called ‗virtually unparalleled in 
recent years‘, making the country a neoliberal success story, at least on paper. 
Much of the improvement in financial indicators seems to have been facilitated by harsh 
political repression, however, and to have come at the expense of the majority of the 
Egyptian population for the benefit of a select few, whose wealth and power was either 
further consolidated or simply changed form, shifting from the political to the economic 
realm (Mitchell 1999). Thus it has been argued that, in Egypt‘s case, economic liberalization 
not only failed to deliver the organic up-swell in democracy its advocates promise, but was 
accompanied by political deliberalization (Kienle 2008). 
Even though it was supposed to be ‗at the centre of the adjustment process‘ envisaged in 
the early 1990s (Bush and Bromley 1994: 201, 205), Egypt ‗grasped the nettle of 
privatization‘ late, around 1996, when it began divesting state-owned enterprises through 
share sales. However, by 1998, the IMF was praising Egypt for its ‗remarkable‘ 
commitment to privatization that made it fourth in the world in terms of privatization 
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income as a share of GDP (Mitchell 1999: 460). This is a process that has carried on to the 
present day. By the first half of 2008, despite opposition accusations of ‗selling the 
country‘, socially and politically damaging bread shortages, and even the state-owned media 
openly referring to the ‗economic crisis‘, the state maintained its privatization-based 
economic policies, backed by Gamal Mubarak, the one-time investment banker son of the 
aging President, and his expected successor (e.g. El-Din 2008; Ezzat 2008). 
‗Privatization‘ may encompass more than the sale of state assets. For instance, Tadros 
(2006) considers that the introduction of user fees for the sake of cost-recovery in public 
hospitals (the World Bank‘s suggestion) constitutes a form of privatization of the health 
care system, and that there is a de facto privatization of Egyptian public education as 
teachers force their students to pay them for outside-of-class private lessons because their 
formal salaries are too low. Nevertheless, divestiture of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has 
been a cornerstone of the process in Egypt. After significant divestitures had already 
occurred, Egyptian Investment Minister Mahmoud Mohieddin stated in 2007 that 159 
public companies were still slated for privatization (quoted in El-Din 2008). Many of these 
took place in the financial sector: banks, insurance companies, and so forth. Public-private 
partnerships (PPP), particularly of the Build Operate Transfer (BOT) kind, have also been 
important, especially in areas involving network infrastructure, for instance in the area of 
water and wastewater networks (International Resources Group Ltd. & Winrock 
International 2001: 9). 
Just as in many other countries experiencing privatization(2), Egypt‘s solid waste 
management (SWM) sector was one of those affected. The process began in Alexandria, 
where a $US446 million fifteen-year solid waste management contract was signed with 
Onyx, a subsidiary of the French Véolia conglomerate (formerly Vivendi), on 3 September 
2000 (Rashed 2002a; 2003c). By October 2001, USAID-paid consultants, in a report 
prepared for would-be private-sector investors as a basic information resource about 
environmental business opportunities in Egypt, noted that 
large-scale municipal waste management contracts for private sector operation and 
management, are gradually being tendered by the government through the Governorates. 
To date 7 tenders have been conducted. It is likely that at least 10 other Governorates 
will be tendered over the next 2–5 years, presenting major private sector business 
opportunities. (International Resources Group Ltd. & Winrock International 2001: 9) 
This included contracting foreign multinational waste management firms to take over the 
bulk of garbage collection in Cairo. Within the national context of significant market-based 
reform across many sectors we have been describing, the reconfiguration of garbage 
collection was called a ‗privatization‘, both in the media and in academic literature (e.g. 
Fahmi 2005). However, because the bulk of the service prior to ‗privatization‘ was 
provided by the informal sector (there were also a small number of formal, Egyptian 
companies), and therefore was not the government‘s to divest, that is a misleading 
characterization. Up to that point, the responsibility for SWM had been split between 
public authorities, who cleaned public spaces such as streets and market places, and a 
community of informal sector garbage collectors, known as the ‗Zabbaleen‘, who collected 
waste from homes and businesses (what we might think of as ‗private‘ space). The 
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Zabbaleen‘s jobs, which represented the lion‘s share of the work, were in a sense 
outsourced to entities that were foreign and formal but certainly no more private. 
In fact, waste collection had already been the target of a large number of reconfigurations 
since the late 1970s, all of which involved the private sector in one way or another, whether 
by initially supporting the existing indigenous collectors, or later attempting to alter the 
domestic private sector landscape through regulation. Rather than being a ‗clean break‘ 
with the past under a newly ascendant neoliberal logic, the latest move inserts itself into 
this long continuity of measures on the part of public authorities to ‗modernize‘ and 
‗beautify‘ the city. The broad trend of privatization, therefore, was the occasion for 
concluding contracts that are, arguably, more fundamentally motivated by aesthetic and 
symbolic imperatives than neoliberal ones. The public authorities‘ key concern seems to 
have been that the companies be Western and operate as in the West, in the full symbolic 
and technical sense: the service was to be ‗modern‘, mechanized and ‗rationalized‘ in terms 
of routes and schedules. Since the West defined progress, modernity and cleanliness, as it 
has long done in the minds of Egyptian elites and policymakers (see e.g. Chiffoleau 2001), 
the Western means for achieving them had to be imported. Perhaps above all, the 
informal-sector system of waste management, and all that it represented, was to be 
eliminated, at last. The press and academic articles discussing this so-called privatization 
(Fahmi 2005; Fahmi and Sutton 2006) – almost all sympathetic to the ‗traditional‘ garbage 
collectors‘ cause – predicted the fall of the Zabbaleen as a result of the ‗multinationals‘ 
takeover‘. In 2010, however, the Zabbaleen were still present, whereas most of the 
companies were embattled or bankrupt. 
THE WORLD BANK, „IRRESPECTIVE OF OTHER TECHNICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS‟ 
Shortly after Egypt‘s declaration of the Open Door economic policy in 1974, the World 
Bank arrived on cue with funds for ‗urban development‘. During the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the Bank catalysed significant change in the waste management sector in Cairo by 
supporting the extension of the indigenous informal private sector. If the IMF is 
neoliberalism‘s battering ram, perhaps the World Bank is one of its Trojan horses: evincing 
the manner in which it sometimes serves as the vehicle by which countries are penetrated 
by global discourses and priorities, the first and second World Bank projects (3) (called the 
‗First Egypt Urban Development Project‘ and the ‗Greater Cairo Urban Development 
Project‘) had important components designed to improve ‗solid waste management‘, 
despite the fact that the Egyptian state did not appear at that time to be requesting 
assistance with SWM, which ‗in Egypt was not considered a public service‘ (WB 1986a: 
§34). It was made a priority notwithstanding the wishes of the Government of Egypt 
because, as the Regional Office for Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, which 
proposed the loans, later admitted in its Project Completion Report, it had ‗essentially 
applie[d] strategies recommended by the World Bank for populous urban areas in 
developing countries‘ (WB 1993: §2.5). According to the same report, these strategies, 
published in 1976 and which guided one-third of all World Bank lending for urban 
development worldwide in the late 1970s and early 1980s, attempted to integrate 
infrastructure, transport and solid waste management in order to produce a ‗synergetic 
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approach to metropolitan development‘ (ibid.: §2.3) that appears to have been undertaken 
largely without regard to social, political or historical context. 
A few framing remarks on the general approach of the World Bank in the two loans we 
will discuss may be helpful at this stage. One gets a real feeling for the Bank‘s orientation 
from an experiment it decided to carry out with a form of stakeholder participation 
somewhat different from the one in vogue today: participation in cost defrayal. The main 
‗new approach‘ that the Bank tested in the first project was whether development projects 
could operate on a ‗cost-recovery‘ basis by charging fees to their beneficiaries. The Bank 
envisaged fees that even ‗the lowest income groups […] could afford, thus eliminating the 
need for direct public subsidies and permitting the project to be replicated on a larger scale‘ 
(WB 1986b: v). To give an example of how the fees were to be made so low, in a move it 
recognized might be ‗politically sensitive‘, the Bank sought euphemistically to make a 
‗reduction in design standards‘ for housing, arguing that government housing was too high 
in quality and therefore mismatched to the means of the urban poor (WB 1978: §6.09 inter 
alia). 
Beyond and perhaps above a probable neoliberal confession, it is clear that the World Bank 
espoused the kind of technocratic discourse that misleadingly proclaims its own political 
chasteness by espousing technical (read: as opposed to ideological) engineering, 
management and planning measures that merely seek to improve ‗efficiency‘. The word 
‗technical‘ itself is probably the most overused in the appraisals and audits, appearing 
twenty-two times in the proposal and forty-eight times in the final report and audit of the 
first project. The Bank‘s techniques, especially in the second project, place very heavy 
emphasis on providing ‗technical assistance‘ and training to the various branches of the 
Egyptian government. The Regional Office‘s final report on the first project emphasizes 
that, where things went smoothly (specifically, the solid waste component of the project), it 
was because they were dealing ‗with clear technical issues and solutions‘ (WB 1986a: §5.09). 
The few times when the audit praised the Regional Office for the first project, it 
emphasized that the measures were ‗technically sound, affordable and propitious to eas[y] 
maintenance and operation of assets‘ (WB 1986b: §31) or reflected the ‗application of 
sound technical criteria‘ (ibid.: §36). Criticizing the Regional Office for the poor quality of 
the housing mentioned above, it pointed out that ‗appropriateness‘ in housing standards 
had simply been equated with lower standards, ‗irrespective of other technical considerations‘ 
(ibid.: §60; emphasis added). The obvious non-technical objections to the decision – such as 
the fact that people suffer when forced to live in low-quality housing – were not raised. 
According to the World Bank, three principles constituted the ‗conceptual framework that 
served as the basis‘ for its approach: ‗economic viability‘, ‗financial viability‘ and ‗efficiency‘ 
(WB 1993: §2.5). What differentiated ‗economic‘ from ‗financial‘ viability, or what 
constituted ‗efficiency‘ – terms of art in the World Bank‘s discourse – is not further 
explained in that report, which is precisely part of the rhetorical strategy of this kind of 
techno-politics, which attempts to evacuate grounds of contestation by implying that 
policies are derived of necessity from principles as unarguable as they are unspecific. 
Whatever they may have meant, to the extent that the World Bank believed a priori, as it 
appears to have believed, that efficiency, and economic and financial viability are always 
best achieved through the private sector, we might say it was ideologically committed to 
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neoliberalism, an ideology that – according to Elyachar (2005) and Mitchell (2002), for 
instance – has dominated a whole cross-section of development strategies of NGOs and 
state and international agencies in Egypt in recent decades. 
The First Project – a small-scale pilot loan of US$14 million to ‗explore new approaches to 
urban development in Egypt and demonstrate their feasibility‘ (WB 1978: §6.09) – aimed to 
supply poor areas in Cairo and elsewhere with a combination of housing, infrastructure 
(e.g. water, sewers, electricity) and garbage collection. The Zabbaleen component was 
already important in the proposal and became more important as the project was 
implemented and setbacks provoked the abandonment of many original non-Zabbaleen 
elements. The audit later deemed the project a failure in virtually all areas except solid waste 
management (WB 1986b). Two main parts of the loan to carry through concerned the 
Zabbaleen directly: new garbage collection routes and ‗slum upgrading‘ of one of their 
living spaces, in Manshiet Nasser. 
Even while the first project was mired and collapsing, and even though Egypt‘s World 
Bank borrowing status was being downgraded from International Development 
Association (IDA) terms to less favourable International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) terms, the World Bank authorized a second line of credit eight times 
larger than the first (WB 1982), again for urban development in Greater Cairo. The second 
project was a US$116 million (WB 1982: §2.07) transport-related credit that included 
US$15.4 million – more than the entire first project – for waste management. 
The World Bank‘s observation that in Egypt SWM ‗was not considered a public service‘ 
reflected the actual state of affairs, but, as is often the case in Egypt, formally (in law) 
things were somewhat different. According to Law No. 38 of 1967 ‗On the Public 
Cleanliness‘, amended by Law No. 31 of 1976 and Law No. 129 of 1982 and the Executive 
Regulations adopted under these laws, Local Councils (the ‗concerned authority‘ in the 
garbage sector) ‗must assume the responsibility of collecting and carrying the garbage, 
rubbish and wastes‘(4). However – and this is a big however – the law provided that in case 
of the aforementioned authority not fulfilling its responsibility directly, it could license 
people to ‗practice the profession of garbage and waste collection‘ and it would be up to 
‗the occupants of buildings [to] agree with a garbage contractor‘ the modalities of 
collection. The World Bank did not disagree with this approach by suggesting that garbage 
collection should be directly provided by the local councils, and its conception of ‗the state‘ 
does not appear to have included, of necessity, the provision of garbage collection services. 
However, having observed that many areas were falling through the cracks, the Bank did 
believe that garbage collection services needed to be provided by somebody. It therefore took 
upon itself the role of demonstrating to the Egyptian state that a universal garbage 
collection service could be provided by supporting the pre-existing private indigenous 
system (the Zabbaleen) to extend their services. 
The World Bank located the most economically viable and efficient solution to the waste 
management problem in the indigenous informal sector. The Bank arranged fee-paying 
contracts for the Zabbaleen so that they would collect from areas whose waste was too 
valueless to attract them otherwise (in the absence of this kind of contract, the Zabbaleen 
make most of their money from recycling and pig raising, not from the collection of fees). 
The Bank initially paid these fees on behalf of the poor residents, but its hope was 
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seemingly that one day it might invite them to ‗participate‘ in the project, by taking over 
payment themselves. At the same time, a neighbouring Zabbaleen slum in Manshiet Nasser 
was targeted for ‗upgrading‘. Thus, the Zabbaleen were both the object and the instrument, 
the target and the technique, of the World Bank‘s development project. 
In the final review, the World Bank audit noted that, ‗project performance was 
disappointing in most respects […] with the important exception of the area of solid waste 
management‘ (WB 1986b: §44). In this area where the solution was achieved ‗on a self-
financing, private service provision basis‘ (i.e. by the Zabbaleen) with minimal government 
involvement, the project was praised (ibid.: §49). Conversely, the housing component, 
which supported Government of Egypt initiatives, was criticized. ‗[I]n retrospect,‘ the audit 
concludes, ‗supporting the private supply of rental housing‘ would have probably been 
better, though ‗the audit recognizes that this type of analysis was not usually part of project 
preparation when the first urban development project in Egypt was appraised‘ (WB 1986b: 
§62). The lessons the Bank seems to have taken were a strengthened preference for the 
‗type of analysis‘ leading to private-sector solutions, and a strengthened resolve to avoid 
dealing with the Egyptian state as much as possible: the failure of the projects was 
explained to a great extent in terms of the ‗institutional and cultural framework in Egypt 
that could arise to hinder progress‘ (WB 1986a: §5.07). However, the Bank‘s approach to 
the SWM file did not quite fit the quintessentially neoliberal proclamation of ‗a resurgence 
of the market and a reduction of state control‘ (Obirih-Opareh and Post 2002: 98). To the 
extent that the Bank hoped Egyptian authorities would continue supporting private waste 
collection after the loan was expended, the Bank actually promoted an expansion in the 
state‘s role, albeit as indirect purveyor, rather than direct provider. This model eventually 
took root, but in an altered form discussed in section IV, and only after a detour, which is 
the subject of the next section. 
MODERNITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: GARBAGE, FOR EXAMPLE 
The Egyptian state continued to support or accept the role of the ‗the private sector‘ in 
waste management throughout the 1980s and 1990s. If the World Bank‘s ways of thinking 
lived on, however, it was in a form the Bank would not have recognized: indigenous 
symbolic and aesthetic concerns either de-natured them, or perhaps revealed, as suggested 
above, that the same vagueness that partially constitutes their rhetorical force also makes 
them highly susceptible to being instrumentalized opportunistically to divergent ends. In 
this section we discuss the Egyptian state‘s unwillingness to continue to support the 
Zabbaleen after the World Bank pulled out, even though that was also the 
recommendation of the foreign consultants who prepared the 1990 Solid Waste 
Management Strategy for Cairo. 
Obviously the World Bank‘s demonstration project failed to convince the key audience 
since, around the same time the World Bank was preparing its pullout, the concept of 
establishing a single, centralized cleansing authority ‗emerged as the concerned 
Governorate agencies realized that traditional approaches [were] not feasible in finding a 
solution for the cleanliness problem‘ (Government of Egypt 2000: 117). Jurisdiction over 
Cairo city cleaning in the early 1980s was splintered. Each of Greater Cairo‘s twelve 
districts maintained its own sanitation department (EQI 1997: 41). These were 
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amalgamated by Presidential Decree No. 284 of 1983, not under the Egyptian 
Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA), but under the auspices of two new organizations, 
called the Giza and Cairo Cleanliness/Cleansing and Beautification Authorities (GCBA and 
CCBA) (5). Under Egyptian law, such ‗General Authorities‘ are more or less parastatal: 
with oversight from the Governor, they are run by boards of directors, have their own 
budgets, sign contracts independently, and ‗manage [their] own affairs to achieve the 
purposes for which [they are] established‘. In terms of financing, it was noted that since 
‗public cleansing is a service utility subsidized by the State budget, […] the concept of 
regarding it as an investment process or a profit generating utility was excluded‘ (ibid.: 118). 
To the public authorities at that time ‗cleanliness and beautification‘ basically meant 
garbage collection and disposal, the washing of pavements in public areas (e.g. streets and 
marketplaces) including the removal of ‗debris and excess dirt from the streets‘, minor 
street repairs, and the establishment and maintenance of parks and green areas (Wilbur 
Smith Associates 1990: 7-8). Door-to-door services for residents and businesses continued 
to be provided privately, on an informal basis, by the Zabbaleen. Thus, when they were set 
up, the CCBA and GCBA did not take on more than the public authorities had previously 
done, but were simply administrative amalgamations reflecting a preference for 
centralization and the ‗total perspective‘. 
On the matter of whether the new general authorities should support the Zabbaleen as the 
World Bank had done, the consultants who prepared the 1990 Cairo Governorate, Solid Waste 
Management Strategy Plan(6) thought that ‗in spite of their living in smelly and unhygienic 
surroundings‘, the Zabbaleen should be allowed to remain since they continued to turn a 
profit and their disappearance ‗would seriously impair Cairo‘s solid waste management 
capability‘ (Wilbur Smith Associates 1990: 47). However, the CCBA and the GCBA could 
not see the Zabbaleen as potential allies in the effort to achieve cleanliness and 
beautification. If anything, they appear to have interpreted their mandate as requiring the 
elimination of the Zabbaleen, who were seen as the sources of pollution, contamination 
and garbage, rather than removers of it, as ironically contributing to the city‘s dirtiness 
rather than its clean-up. 
The donkey-cart was a veritable lightning rod in the clash between the technical thinking 
that ignores appearances and the Egyptian state‘s more aesthetically and symbolically-
minded discourse. EQI, an environmental consulting firm that had worked closely with the 
World Bank, assessed the donkey-cart‘s ‗appropriateness‘ according to its cost-effectiveness 
and technical capacity to provide service, not contemplating whether it projected the right 
‗image‘. The firm believed that ‗[t]he use of low cost, animal drawn vehicles is particularly 
appropriate for the extension of affordable service to low income areas and is especially 
suited to the physical conditions in these areas where streets are often narrow and unpaved‘ 
and that ‗the system of choice for low income communities is the traditional donkeydrawn 
cart. […]  
Mechanization of waste collection service should be restricted to upper income areas of the 
city that are willing to pay for it‘ (Neamatalla et al. 1985: 45, 91). The firm‘s founder, an 
Egyptian Christian, was particularly influenced as a graduate student in the USA by the 
concept of ‗appropriate technology‘. When he encountered the Zabbaleen, he was not, the 
way many Egyptians are, disgusted and embarrassed, but rather amazed and impressed to 
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find ‗the perfect example‘ of the appropriate technology concept in his own home 
country.(7) 
However, in the CCBA‘s view, the donkey-cart could not provide a ‗full, modern service‘ 
(Wilbur Smith Associates 1990: 114; emphasis added). EQI lamented that, 
[w]ith the municipality's growing interest in enhancing Cairo's image as a modern city, 
the pressure on the Zabbaleen to mechanize the system increased. The authorities 
increasingly viewed the Zabbaleen's donkey carts as eyesores and traffic hazards [even] in 
the areas to which they did provide adequate services (1997: 39). 
The Governorate and its agencies desire not only to meet technical requirements but also 
to create a ‗modernized system of solid waste management‘ (EQI 1985: 7), based on 
‗mechanization‘ and purged of what they considered symbols of rural backwardness, 
resulted in a ban on donkey-carts in the 1980s. By 1990 the CCBA had ‗issued an edict that 
all Zabbaleen donkeys are to be seized by the police and turned over to the Giza zoo‘ 
(Wilbur Smith Associates 1990: 26). Lest one mistakenly picture a growing herd of donkeys 
delivered from being beasts of burden and living on popcorn fed to them by children, their 
fate at the zoo is in fact to feed the large carnivores (Rashed 2003e). 
Mechanical technology seems to have been central to the Governorate‘s goal of 
‗progressing‘ into something that might be called ‗modernity‘, at least by the Governorate 
itself. There exists a broader connection between Egyptian perceptions of modernity and 
‗showy‘ engineering, underscored for instance in Moore‘s book that discusses how 
Egyptian ‗images of development‘ often focus on engineers, the country‘s ‗most politically 
influential profession‘ (Moore 1994: x). The Egyptian engineer‘s long-standing prestige 
(now waning, as recognized in Moore‘s second edition epilogue) was due precisely to a 
national mystique of industrialization. Engineers produced many of the country‘s most 
powerful modernist and nationalist symbols, from the Aswan High Dam to the 
appropriation of the Suez Canal, an act Engineer (muhandis) Mahmud Yunis was 
symbolically chosen to perform (see, e.g., Moore 1994: 23, 44, 88).  
Lamenting the failure of Egypt to continue down the path of modernity since the 
construction of the High Dam, Egyptians complain about the downfall of its atomic energy 
and rocketry programmes, and the Egyptian-born head of the International Atomic Energy 
Commission, Mohammed El-Baradei, is lionized and considered by many to be a good 
candidate to lead the country. Anyone with even the vaguest claim to the title – for 
instance, a plumber – is called mohandis or the diminutive bash-mohandis, as a sign of respect. 
Parents whose children have gone to engineering school, even if they only earned the 
dubious and common qualification ‗agricultural engineer‘, are eager to boast about this to 
neighbours or acquaintances, often mentioning only afterwards, if at all, that their son now 
works in a shop selling gold, or a tourist bazaar in Khan el-Khalili. And so forth. It should 
be clear that this kind of engineering fetishism is very different from technical-mindedness. 
While the World Bank‘s work in Egypt in the late 1970s and early 1980s was completely 
driven by ‗technical considerations‘ and ‗efficiency‘, it had no a priori preference for 
mechanical technology and technologically complex solutions, or their symbolism. 
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Beginning in 1987, having rejected the extant Zabbaleen system, indeed having been 
constituted as a rejection of the Zabbaleen system, the CCBA sought to create a new 
system under which door-to-door and building-to-building collection would to be done by 
state-licensed private companies. The cleansing of public areas, historically in the hands of 
the public authorities and at that time dealt with by the CCBA, remained public and was 
not affected by the reforms. The licensing requirement applied in many areas where the 
Zabbaleen had been collecting for years or generations, but their rights were not ‗grand-
fathered‘ and they had to bid alongside would-be upstart competitors. The Zabbaleen were 
not, at least in theory, excluded from this system since bidding was open to domestic 
companies and the licensing areas were small. However, only formal (i.e., incorporated) 
companies were eligible to bid, and one of the conditions on which the licences were issued 
was that service be provided with a mechanized fleet. The requirements pertaining to the 
state of the ‗mechanical fleet‘ were the lengthiest section in the contract that license-holders 
had to sign with the CCBA, and were generally aimed at ensuring the ‗internal and external 
cleanliness of the vehicle […] as well as disinfection and [attentiveness to] overall 
appearance‘ (Wilbur Smith 1990: 109, 110, where the contract is reproduced in full). 
As should be clear, this was in pith and substance a system for either putting the Zabbaleen 
out of business or forcing them to reform along the lines of the state‘s modernist, hygienist 
vision. The new licensing and contractual arrangements had nothing to do with 
privatization, but rather sought to erect barriers that would exclude certain private-sector 
actors already in possession of going concerns. Ironically, given the ‗rolling back the state‘ 
concept, the state‘s role was actually augmented under this system as it took on the new 
administrative burden of creating and enforcing the licensing system. 
EQI wanted to keep the Zabbaleen from being shut out, so it created a share-holding 
corporation called Environmental Protection Company (EPC) which was designed to allow 
them to formally bid for licenses (EQI 1997: 41-44). EPC functioned for several years 
before declaring bankruptcy in 1993. Still, even after its bankruptcy, the Zabbaleen 
managed to survive without it, only partially incorporated into the formal system. Initially 
the CCBA regulated the Zabbaleen by requiring that they possess permits that could be 
obtained only upon signature of a contract. Later, however, it eased the requirement to 
deposits of ‗insurance‘, only obliging formal companies to sign the contracts (Iskandar 
2001: 17). Over time many Zabbaleen did convert to mechanized collection, though using 
standard production-line trucks rather than specialized vehicles with compactor devices. 
Even the Zabbaleen who abided by the regulation, to say nothing of those who did not, 
continued to operate in a highly informal fashion. 
However, just as a significant amount of Zabbaleen collection is done with donkey-carts 
even today, especially in poorer areas far from the city centre, where police presence and 
traffic control is limited, the symbolic struggle over the cart continues. In the summer of 
2009, when Giza Governor Sayed Abdel Aziz banned the carts for the nth time, it was 
business as usual for the arbagīyya, (cart drivers, including not just the Zabblaeen, but 
fruit sellers and so forth as well) despite campaigns by police to implement the decree. 
Justifying the decision in the media, one public official declared that banning donkey carts 
in the streets was a necessity to preserve the ‗civilised face of the capital‘, and in order to 
prevent the offence they cause ‗to the public‘s tastes‘. He reaffirmed that the campaigns to 
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eliminate the donkey cart would not cease until the caro (cart) disappeared once and for all 
from Cairo‘s streets.(8) 
MEMORANDUM OF (MIS)UNDERSTANDING (9) 
It has been suggested by authors writing on the privatization of waste management in 
Africa that most of the policy literature driving the process is based on the experience of 
industrialized, high income ‗Northern‘ countries where public-private partnerships were 
first experimented with from the 1980s onward. The PPP notion did not properly translate 
from the Northern ‗context in which the state services were already a ―going concern‖, 
with near universal coverage‘ to the Southern context in which ‗the problem is more about 
the extension of creation from scratch of services for communities which currently lack 
them altogether‘ (Ayee and Crook 2003: 4, references omitted). In a similar vein, writing 
about the privatization of solid waste infrastructure and services in Asia, Lee argues that: 
whereas urban infrastructure and services in developing countries are invariably 
characterised by deficiencies such as partial coverage and inadequate cost recovery, urban 
services in the developed nations are mostly ‗mature‘ systems in the sense that near-
universal coverage has been achieved, [the] ‗user fee‘ concept has been accepted, and 
concerns with cross-subsidy between social groups are less imperative. Given the 
fundamental differences in the nature of the deficiencies of urban services between the 
developed and the developing countries, arguments for the privatisation of urban 
infrastructure and services in the developed countries may thus have very limited 
relevance for the cities of developing countries. (1997: 141) 
In other words, as the French say of their wine, some ideas don‘t travel well. The problem 
of what happens to systems of thought when they are imported from abroad needs to be 
analysed in a slightly different way in the present case, however. This is not merely because 
divestiture contemplates the transfer of existing publicly-provided services to private 
provider(s), whereas in Egypt, as we have seen, there was already a spontaneous market-
based solution and the state had no significant going-concern to sell. Although it may have 
been hoped that the foreign SWM firms would be the deus ex machina that many Egyptians 
probably believed, by the 2000s, was the only plot device that could get them out of their 
inextricable waste problems, the decision to contract foreign firms in fact had a long 
genealogy lying in large part outside the neoliberal turn of the 1990s, as we have been 
seeking to explore. 
The longstanding effort to solve Cairo‘s festering ‗dirtiness‘ and ‗modernity‘ problems, 
which are perhaps nowhere more acutely felt than in the garbage portfolio, was recast in 
terms of the logic that happened to be in vogue at the time. The point is not simply that 
PPP is not a modular gadget and hence cannot be bolted onto dissimilar contexts and 
expected to produce consistent results, or that neoliberalism is not merely a juggernaut in 
the face of which Egyptians had no agency, though both of those statements are 
undoubtedly true. Rather, what this case shows is that as neoliberal concepts migrated into 
Egypt, their importers‘ local agents were not passive recipients, but actively appropriated 
and inflected them through local logics and priorities extrinsic to the (economic) rationale 
underpinning them at the origin. This helps to explain why the Egyptian state often 
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frustrated the realization of the supposed benefits of the private sector after having itself 
claimed to embrace them. Privatization could be used as a buzzword to repackage a 
process that was ongoing for a longer period of time, much the way it has served to 
concentrate and consolidate elite power, transmogrifying it from political to economic 
form, but preserving essentially the same repressive, nepotistic structure that existed prior 
to the ‗reform‘ (see, e.g., Bush and Bromley 1994; Mitchell 1999; Kienle 2008). 
In 2000, the Government of Egypt published a National Strategy for Integrated Municipal Solid 
Waste Management that described ‗the existing undesirable state‘ and outlined an ‗aggressive 
national strategy‘ and vision that would allow the country to move toward ‗the desired 
future state‘ (p.19; references to the National Strategy are given only as page numbers in this 
section). The government had promised the USA that it would develop this strategy in a 
1999 Memorandum of Understanding it signed with USAID, aimed at ‗improv[ing] 
efficiency and performance of the solid waste management systems through a combination 
of strategic planning, improved administration, greater public awareness, and more active 
participation in the private sector‘ (International Resources Group/EPIQ 2002). 
One of the cornerstones of the strategy was a ‗more active participation by the private 
sector‘, and the National Strategy was part and parcel of the subsequent calls for tender that 
culminated in the contracts with foreign SWM firms. This must have pleased USAID, 
since, as it explains in its document ‗Privatizing Solid Waste Management Services: USAID 
helps provide a cleaner, healthier environment for over 15 million Egyptians‘, it had 
invested significantly in the effort to see Egyptian waste collection privatized: ‗Due to the 
growing inadequacies of SWM service provided by the public sector, USAID began 
working with the government of Egypt to privatize these services in areas that are homes 
to more than 15 million Egyptians. In the past five years, USAID has devoted some $5.72 
million to this effort‘ (USAID/Egypt undated). However, the two partners to the 
Memorandum of Understanding, as we will see, understood the meaning of the contracts 
with foreign companies differently. 
Ignoring the fact that formal-sector waste collection jobs were often created at the expense 
of the livelihood of informal-sector collectors,(10) USAID exclaimed that ‗privatization of 
SWM services created thousands of better paying jobs and encouraged foreign investment. 
Over 15,000 new general labor jobs have already been generated or will soon be created in 
the private sector, and‘ – in a manner that ironically attempts to eat the cake of the state 
while having it too, to simultaneously roll it back while rolling it out – ‗1,000 new contract 
monitoring jobs created in the public sector‘ (USAID/Egypt). In addition to whatever 
neoliberal ideological belief in the superiority of private service USAID may have espoused, 
the move also had its predictable self-interested dimension, since it aimed to create markets 
for US businesses: USAID boasted that ‗total estimated value of equipment and materials 
provided by US manufacturers for the new activities in this sector could eventually exceed 
$140 million‘. Indeed, as USAID‘s consultants point out, ‗donor financing and technical 
assistance‘ (i.e., the practice of international development) ‗has been a crucial driver of 
environmental business opportunities in Egypt‘ through the 1990s, and was likely to remain 
so (International Resources Group Ltd. & Winrock International 2001). Funnily enough, 
one of the growing business opportunities the consultants were able to identify in the 
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environmental sector was the business they were themselves in, the ‗market for local and 
outside consulting services‘ (ibid.: 16). 
From the Egyptian perspective, however, the contracts embodied the hope that the ‗city 
would soon rise to international standards of cleanliness‘ (Rashed 2004). The National 
Strategy observed that, in the current situation: 
Increasing waste amounts have been accumulating at various places and becoming foci 
for pollution, bad smells and non-appealing appearance. Also, ineffective and 
environmentally unsound handling, treatment, recycling and disposal methods become 
prevalent [an indirect way of referring to the Zabbaleen, J.F.], adding more to the already 
deteriorating environmental quality. (National Strategy, p. 8) 
In the context of a ‗general progressive national movement‘ – that is, a national 
preoccupation with achieving ‗progress‘ – the ‗time was ripe for action‘, according to the 
Government of Egypt (p.7). The ‗consequences on public health, environment and 
national economy (particularly as related to manpower productivity and tourism)‘ of the 
accumulation of waste in Cairo, which had become ‗quite apparent and acute‘, ‗culminated 
in political commitment at the highest level [the standard euphemism for President 
Mubarak] for a decisive confrontation towards a complete eradication of this pervasive 
problem based on a well-founded scientifically planned approach‘ (p.7). Science and 
planning must be read as the antithesis of the existing system, which is characterized as 
‗primitive‘, ‗dating back to the early decades of this century‘ (p.25), ‗random‘ and so forth. 
‗The problem – very apparent‘ was that ‗litter and Solid Waste (SW) accumulations are seen 
everywhere‘. Although there are many causes, the key one picked out for the executive 
summary of the National Strategy was ‗inappropriate (appearance and function wise) means 
and methods‘ (p.5) for disposal. Notwithstanding the conversion of the Zabbaleen to a 
mainly mechanized service, which would appear to have resolved the main rub of the late 
1980s, the National Strategy‘s position was that that ‗[w]hile maximum recovery [i.e., 
recycling of waste] is achieved at the Zabbaleen settlements, the aesthetics and hygiene at 
these areas are unacceptable‘ (p.24). Indeed, the Zabbaleen are often seen not as removers 
of waste who clean the city, but rather as the sources of pollution who, by their presence, 
make the city dirtier. Consistent with this attitude, the report considers that among the 
‗symptoms of the problem that are clearly evident to everybody‘ is the ‗frequent resort to 
ineffective and environmentally unsound handling, treatment and recycling techniques that 
may pose health risks‘ (p.12-13). If the National Strategy does not explicitly envisage the 
elimination of the Zabbaleen, that may only be because they had already been dealt with in 
the mind of the National Strategy‘s authors, who note that their settlements were already in 
the process of being ‗relocated to assigned areas further from the cities (about 40–50 km)‘, 
which would be ‗well-planned from the beginning‘ (p.26). In any case, no role was allotted 
to them under the National Strategy. 
The government affirmed that in its vision for the future, ‗public cleansing services and 
SWM will be gradually delegated to the private sector. The role of governmental agencies 
will then be […] grounded [in a] ―public-private partnership‖ approach‘ (p.8). Although it 
is not explicitly mentioned that the private partners will be non-Egyptian, the National 
Strategy foreshadows this with its observation that ‗most developed and rich developing 
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countries have achieved high standards of public cleanliness‘ whereas ‗many developing 
countries (in the middle on [sic] low-income bracket) are struggling with MSW problems 
since they lack most of the prerequisites for success‘ (p.32). In that light, it would be 
senseless to search for the solution in places that are constitutionally lacking the 
prerequisites for public cleanliness, rather than importing the techniques of locations with 
proven track records. 
Since ‗time is money‘, the National Strategy, like the whole neoliberal turn, seeks to bring 
those few services, objects or relationships that have escaped pricing into the fold of 
monetization in the belief that setting price signals will cause us finally to begin relating to 
them in more ‗efficient‘ and ‗rational‘ ways, albeit in the highly idiosyncratic economic 
definitions of those terms. Thus the National Strategy introduced what it seems to believe 
was a novel concept that would at last imbue the environmental portfolio with a logic the 
lack of which perhaps explains the perennial trouble in getting people to take ‗ownership‘ 
of it, as the phrase goes: in the future, ‗the concept of attaching an economic value to 
wastes, as being recoverable resources, will be fully stressed as a necessary means for 
reducing their disposal costs and negative environmental effects‘ (p.11). Of course the 
Zabbaleen have been doing this for decades; it is the very premise of their existence. The 
point is not to show that the National Strategy is unoriginal, but rather that the intellectual 
personality of neoliberalism is that of Isaiah Berlin‘s hedgehog: it seeks to relate everything 
to a single, universal vision or organizing principle in terms of which alone all things of the 
world acquire their significance. In a logic that makes economic value the measure of all 
things, even, or perhaps especially, that which is defined precisely by the absence of value – 
waste – and therefore poses a challenge to the ultimate of objective of encircling and 
enclosing all existence into a grand unified theory with a single coupling constant at its base 
– economic value – even that which is defined by its lack of economic value must be re-
absorbed into the market logic. 
Though the term ‗participation‘ is not part of the National Strategy as such, it might well 
have been, at least in the sense Mosse has observed – ‗public works agencies often view 
―participation‖ as a means to reduce operation and maintenance costs‘ (Mosse 2001: 29) – 
and the World Bank earlier practised: ‗cost recovery‘ mechanisms (user fees) would be 
introduced. These were justified through recourse to two ‗two basic principles‘: ‗the 
―polluter and user pays‖ principle, and the fair cost burden distribution among the masses, 
taking into account the socio-economic realities of the served community‘ principle (p.60). 
The principles themselves are not justified, but are regarded as the axioms from which the 
shape of a SWM system can be deduced. The ‗polluter pays‘ principle is transformed from 
a concept of justice designed to defeat impunity in the international environmental legal 
scene into a model for cost-distribution. 
The process of privatization was overseen by a Ministerial Committee composed of 
representatives of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finances, and the Egyptian 
Environmental Affairs Agency. No members of civil society, and certainly no Zabbaleen, 
appear to have been invited to participate in it. The only ‗participation‘ was by 
multinational corporations in the tender process. According to a call published in Al-Ahram 
on 6 May 2000, bid documents were available abroad, from Egyptian embassies. This, along 
with the requirements for eligibility –‗specialized international companies with experience 
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and technical, financial and administrative expertise in waste collection, sorting and 
transportation from all sources, using modern technology in treatment, either through 
recycling or sanitary landfilling, according to international regulations and specifications‘ –
made clear that the Egyptian state was seeking foreign contractors. The phrase ‗specialized 
international companies‘ was, as though for emphasis, repeated in each of the three 
paragraphs of the announcement. The outcome of this process was the conclusion of a 
series of contracts with mainly Spanish and Italian firms. 
Under the 1980s licensing system, the service was paid through a fee the companies 
collected for themselves directly from service recipients (as well as from the recovery of 
recyclables and fattening of pigs, where the Zabbaleen were concerned, as we have seen). 
Conversely, the multinationals were paid by the state, which raised the funds to meet its 
new obligations – estimated at $2.6 billion between 2000 and 2007 (International Resources 
Group Ltd. & Winrock International 2001) – by adding a levy to the electricity bill.(11) The 
levy is a fixed monthly fee depending on the categorization of the premises (commercial, 
residential etc., and depending on the social class of the neighbourhood). With the 
company providing the service and the state acting as its billing department (which is much 
more effective than private-party billing: by threatening to cut power the state can leverage 
the coercive power of the utility to extract payment), a system like that proposed by the 
World Bank had been finally implemented, albeit to the detriment rather than in support of 
the Zabbaleen. One of the lesser ironies of this story is that the Zabbaleen themselves are 
charged (on their electricity bills) for ‗garbage collection‘ even though, needless to say, the 
companies do not serve them. 
PARTICIPATION AS REACTION 
The manner in which the Zabbaleen ‗participated‘ in this process from which they were 
formally excluded (to such an extent that they seem to have learned of the foreign 
contracts, as a fait accompli, from the press (Dollet 2003)), mainly involved a complex series 
of adaptation strategies and what Scott famously called ‗everyday forms of resistance‘ 
(1985). Their attempts to oppose the companies‘ arrival politically – what ‗participation‘ 
perhaps conventionally refers to – were brief and futile. Just as they were violently 
suppressed for protesting the slaughter of pigs during the H1N1 flu crisis in May 2009, a 
number of Zabbaleen were immediately arrested during a protest they staged against the 
arrival of the foreign companies on 3 July 2003 (Dollet 2003), and the brief period of 
formal political activism against the arrival of the foreign companies seems to have gone no 
further. 
The Zabbaleen‘s only significant source of political clout is formidable in theory but 
impossible to execute in practice: a strike would bury the city in waste in short order, but in 
addition to lacking the organizational structure to coordinate this kind of action, their 
power to withhold their services is thwarted by their own dependence on a regular stream 
of waste. In addition to financial precariousness that makes reducing their revenues 
difficult, the need to feed the pigs (in the early 2000s, no longer the case today) ensured 
extreme regularity of collection. ‗Collection never stops‘, except in the case of those 
Zabbaleen who can afford to purchase feed for their pigs in order to liberate themselves 
for several days to travel to Assyut for the festival of the Virgin Mary in the summer.(12) 
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More broadly, Egypt‘s repressive totalitarian regime practises arbitrary detention, frequently 
tortures prisoners, and has very limited tolerance for democratic expression, either in the 
press or through public gatherings. The country‘s emergency law, which temporarily 
abrogates normal due process and vests extraordinary powers in the executive in order to 
face an urgent, critical situation, has been continuously in force for nearly 30 years, making 
protest a perilous and above all fruitless avenue for participation, no matter who is 
concerned. 
The Zabbaleen had much greater success with ‗weapons of the weak‘-style ‗participation‘ 
(which is to say, resistance: whether participation can be expanded to include resistance is a 
question addressed in the conclusion). They began robbing and sabotaging the foreign 
companies, engaging them in a sort of guerrilla-style war of attrition. The companies had 
huge problems with theft of waste bin (not just by the Zabbaleen – many Egyptians found 
they made handy containers for selling cold beverages, storing meat, pickling vegetables 
etc.), and with deliberate dumping of waste outside of the containers in the zones from 
which they were supposed to collect, apparently to prove that they could not do the job 
and to cause them to incur fines from the city for non-compliance with their contractual 
terms. 
The key struggle, from the Zabbaleen point of view, concerned access to and ownership 
over waste, which is a resource and a source of income over which the Zabbaleen did not 
wish to relinquish control (see, e.g., Rashed 2002a; 2002b; 2003d; 2003b). One informal 
garbage collector stated in a 2002 interview with a journalist: ‗We want the garbage because 
it is our lifeline‘ (quoted in Rashed 2002b). Indeed, the main source of Zabbaleen revenue 
both before and after the arrival of the foreign companies was the sale of recyclables 
recovered from the collected waste, and the slaughter and sale of pigs raised on the 
inorganic waste.(13) Collection fees were never a major source of revenue; low to begin 
with, they were often fully or partially retained by middlemen. Where the garbage is 
particularly rich, the Zabbaleen often actually pay owners/gatekeepers for access (e.g. 
Meyer 1987: 81). For example, in 2007 the Nile Hilton received 3000LE (approx. US$500) 
monthly for the exclusive right to its garbage.(14) 
Under the contracts, in addition to taking over the formerly public responsibility for 
cleaning streets, market-places and so forth, the firms also became responsible for 
household and business waste collection both in areas serviced by the Zabbaleen and un-
serviced areas. In the areas un-serviced by the Zabbaleen, companies used uniformed 
employees, most of whom were hired from outside the traditional Zabbaleen profession, 
which is a closed-shop, hereditary group. In these areas, the companies faced challenges 
like the narrow streets (which required specialized equipment, hence the earlier discussion 
over ‗appropriate technology‘), but there was no direct conflict with the Zabbaleen, since 
they were  not interested in collecting the waste produced by the poor. 
However, in the areas serviced by the Zabbaleen, the Egyptian licensing authorities 
stopped renewing the licences of the existing service providers, unilaterally putting them 
out of business (Rashed 2003d). The manner in which each individual zabbal (singular of 
Zabbaleen) succeeded, or in some cases failed, to maintain access to waste is exceedingly 
complex and cannot be fully discussed in the present paper.(15) Briefly, it inevitably 
involved a sophisticated and idiosyncratic series of building- and apartment-level 
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negotiations and bribes with doormen, local police, shop owners, the uniformed employees 
of foreign companies themselves, and anyone else with a sliver of authority they reckoned 
on transforming into a sliver of the pie. For example, some enterprising doormen [masc. 
sing. bawab] took advantage of the new system to tell residents that the zabbal would no 
longer be coming to their door, but that they, the bawab, would carry the waste to the 
street-level dumpsters for a small fee. In such cases, the bawab would typically store the 
waste then extort a fee from the zabbal in order to access the waste, or sort out the plastics 
himself in order to sell them to itinerant buyers of bekia (a different livelihood group from 
the Zabbaleen), or both. Where Zabbaleen collected from marketplaces or businesses such 
as the Bab el-Louq market or the American University, they often paid bribes to the 
uniformed company employees to allow them (the Zabbaleen) to pass prior to the 
company trucks and skim off the valuable items, or so that the uniformed employees 
would set valuable items aside in pre-agreed locations as they went about and swept up the 
streets.  
Access also depended on the attitude of the person producing the waste. For instance, 
many inhabitants, especially Christian ones, take pity on their zabbal and continued to 
employ him as a form of charity. Others felt loyal to their longstanding relationship. 
Others, who could not afford to do this or were more rigid in their desire to conform to 
the new system, might allow the zabbal to take their waste but refuse to pay him his usual 
fee, arguing that they now paid for his services via their electricity bill. Still others refused 
outright to hand over their waste, and began to carry it themselves to a public container 
(the zabbal normally comes to one‘s door), where it might be scavenged by a zabbal other 
than the one who used to collect it. 
Although it involves glossing over a great deal of complexity only just hinted at, it is 
possible to make some broad remarks about structural factors that influenced access to 
waste. In the areas where the companies did not have a contractually stipulated right of 
ownership over the waste, it was easier for them to accept that the Zabbaleen skim off the 
items they desired. These included Giza and Alexandria. However, in Cairo proper, the 
companies tried to deny the Zabbaleen access to the waste because ownership over it was 
given to the companies under their contracts. In these areas, where the companies ‗owned‘ 
the waste, the issue of access varied, structurally, based on whether the company in 
question used Zabbaleen as subcontractors or not. Although both the subcontracted and 
the non-subcontracted Zabbaleen were able to maintain access to waste, they did so in 
different ways. 
Zabbaleen under subcontract 
Those companies that employed the Zabbaleen as subcontractors – above all, AAEC – 
fared the best. Indeed, when the Spanish firm ENSER terminated its contract prematurely, 
its zones were taken over by AAEC, a move many of the other companies were not in a 
position to make, since they were too busy licking their wounds and fighting rearguard 
actions on their initial territories. A spokesman for one of the foreign companies in the 
Cairo zone initially held fast on the point of waste ownership, saying that although his firm 
was willing to hire some informal sector workers as employees, it would not give them 
access to the waste even after it had been deposited in the landfill: ‗the waste remains our 
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property as the contract we signed with the governorate stipulates‘ (quoted in Rashed 
2003a). However, this position proved impossible to maintain in practice. AAEC reached a 
sort of gentleman‘s agreement with the Zabbaleen subcontractors that allowed them to 
skim off the items they wanted from the waste they were hired by the company to collect. 
The Zabbaleen who work for AAEC collect as they have always done, with their same 
privately owned trucks and typically (but not always) without uniforms, except that they are 
forbidden from requesting fees from apartments directly, and must provide the service in 
exchange for the fee they receive from the company. In practice, matters are different, and 
the companies have often complained that the Zabbaleen pressure the inhabitants to pay 
them directly also, so as to double the salary they receive from the company (Abde Raouf 
2006). At the end of their workday, they take the waste they have collected back to their 
home and sort it for the valuables they wish to keep. The following day, as they begin 
work, they back-haul the unwanted waste to AAEC transfer stations where company trucks 
carry it, at last, to landfills. 
Zabbaleen not under subcontract 
IES, on the contrary, did not to employ subcontractors to provide door-to-door collection, 
and relied on a more Western-style system of placing containers in strategic public 
locations, hoping inhabitants would carry their waste to those containers. Since the 
Zabbaleen wished to access the waste and most inhabitants were not eager to carry their 
waste to the containers, agreements were reached behind the back of the company and the 
former system of collection was little perturbed. Essentially, IES took over the cleaning of 
public space – the service once provided by the government – and in parallel to it, just as 
before, the Zabbaleen went on collecting their waste from private dwellings and businesses. 
In these areas, the Zabbaleen have no formal arrangement with the companies to use their 
transfer stations, but often take advantage of their containers in order to get rid of the 
portion of the waste without economic value (they also do this even in AAEC zones, since 
not all the Zabbaleen operating in AAEC zones are hired by AAEC). The companies are 
legally required to dispose of the waste in their containers by taking it to the city‘s 
dumpsites and are fined when the dumpsters are not regularly cleared. Many therefore 
interpreted the Zabbaleen dumping as sabotage, but that was not always its intent.  
On the contrary, the Zabbaleen who do this actually assist the companies and the residents, 
since they both diminish the amount of waste the company must dispose of by extracting 
recyclables, and also transport the remainder to the containers, where it is supposed to end 
up, saving the residents from having to do so. This has also, paradoxically, been of some 
benefit to the Zabbaleen, who, ironically, have themselves always had their own waste 
problem: how to dispose of the items they cannot sell or feed to pigs. In the past they have 
burned this waste, engaged in fly-tipping in hilly or desert areas, or disposed of it in 
municipal dumps (subject to tipping fees), depending on the circumstances. The manner in 
which the Zabbaleen have piggy-backed on the foreign companies and now use them to 
help dispose of their non-recyclable waste is one of the creative forms of 
participation/resistance they have devised in response to this new system. 
Chapter Five 
Private Sector Reform of Egyptian Solid Waste Management 71 
Scavenging 
The increase in the number of public containers, which are magnets that create waste 
concentrations in public spaces and create suitable sites for scavenging, as well as the 
increased exclusion of Zabbaleen from private space under the system of the foreign 
companies has led to an increase in the amount scavenging activity. Indeed, this seems to 
be one of the major shifts in the profession over the last decade. Historically, unlike the 
informal waste collectors in many developing and almost all of those in developed 
countries, the Zabbaleen were not mainly what are alternatively called scavengers, roamers, 
foragers, etc. EQI remarked in the mid-1980s that ‗[i]n contrast with many major 
metropolitan areas in the Third World, scavenging on municipal dump sites is a relatively 
limited phenomenon in Cairo‘ (Neamatalla et al. 1985: 25; see also Neamatalla et al. 1987). 
That continued to be the case just prior to the arrival of foreign waste management firms, 
when another consulting firm with significant Zabbaleen experience estimated that only 10 
per cent of the Zabbaleen roamed the city skimming valuables from public dumpsters 
(Iskandar 2001: 8, 12).  
Increasingly, even those Zabbaleen with regular collection routes are conceiving of 
themselves less as service providers and more as scavengers. For instance, many Zabbaleen 
have begun sorting their waste in the city as they collect, rather than transporting all 
collected waste to their home for sorting. This phenomenon was exacerbated after the 
H1N1 flu crisis because once their pigs were slaughtered the Zabbaleen no longer had any 
use for organic wastes. Relatedly, in a limited number of neighbourhoods that fall outside 
the catchment areas of the companies, Zabbaleen may collect on a one-off basis, requesting 
that the residents pay them on the spot for their services, rather than monthly, as was once 
the norm. 
CONCLUSION 
Driven from the outside into the country, then from the top down within the country, the 
private sector reform of SWM of the early 2000s was supposed to simplify and ‗rationalize‘ 
the system, but instead resulted in a system more complex than ever before. By super-
imposing new layers of bureaucracy and administration, the ‗rolling back the state‘ rhetoric 
that justified these reforms may have ironically led to the state inserting itself into a sector 
from which it was previously absent. 
These were expert rather than participative processes. Nevertheless, the two main Egyptian 
‗actors‘ – the state and the informal sector – each retained an important amount of agency. 
The Egyptian state, rather than being overrun by a foreign juggernaut, preserved a domain 
of creative autonomy even while yielding to international trends and pressures. It 
‗privatised‘ SWM in a manner that creolized the neoliberal creed, giving it new, local 
meanings. The government‘s longstanding aesthetic and symbolic preoccupations over 
garbage and its relation to Cairo‘s modernity and image have a kind of protean power to 
recast periodically themselves in whatever are the terms of the day. Neoliberalism is 
certainly not a series of forgone conclusions: a highly ‗neoliberal‘ institution such as the 
World Bank took a stance almost exactly opposite to that of the Government of Egypt 
when confronted with the same informal-sector garbage collectors. Meanwhile the 
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Zabbaleen, who were, on a formal level, completely excluded from the process (one of its 
objectives was precisely to exclude them), managed to force their way in through acts of 
resistance. Ultimately they survived, which is more than can be said of some of the 
companies. 
Should the Zabbaleen role in this case be considered ‗participation‘? If we take ‗neutrality‘, 
‗withdrawal‘, ‗indifference‘ and so forth as participation‘s opposites, then resistance or 
contestation of the kind the Zabbaleen manifested may be, stricto sensu, defined as forms of 
participation. Even though participation need not always involve agreement, it seems to 
involve a collaborative aspect or a dimension of shared purpose or taking part that would 
be lost on this interpretation, however. Analytically, it is probably more useful, therefore, to 
distinguish resistance from participation, than to try to equate them, lest participation 
become the kind of concept that in attempting to touch everything, grasps nothing. 
While there is of course planning involved in the creation and implementation of any 
project, participation advocates a casuistic approach rather than a drawing-board approach. 
Instead of designing picture-perfect master plans, participation emphasizes a detailed, 
needs-driven rather than elegance-driven approach. In this sense it can be said to be a 
bottom-up process, more in the nature of the common law, building piecemeal solutions to 
specific cases into a larger system, rather than trying to impose the elegance of a 
prefabricated system onto all the myriad cases it may encounter. Planning is a term that 
should be associated more with a expertise-derived system of authority. 
Outsiders seeking to intervene in a community ought to be bound, at minimum, by a duty 
to notify those who will have to live with their consequences and listen to their opinion 
about the intervention. More likely, the duty should be interpreted as going much beyond 
consultation and accommodation, to the point of requiring full involvement of the 
community through discussion, project design and implementation, and of course 
informed consent. The scope or extent of this duty can perhaps be interpreted as varying 
according to the circumstances, particularly the impact of the proposed intervention and 
the nature of the intervening institution (for instance, is it elected, governmental, grass-
roots, national, or is it foreign, expert, technical, etc.?). The means for discharging the duty 
could be called ‗participation‘. 
Endnotes 
Sincere thanks to John Salevurakis of the Economics Department at AUC for his thoughtful 
comments on this paper and his hospitality and guidance in Cairo; Mary Alice Wheeler, Walter 
Armbrust, and especially Nandini Gooptu re-read earlier drafts and provided helpful comments and 
guidance. Above all I wish to thank Lise Debout, with whom this article was for a time conceived 
of as a collaboration. This work would not have been possible without her, even if, in the end, only 
I can take responsibility for the interpretations here expressed. 
1. One of the most significant partners of the Egyptian government for the purposes of 
‗development‘ – the Federal Republic of Germany‘s agency for technical cooperation, the GTZ – 
builds participation into the very title of its mission in Egypt, which it calls the ‗Participatory 
Development Project‘ or PDP (see generally Kipper & Fischer 2009). 
2. Garbage collection, jargonized as ‗solid waste management‘ (SWM), is an important sector in the 
global trend toward market-driven reform, particularly in the area of resource management. For 
instance, some authors claim that it is the foremost example of a traditionally public service 
experiencing widespread privatization in Asia (Lee 1997: 144) and there are numerous examples of 
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cities privatizing SWM throughout Sub-Saharan Africa (Post 1999; Obirih-Opareh and Post 2002) 
and Latin America (Batley 1996: see esp. 741-744), for example. 
3. Other loans were made earlier and throughout this period. Here we focus on those World Bank 
projects calling themselves ‗development projects‘ and which focussed on urban Cairo, containing 
solid waste components. 
4. Based on the outline of the applicable legal framework in Annex 3 of the Government of Egypt‘s 
2000 National Strategy. 
5. [hayit al-nazafa wil-tagmīl] is also sometimes translated as ‗Beautification and Sanitation Authority‘ 
(e.g. Neamatalla et al. 1985). Most details concerning the legal framework are once again borrowed 
from Annex 3 of the Government of Egypt‘s 2000 National Strategy. 
6. Not an official document but a report prepared by consulting firm Wilbur Smith Associates, of 
the Deloitte and Touche Development Consulting Group, Public Administration and Service 
branch of the Engineering and Geological Consulting Group, who were under retainer by USAID 
Egypt through the 1980s in the context of its ‗Local Development II Urban Project‘. 
7. Interview, 13 April 2009, Cairo. 
8. October Weekly, 9 August 2009. 
9. Special thanks to Lise Debout without whom it would have been impossible to complete this 
section. 
10. Similarly, officials who claimed to have created 10,000 new job opportunities by formalizing 
waste collection in Addis Ababa failed to take into account the manner in which their decision 
dispossessed and evicted the pre-existing, informal collectors (Baudoin et al. 2010). 
11. This method has been used for garbage collection billing in other settings (in some cases the 
water bill is also used) to avoid the so-called free-rider/civil disobedience problems of non-payment 
(Post 1999: 212). 
12. Fieldnotes, August 2007. 
13. In May 2009 the H1N1 (‗swine‘) flu crisis led Egypt to slaughter all pigs in the country as a 
preventive measure. The Zabbaleen economy was severely harmed as a result. Egypt appears to 
have been the only state in the world to take this bizarre and scientifically unjustifiable step. 
14. Fieldnotes 16 August 2007. 
15. The brief account given from this point to the end of the section is based on various 
observations and collection rounds which were performed with the Zabbaleen, especially those of 
Ezbet el Nakhl (who collect on both IES and AAEC territory), as well as a ‗stakeout‘ of a site on 
Falaky St. (Downtown), which was observed and photographed from a balcony for a period of 24 
consecutive hours on three separate occasions. Special thanks to Nicole Javaly, Chantal Hudson, 
Pierre Desvaux, Reinout Meijnen and Camille for their vigils on the balcony. Thanks to Pierre 
Desvaux for sharing scavenging and collection adventures out of Ezbet el Nakhl – some of the best 
fieldwork moments – and to AAEC and the ‗Trashopolis‘ film crew for facilitating a view of things 
from a very different angle. The Zabbaleen, whose help was of course the greatest, are named only 
in confidential fieldnotes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Community Forestry (CF), a forest management policy based on partnership between the 
government and local communities, is used in more than fifty countries (FAO 1999: 29).  
It is seen by international development agencies and governments as a tool for poverty 
reduction and sustainable natural resource management. In Nepal, CF is heralded as an 
appropriate instrument to help accomplish the poverty reduction goal of the country, as 
per the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of 2002 and the Millennium Development Goals 
(Kanel 2004). CF is seen as a potential strategy of development in Nepal, consistent with 
the current global environmental agenda against climate change (DoF 2008).  
Much has been written about the changes taking place in Nepal because of CF. Forest 
conditions have improved in community-managed forests (Karna et al. 2004, Gautam and 
Shivakoti 2005). CF has contributed to enhancing the capacity of government staff and 
civil society (Pokharel and Niraula 2004). Civil society organisations are engaged in policy 
deliberations (Britt 2002, Ojha and Timsina 2008). Opportunities for livelihood 
improvement for the poor have been created at the grassroots through change in forest 
management systems (Hobley 2008). Community forest user groups (FUGs hereafter) have 
been able to generate funds from the sale of forest products, and these funds are being 
used for forest conservation and community development (Kanel 2004, Shrestha and 
Khadka 2004, Koirala 2007).  
However, in addition to these positive changes, the CF literature also discusses the 
problem of exclusion. Limited access to resources and economic benefits and lack of 
influence over the operation of FUGs by the poor, dalits, landless nomads, indigenous 
ethnic groups (e.g. majhi), women and other disadvantaged groups has been commonly 
reported in the CF literature (Baral 1993, Agarwal 2001, Lama and Buchy 2002, Winrock 
2002, Adhikari 2005, Dev et al. 2003, Dhakal 2006, Rai Paudyal 2008, Yadav et al. 2008). 
These problems were first identified in the 1980s and persist in CF to the present (see 
Khadka 2009). 
Socio-cultural, economic and institutional factors at the community level have been blamed 
for the exclusion of people with low influence. However, these community-level factors are 
not sufficient to explain selective inclusion in CF. CF policy in itself is exclusionary 
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(Khadka 2009: 227). For example, the policy does not recognise social concepts in 
managing local forest resources. It largely focuses on scientific forestry ideology in the 
terms and conditions of partnerships. The provisions articulated in the legislation are not 
conducive to the poor and illiterate participating in the executive bodies of FUGs. The 
required maintenance of environmental and financial records and submission of progress 
reports to forest authorities demand literacy and networking skills from members of FUGs. 
This in turn blocks the poor, illiterate dalits and differently able people, who have little 
access to information and informal networks, to hold leadership positions. The policy 
recognises people‘s participation to some extent, but the forest department (DoF hereafter) 
has power over the mobilisation of FUGs. While the policy recognises the power 
relationships between the state and the community, it does not recognise the role of power 
of local elites over FUGs (Khadka 2009). The restriction of FUG membership to 
household heads excludes many women. Although all women provide a significant amount 
of labour for the rural production system, most lack control over production assets (Buchy 
and Rai 2008: 131). The membership fee excludes the poorest of the poor from 
membership (ibid: 128). Similarly, FUGs‘ norms for forest protection increase the 
economic burden of the poorest. Poor households pay a relatively higher amount of fine if 
they illegally take out basic forest products from community forests. FUGs‘ policies on 
forest use do not meet the needs of the poorest and dalits for subsistence living (Timsina 
2003).  
This paper explores why CF policy has not been changed to address these problems, 
despite the increasing attention to people and poverty in the CF discourse. One potential 
answer to this question is that the dominance of eco-centric ideas in the CF discourse has 
not shifted. Ideas and policies are shaped by the interaction of powerful national and 
international actors, and the structure and organisation of these interactions and embedded 
power relationships tend to reinforce techno-scientific and instrumental ways of doing 
things. As a result, there is little acknowledgement that CF policy and practice needs to 
change to address persistent exclusion.  
With this hypothesis in mind, this paper analyses the key actors engaged in the operation of 
CF policy, their perceptions of exclusion, and institutional factors that contribute to 
developing these perceptions. The analysis is based on interviews, observations, and a 
literature review and documentary analysis done in 2006. People interviewed included 
forestry and non-forestry professionals, members of non-state actors engaged in CF, key 
CF actors within the forest ministry, the DoF, key CF donors and the staff of CF projects 
in Nepal. 
The following section gives a brief overview of the structure of CF in Nepal along with its 
documented exclusionary outcomes. The paper then defines concepts employed in the 
analysis. Thereafter, the paper identifies the ways in which actors‘ interactions at the policy 
sphere have addressed or failed to address local exclusionary social-cultural, economic, and 
institutional factors to improve decision making power and resource opportunities for the 
excluded groups.  
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NEPALI COMMUNITY FORESTRY AND ITS EXCLUSIONARY 
OUTCOMES  
As a response to the environmental crisis, the government of Nepal passed the CF policy 
in 1976. The policy embraces the participation philosophy (MFSC 1988a). More than 70 
out of 75 districts implement CF under the administrative arrangement of the DoF with 
donor support. The current model of CF is based on FUGs, i.e., village-based organisations 
established to protect, develop and use a particular area of national forest as a community 
forest under the Forest Act of 1993 and Forest Rule of 1995. FUGs receive technical, 
financial and institutional support from a large number of national and international actors. 
A FUG consists of a specific group of households. Each FUG has its executive committee 
which is elected by the general assembly of FUG members, in order to coordinate and 
implement national policy and FUG decisions. To be legally recognised, a FUG must 
develop a constitution and register at the district forest office (DFO), the district level 
authority of the DoF (Kanel 2001). The district forest officer hands over to the FUG a 
delineated part of national forest as community forest under the conditions and terms 
specified in a forest operational plan, which must be consistent with the forest legislation 
and decisions of the forest ministry and department. In this sense, district forest officers 
who approve the plans and constitutions of FUGs are the institutional ‗gatekeepers‘ in the 
CF operation (Kanel 2001: 72).  
Many scholars have documented exclusionary outcomes in CF, focusing primarily on 
households that do not have access to CF benefits. One study in Nepal found that almost 
half of the FUGs studied have excluded the blacksmiths from charcoal collection (Dhakal 
2006: 28). By some accounts, access to forest resources by the poor and the low castes has 
even decreased since the CF programme in Nepal began (Winrock 2002, Adhikari et al. 
2004, Aryal 2005, Dhakal et al. 2005). Others have shown that poor households benefitted 
less than wealthier households from the forest policy change (Bhattarai and Ojha 2000, 
Thapa 2001, Dev et al. 2003, Malla et al. 2003, Koirala 2007), and that the costs of 
participation for the poor may exceed the benefits. FUG‘s price and payment policies 
enabled better-off households to capture the annual benefits generated by community 
forests (Iversen et al. 2006). The socio-economic profile of individuals, social relations and 
the caste system shape participation of the poor and dalits in the CF, which in turn affects 
their access to forest resources and benefits (Lama and Buchy 2002, Timsina 2003, 
Adhikari 2005, Maskey et al. 2006, Yadav et al. 2008). 
In explaining the causes of exclusion, scholars have focused exclusively on local socio-
cultural, economic and institutional factors. The rich, local elites and high-caste people 
have been able to influence the use and distribution of forest resources and income 
generated from community forests, as they dominate decision-making position in the 
executive committees (Iversen et al. 2006, Koirala 2007, Rai Paudyal 2008, Yadav et al. 
2008). Moreover, the caste ideology, private resource entitlement, social perception towards 
dalits and women, and traditional gender ideology have constrained dalits, the poor and 
women from taking part in decision-making position in FUGs (Inserra 1988, Hobley 1990, 
Chhetri and Nurse 1992, Baral 1993, Bhattarai and Ojha 2000, Agarwal 2001, Lama and 
Buchy 2002, Nightingale 2002, Lachapelle et al. 2004). This evidence reminds us of the 
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importance of policy processes at the macro level in which national and international actors 
interact in CF development. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK   
This paper conceptualises exclusion not only as the result of local economic, social, 
political and physical factors but also as an outcome of actors‘ interactions at the policy-
making level. Actors‘ interactions can be defined as the process that takes place between 
national and international actors in order to design and implement CF policy in Nepal. 
Whether the outcome of the interactions supports the poorest and socially excluded groups 
depends on three factors; the power relationships between actors, their perception of 
‗exclusion‘ issues in CF, and institutional factors that perpetuate the dominant ideology for 
the operation of CF.  
Social exclusion/inclusion   
Social scientists talk about social exclusion in terms of complex processes, encompassing 
multiple dimensions along which people are disadvantaged as individuals, households, 
residents of a particular place or members of a social group (Silver 1994, Kabeer 2000, 
Percy-Smith 2000, Silver 2007). The concept of social exclusion is broader than poverty 
and goes beyond the distribution of resources to individuals or households in need. Social 
exclusion recognises social change from ‗relational‘ and ‗rights‘ perspectives rather than 
focussing on characteristics of socio-economically disadvantaged groups (De Haan 1998, 
Silver 1994, 2007).  
In this paper, exclusion is defined both as material exclusion from resources and benefits 
and as exclusion from influence and decision making (Khadka 2009). In Nepali CF, 
exclusion is manifested through outcomes such as reduced and inequitable access to 
common resources, benefits of forest production and development opportunities, and the 
lack of decision-making rights for social groups who depend on natural resources for their 
livelihoods (Khadka 2009). Achieving inclusion in the Nepali CF context would thus mean 
achieving access to resources and decision-making power by those who are traditionally 
excluded.  
Transformative participation and a supportive ideology for natural 
resource management 
The concept of participation has emerged as one of the pillars of the basic needs approach 
to the poverty reduction goal of development policy in the 1970s (Cornwall and Brock 
2009: 6). Participation in the development context can be defined as the process through 
which primary actors influence and share control of development initiatives, decisions and 
resources (De Haan 2009: 161). Two approaches to participation, namely the ‗instrumental‘ 
and ‗empowerment‘ (or ‗transformative‘) approach, have been discussed in the 
development literature. An instrumental approach considers participation as a means to 
achieve better cost-effectiveness of projects and programs, while an empowerment 
approach values the process of increasing participation as an important end in itself (Guijt 
and Shah 1998: 9). Hickey and Mohan (2004) recognise participation as the citizen‘s right. 
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They argue that participation must be a process of transformation that addresses existing 
unequal power structures and political empowerment at different levels. Social scientists 
criticise the misuse of instrumental participation as ‗tyranny‘, which emphasises the 
reproduction of power relationships at the local level (Cooke and Kothari 2001).   
Natural resource management (NRM) scholars who adopt the transformative view of 
participation (Admassie 2000, Buchy and Subba 2003) argue that participation is a socially 
embedded phenomenon linked with power relations. This means that the concept of 
participation in the CF policy process cannot bypass structural and institutional issues 
arising from local power relations. This paper conceptualises participation from the 
transformation perspective and examines whether key CF actors recognise the institutional 
and structural causes of exclusion in order to create a space for participation of excluded 
groups in CF.  
Actors‘ ability to practise CF from a transformative perspective depends on the ideology of 
environmental management they adopt. Two major strands of ideology can be observed, 
namely ‗eco-centric‘ and ‗ethno-centric‘. Eco-centrism adherents believe in green 
consciousness where human beings are considered as agents of environmental protection 
and development. The focus of this ideology is always on the environment rather than on 
the interrelatedness of environment and human beings. An ethno-centric ideology, in 
contrast, focuses on human beings as the centre of natural resource management. In this 
ideology, all policies and processes on natural resources are oriented towards 
conceptualising the ecological process for people and not the other way round. This 
ideology considers the recognition of ecological, economical, social and political 
dimensions in environmental management as an opportunity for tackling environmental 
issues (Dryzek 1997). Adopting the latter view is essential if one is to recognise people‘s 
diversity based on gender, caste, class and social status in natural resource management, 
Dryzek points out. This view is similar to that held by NRM scholars who argue for the 
need to apply multiple perspectives for tackling environmental management problems 
through a participatory approach (Mahanty 2000, Child 2004, Fabricius 2004). Adopting an 
ethno-centric ideology enables actors to recognise social issues in the CF management 
system and development. This perspective is a critical stepping stone to adopting a 
transformative view of participation in CF. 
Power and knowledge in policy development 
Policy scholars recognise the importance of power/knowledge relationships in policy 
processes, and that these in turn have an impact on social outcomes (Keeley and Scoones 
2003, Leach 2008). There are various ways of looking at power. In this paper, the relational 
view of power (Foucault 1972: 94) is adopted. This approach considers power as a process 
rather than as a resource; power exists only when it is put into action. The relational view 
sees discourse as a powerful tool for creating and maintaining the power of certain human 
beings. Discursive power is manifested in aims, objectives and strategies (Foucault 1972: 
90). In a discourse, these elements determine and shape the dominant knowledge base 
which in turn produces the system of power relationships. Thus, knowledge and power are 
inseparable. Knowledge does not simply emerge from scholarly work, but it is produced 
and maintained through the work of different organisations and social practices (Gordon 
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1980). For example, science produces certain knowledge. Engaging a single science in the 
formation of knowledge reproduces ideas that sustain non-transformative thinking in 
development (Foucault 1972). The concept of knowledge as power provides a guide for 
understanding the scientific and social practices that form perceptions (Hoy 1986: 129).  
Importantly, the relational approach to power tells us that power is unequal, and thus to 
study societal change one must look at power wielded by actors in making certain ideas 
dominant (Eyben 2006). The power relationships between actors allow some of them to 
deliberately change the incentive structure of others, a process which Rowlands (1998: 14) 
calls ‗power over‘. This form of power eventually affects the way the CF discourse is 
directed and which ideas become influential. This paper takes up these ideas and considers 
power/knowledge dynamics at the policy level as an essential factor that shapes the 
behaviour and attitude of CF actors. 
DOMINANT ACTORS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS IN CF  
The actors involved in CF intervention in Nepal can be divided into state actors, non-state 
actors (CBOs, NGOs, civil society and private firms), and aid providers (multilateral and 
bilateral donors and INGOs). The key players at the policy level include the Ministry of 
Forest and Soil Conservation (MFSC), the Department of Forests (DoF) and donors. 
These actors operate within unequal power relationships, and donors exercise power to 
introduce and maintain their preferred policy model.  
The Government  
The MFSC coordinates multilateral and bi-lateral funding. Both the MFSC and the DoF 
take part in the planning and decisions of projects related to CF. The DoF, with the 
expertise and human, material and financial resources provided by aid donors, implements 
the CF policy. Under the Forest Act of 1993 and the Forest Rules of 1995, the DoF with 
its district forest offices has the power to hand over community forests to FUGs, and it 
monitors the functioning of FUGs with particular emphasis on forest management and 
use. The government practices of assessing CF from a social perspective are mostly limited 
to establishing FUGs, handing over community forests, delivering training, measuring 
FUGs‘ performance in controlling forest encroachment and illegal felling and the 
prevention of forest fires, and on the use of FUG funds for forest and community 
development.  At the government level, there are still no efforts to analyse the participation 
process in CF from the perspective of social relations and structures or its implication for 
access to resources and influence for the powerless. The identity of the DoF and the MFSC 
is primarily one of ‗agent‘ when interacting with donors, but of ‗principal‘ or ‗controller‘ 
when interacting with non-state actors. As shown later, non-state actors are excluded from 
meaningful participation at the policy level.  
The Donors  
Donors are also major actors in CF because the funds for CF operation mostly come from 
them, and because they shape ideas in CF policy debates. In the late 1990s, 60 per cent of 
Nepal‘s annual forest development budget came from donors. Donor involvement in CF 
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programmes is even higher as they share 80 per cent of the total annual development 
budget (Khadka 2009: 89). There are currently three donor-funded CF projects. More than 
twelve donors with a wide diversity of working approaches interacted with the sector 
between 1970 and 2005 in the CF development context. As of 2006, 70 of 74 district forest 
offices of the forest department have CF aid.  
Donors‘ identity as principal actors has been established and maintained through giving 
resources such as money, human resources, expertise, ideas and materials. For example, 
over the past more than 30 years donors have introduced a variety of ideas in CF 
development ranging from forest conservation and promotion in the 1970s and 1980s, 
FUG development in the 1990s and pro-poor livelihood in the early 2000s. The giver 
always has the upper hand when interacting with the taker, and the relationship thus 
becomes one of domination (Eyben 2003). Donors interact mostly in a ‗power over‘ 
relationship with government and non-state actors because of aid money, knowledge and 
ability to influence knowledge acquisition and dissemination. Nonetheless, in everyday 
social interactions, donors want to keep others happy for political reasons and do not push 
agendas that would encourage the government or other actors to understand power and its 
role in poverty reduction.  
Non-State Actors   
The role of non-state actors in CF started when German Technical Assistance (GTZ) 
included local government bodies and NGOs as implementing actors in CF projects in 
1992. Since 1996, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) has also 
started to involve non-state actors as service-providing agents, with a major role of assisting 
the DoF. The involvement of non-state actors in project delivery has increased since 2001 
when donors changed their operational strategy during the political insurgency.  
It is observed that influential non-state actors are aware of power relationships, but instead 
of challenging these they use them for two purposes; establishing and advancing their 
organisation, and establishing their role as service providers to the forest sector and 
donors. Moreover, although non-state actors such as the federation of FUGs have been 
supported by donors in policy activities, the organisations have little ability to raise an 
agenda that challenges power issues at all levels of forestry governance. Their ability to 
make exclusion issues explicit in their actions is not developed. Their dependency on 
donors for financial and intellectual support is a critical limitation. For instance, CF issues 
identified by the Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal (FECOFUN) under its 
donor-funded ‗policy advocacy programme‘ do not include any problem related to social 
inequities and gender. While the issues mainly focused on are forest resource management, 
forest marketing, forest taxing, institutional barriers from the forest department in CF 
operation and incompatibility of forest policies with FUG empowerment, none of the 
issues is related to gender and social issues (FECOFUN Calendar 2006, PAC 2006). It 
means that the non-state actors talk about pro-poor livelihoods, but they lack commitment 
to raise the issue of power and power relations in implementing livelihood strategies as a 
prime concern of CF development.  
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PERCEPTIONS OF KEY ACTORS  
Actors‘ perceptions of particular issues shapes their policy agendas and how they react to 
policy proposals. Interviews with 99 people involved in CF policy making and 
implementation at the national level revealed that there are differences between and within 
actor groups in understanding the cause of and solution to exclusion in CF. However, the 
dominant perspective is that there is nothing wrong with CF policy or with the actors‘ own 
actions. Most actors locate the cause of exclusion outside themselves or their organisations. 
They do not see solving exclusion as their responsibility. Although they recognise poverty 
and exclusion issues in CF, they take an instrumental view of participation in tackling the 
problem. Their ideas for addressing exclusion focus on material approaches, such as 
providing physical services, skills and income generation opportunities, and involving the 
poor in FUG executive committees. They claim that the poor or dalits are not able to 
capture the opportunities offered to them. Actors see the community or FUG as an 
appropriate site for addressing poverty. They do not consider the forest sector as a 
development sector, with a priority for dealing with social issues.  
Within each of the major actor groups, however, there are some minority views that see the 
problem of exclusion in a transformative way and focus on their own organisation or CF 
policy as contributor to exclusionary outcomes (Khadka 2009). These minority views are 
held by actors who are low in the institutional hierarchy. They perceive that they cannot 
change the thinking in their organisation because of power relations.  
In principle, actors work for the shared goal of poverty reduction through participatory 
forestry policy intervention. However, most actors believe in instrumental ways of dealing 
with poverty. Why do instrumental views prevail and where do they come from? 
WHY DO INSTRUMENTAL VIEWS DOMINATE? 
Scholars who have studied gender issues at organisational level demonstrate how the 
institutional norms, values, incentives, resources, relationships and perceptions of social 
issues within an organisation influence the organisation‘s ability to produce social outcomes 
(Goetz 1998, Rao et al. 1999). NRM scholars also point out that the nature of intervening 
organisations impacts on poor people‘s livelihoods (Hobley and Bird 2001: 188). Actors‘ 
diversity in expertise, education, social background and relationships, and level of influence 
within an organisation, thus shape the priorities in everyday actions and understanding of 
change. In Nepali CF, two factors influence the domination of instrumental perspective: (a) 
the structure and nature of relationships and knowledge in the forest sector, and (b) actors‘ 
interactions in policy making spaces. 
The structure, relationships and knowledge within the forest sector  
The forest sector in Nepal is rather homogeneous. A single profession, namely forestry, 
and a single caste dominate in local, district, and national level forest offices. As shown in 
Table 1, actors within the sector are stratified along four dimensions: professional level, 
education, rank/position and role/expertise. The professional level is stratified into 
‘officer‘ and ‗non-officer‘; each level has staff with different ranks. 
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Overall, men dominate the sector, making up 97 per cent of total staff. Technical 
professionals outnumber the administrative staff. There are skewed power relationships 
between staff, as 93 per cent of total staff occupy lower ranking positions (non-officer 
level) without influence at the policy level. Female staff are mostly in the low ranks as they 
occupy only 0.4 per cent of total officer-level staff. Women make up 1.4 per cent of the 
total technical level staff. There are no dalits among the first and second rank officers.  
 
Table 1 
Actors in the forest sector, Nepal 
Category 
         Actors 
Male 
(No.) 
Female 
(No.) 
Total Women  
(% of 
total 
category) 
No. % 
Professional Level       
Officer level 549 35 584 7 0.4 
Non-officer level 7488 223 7711 93 2.7 
Education      
Technical science 5649 119 5768 70 1.4 
Non-technical science 2388 139 2527 30 1.7 
Ranks      
1st class officer 37 0 37 0 0 
2nd class officer 156 8 164 2 0.1 
3rd class  officer 356 27 383 5 0.3 
Non-officer 7488 223 7711 93 2.7 
Roles      
Foresters (officer level) 359 11 370 4 0.1 
Other technical officers* 109 22 131 2 0.3 
Forest ranger/other technical  
non-officer 
1333 39 1372 17 0.5 
Forest guards/game scouts 4026 65 4091 49 0.8 
Administrative staff 2210 121 2331 28 1.5 
Total no. of staff 8037 258 8295 100  
% of total 97 3  100  
Source: Adapted from Khadka 2009: 81 
* Agriculturists, botanists, engineers and chemists working in the department of soil conservation and 
watershed management, the department of plant resources and the department of forest resource survey 
 
The recent change in Article 24 (gha) of the Public Service Rule of 1992 of the government 
of Nepal, has allowed government staff to be self-promoted based on his/her job 
experiences. However, salary is the main incentive for the self-promotion, as roles remain 
the same. For example, as of January 2010, 660 forest rangers (non-officer) including 14 
women rangers were promoted to officer level in the forest sector, but their roles and 
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responsibilities have not changed from the ranger position. Therefore, they are not 
included in the officer-level staff in Table 1.  
In addition, the sector is characterised by the unequal position of decision-makers by 
caste/ethnicity and gender. The high caste (brahmin/chhetrii) and advantaged ethnic group 
(newar) who have a low incidence of income poverty (Deraniyagala 2005: 53), hold the 
decision-making positions of the forest ministry, DoF, regional offices, ministerial and 
departmental divisions and district level forest offices. The DoF as the key implementing 
agency of CF is dominated by high-caste and ethnically advantaged men. Table 2 shows the 
unequal positions of forest officers by caste/ethnicity, gender and regions within the forest 
department. 
 
Table 2 
Forest officers in the department of forests, Nepal 
Gender Terai Hills 
Total  
no. 
% Dalit  BCN* 
Ethnic 
group 
Minorit
ies** 
Male 70 159 229 97 2 218 7 2 
Female 1 5 6 3 0 5 1 0 
Total 71 164 235  2 223 8 2 
% 30 70   1 95 3 1 
Source: adapted from Khadka 2009: 84                                            
* Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar 
** religious minorities (e.g. Muslims) 
 
Only one out of 74 district forest offices, the smallest in terms of land coverage and forest 
area, has a female forester as the head of the forest office.  
The sector is very hierarchical. Low-rank staff are labelled as ‗the followers‘ of their 
superior (Khadka 2009: 82). The majority of the high-level forestry officials in the centre 
offices maintain their traditional forestry norms, values and bureaucratic procedures 
(Pokharel 1997: 349).  
Whilst the structure of the forest sector is homogenous, the human resource development 
programme offered by donors reinforces homogeneity. Aid-funded training for higher 
ranks among DoF staff is not diverse. Staff receive higher education scholarships from CF 
aid to pursue forestry science or a related field. Moreover, aid-funded studies and 
curriculum development activities support the reinforcement of techno-scientific 
knowledge in CF. The aid-funded activities define forestry, the role of the forest sector and 
foresters in CF development with high priority for techno-scientific knowledge. This 
contributes to the dominant perception that foresters have to deal with forests, not people. 
Compared with the forest sector in government, donor-funded CF projects are more 
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heterogeneous in terms of professional disciplines, gender and caste/ethnicity in staffing. 
However, foresters are in power at the decision-making level (Khadka 2009: 84-85).  
The crucial point is that the strategy of the forest sector does not recognise human 
resource management as a tool for dealing with exclusionary outcomes or equipping people 
to take a more social perspective. Despite an awareness of the knowledge crisis at 
government level in dealing with social issues in CF (Kanel 1993: 4), knowledge inclusion 
has not yet been put on the agenda of CF aid.   
The chance of making the forest sector more inclusive is very low unless the forestry 
training centre in Nepal gives due emphasis to the inclusion of ethnic minorities, dalits and 
women in forestry education. The high and middle castes represent 90 per cent of the 
graduate population in Nepal (Deraniyagala 2005: 53). As shown in Table 3, brahmin/chhetri 
students (87 %) outnumbered all others in the BSc Forestry training programme between 
1981 and 2001. Dalits and religious minorities are low in number. By region, 75 per cent of 
total students represent the hill residents. Until 2001, there was no female graduate from 
dalits and religious minorities. 
 
Table 3 
 No. of BSc forestry graduates produced at Institute of Forestry, Pokhara  
(1981–2001) 
Gender Terai Hills 
Total  
no. 
% Dalit  BCN* 
Ethnic 
group 
Minorit
ies** 
Male 176 490 666 91 4 583 73 6 
Female 4 62 66 9 0 59 3 0 
Total 180 552 732  4 642 80 6 
% 25 75   1 87 11 1 
Source: Khadka 2009: 85  
* Brahmin, Chhetri and Newa 
** religious minorities (e.g. Muslims) 
 
The domination of high-caste and ethnically advantaged males in education institutions has 
the implication of continued dominance in recruitment in the sector. The nature of forestry 
education is equally important for maintaining an instrumental view of CF at the policy 
level. The content of the CF course at the Institute of Forestry (IoF), for example, focuses 
on physical rather than social issues. While the content emphasises the formation of FUGs 
and preparation of forest management plans, it lacks content on transformative 
participation and gender-, class- and caste/ethnicity-based power relationships.  
Clearly, institutional dynamics has a role in organising policy-making spaces in which the 
chance to include different views is low.  
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POLICY-MAKING SPACES  
Cornwall (2002: 2) conceptualises space in three ways; as political space, policy space and 
space for participation. The structure and organisation of spaces shape the participation 
process. The interplay of power between actors determines who is included or excluded 
and which knowledge is acknowledged. In Nepali CF, policy spaces which are organised by 
the government and shaped by foreign aid agenda lack room for other ideas.   
The forest ministry and DoF coordinate and organise several formal and informal policy 
spaces financed and facilitated with donors‘ funds. For the CF operation, six main types of 
spaces exist. These include (a) the Forestry Sector Coordination Committee (FSCC), (b) the 
sub-working groups of the FSCC, (c) the CF interactive group, (d) an issue-based task 
force, (e) the national CF workshop preparatory committee, and (f) the Gender and Equity 
Working Group (GEWG). The objectives of these spaces are to discuss both policy and 
implementation issues related to forestry and CF intervention, and to give new directions 
for CF development (Khadka 2009: 195).  
Actors in the policy space 
Government, civil society, (I)NGOs, and donors participate in the spaces, but powerful 
actors such as foresters, high-caste and ethnic advantaged groups and men dominate. The 
spaces are very hierarchical. The chance of inclusion of field staff and community members 
with low social positions is relatively low. Spaces like the FSCC are the most important 
sites to push and pull agendas for CF development. However, only top-level officials from 
member organisations are selected for FSCC. While acknowledging stakeholders‘ 
participation, the FSCC neglects power relationships in the participation process. 
 
Table 3 
 Participants invited for the FSCC meeting by organisation 
Meeting Gender GO Donors INGO 
Non-
state 
Total 
no. 
% of 
total 
9th/2000 Male  48 21 5 3 77 94 
 Female 2 2 0 1 5 6 
11th/2003 Male 45 29 3 6 83 95 
 Female 0 3 0 1 4 5 
 Total no.   95   55  8 11  169  
Source: Khadka 2009: 198 
 
Table 3 shows the composition of participants in two FSCC meetings held in 2000 and 
2003. Government and donors including INGOs constituted 94 per cent of total invitees. 
As of 2001, foresters made up more than 90 per cent of these participants (Shrestha 2001: 
64). 
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Only 5 per cent of the participants invited to the meetings were women. As of 2006, the 
sector had five women foresters in low-rank positions in the central office. None of them 
are involved in any policy spaces as ‗resourceful actor‘. Moreover, high castes and ethnically 
advantaged groups dominate in the policy spaces. This is due to their prevalence in 
decision-making positions in the participating institutions (Khadka 2009).  
One policy space theoretically open to all is the national CF workshop which is held every 
five years. In practice, however, access to this space by socio-economically disadvantaged 
groups is restricted. For the recently held fifth CF workshop, there was a prohibitive 
registration fee of NRs 500. Those who could not pay needed to apply to the workshop 
secretariat office, and only 40 participants were admitted on a ‗first come first served‘ basis 
(DoF 2008).  
The DoF convened five CF workshops between 1987 and 2008. The workshops varied in 
focus, objective and output over time (Khadka 2009). They became more inclusive in terms 
of represented organisations. However, foresters, senior staff, high-caste and ethnically 
advantaged groups and men from forestry institutions (government, donors, INGOs, 
NGOs) dominated the workshops in numbers and roles. Importantly, progressive ideas 
evolved over time in the workshops, but they are defined vaguely. Social issues raised in 
one workshop are ignored in the next (Khadka 2009: 204).  
Power dynamics in the policy spaces 
Although the spaces have encouraged the participation of multiple actors, power 
relationships continue to shape their interaction process. At the same time, the spaces 
reinforce existing power relationships. The forest ministry and DoF invite civil society 
organisations and NGOs, but donor-funded projects have a major role in creating this 
invited space for participation. Participating non-state actors feel the ‗domination‘ or 
‗control over‘ of the government and donors. An NGO member expressed this: 
I attended the forest sector‘s meeting in 2001 as NGO representative, but the meeting 
was dominated by government and donors. The forest ministry presented agenda. All 
papers were about bio-diversity, collaborative forest policy and community forest 
handover in the terai (Khadka 2009: 200).  
Individuals from non-state actors are selected based on their personal relations with 
government and project staff. They participate mainly passively. A respondent from civil 
society remarked: 
I am the chair of FUG in my village. I am also the chair of organisation X established for 
empowerment of local NRM groups. With the support of CF project Y, I was able to 
establish this organisation. I have a good relationship with the forest sector. I know 
many senior people in the sector and the project Y. I represent my organisation in 
several policy meetings. The role of civil society in the meeting however is a ‗witness‘. 
We do not have any power to influence the policy agenda. (Khadka 2009: 200).   
Project staff feel it is their responsibility to participate in the policy dialogue and advise the 
government about who participates and what to discuss. Government policy makers give 
low priority to the voices of grassroots NRM NGOs run by women (Rajbhandari 2001). 
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Some have observed the exclusion of women in recently created policy spaces, such as the 
working group on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) 
(Gurung and Quesada 2009:7). CF, in rhetoric, is heralded as participatory policy engaging 
people in defining and implementing programmes in order to improve the social and 
ecological system. However, in reality this sort of interaction does not happen frequently 
either at the local level or in the national policy dialogue.   
A deeply rooted institutional practice of the forest sector is contributing to sustain non-
participatory and exclusive policy spaces. Institutional norms such as giving priority to 
professionals with a forestry background and working experience have contributed to enrol 
selective people in policy power. Donors recognise the knowledge of top-level government 
foresters and involve them in influential policy events, policy reviews and project impact 
studies (Khadka 2009). The implication is that it is hard to include new ideas or views in 
the space which would emphasise structural issues of exclusion.  
CONCLUSION  
The dynamics and complexity of actors‘ interactions, perceptions and power/knowledge in 
participatory forestry play a role in the exclusion of the poor, dalits and other disadvantaged 
social groups. While CF in principle emphasises social as well as environmental objectives, 
there is, at the policy level, a lack of attention for social issues that would help tackle 
exclusion in a transformative way.  
The institutional setup and structure of policy-making institutions such as the DoF, power 
relationships between key CF actors, and the process of knowledge development have 
contributed to develop and maintain an uncritical perspective. These institutional processes 
contribute to understanding and operating CF in an eco-centric view of forest 
management. This view ignores power as an important issue to be addressed for providing 
a space for participation by the poor, dalits and women.  
To argue that ‗community‘ or ‗local institutions‘ are the cause of exclusion and an obstacle 
for poverty reduction is not sufficient in the Nepalese CF. It is argued that actors‘ 
interactions and power relationships at the policy level impact negatively on the poor and 
other marginalized groups. The extent to which CF policy supports these depends on 
power relationships between national and international actors, structures and knowledge 
within the government, and relationships, behaviour and power positions of individual 
actors. Progressive ideas introduced through external forces will not benefit the poor and 
other disadvantaged groups unless actions are taken to overcome the current hurdles of 
actions and behaviour put up by key CF actors.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Speaking Up: Citizen Demand for 
Accountability and Improved Services  
in a Nairobi Slum 
Mariana Cifuentes 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades there has been a shift in many countries towards reforming lower-
tiers of government through participatory mechanisms. These reforms aim to encourage 
citizens‘ groups to engage in collective action to provide public goods in co-operation with 
public authorities. These local government reforms decentralised decision-making while 
opening channels for citizen inclusion, theoretically resulting in better services and greater 
accountability of the state (Cornwall and Coelho 2004).  
In Africa these types of reforms have ‗failed‘ in nearly all cases (Crawford 2005; Manor 
2004). Crook and Ayee (2006) argue that this is because participatory reforms are not easier 
or cheaper than central government-driven service provision. Opening participatory spaces 
for citizen representation is a radical challenge to traditional forms of state organisation. 
For such provision to work public officials need to be flexible and adapt to new ways of 
working that may involve more onerous and time-consuming tasks, such as more 
consultation, changes in delivery practices, open access to information and complex co-
ordination. These changes often require reforms of public agencies to develop new 
organisational cultures centered around incentives and continous staff training. Furthmore, 
the reforms require improvement in the political legitimacy of governments in order to 
encourage citizens to co-operate with public authorities. This is essentail as political 
relations between communities and city governments are characterised by hostility and 
mutual mistrust.  
In 2000, Kenya adopted a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) which outlined 
reforms involving citizen participation in service delivery. This chapter describes the 
implementation of one of these participatory reforms in a slum in Nairobi City, Kenya. The 
aim of the chapter is two-fold. First, it explains how the reform was interpreted by officers 
working within the Nairobi City Council, and second, it describes how an action research 
methodology helped residents to voice their concerns, which in turn led to improvements 
in the participatory process.  
 
 PARTICIPATION FOR WHAT: SOCIAL CHANGE OR SOCIAL CONTROL? 
94 Mariana Cifuentes 
THE LASDAP REFORM  
In Kenya today, both local government authorities and line ministries share responsibilities 
for the provision of basic services, such as health, education, garbage collection, street 
lighting, road provision, water and sewerage infrastructure. This parallel modality of service 
provision has led to confusion regarding the role of local governments. The extent to 
which local governments undertake service delivery depends on the willigness to firstly 
define and then fulfil their governance role. As a result, local governments‘ role as service 
providers is limited and they are often accused of corruption and inefficiency, making 
‗informality‘ the dominant mode of urban administration (GOK 1995).(1)  
In 1998, the Government of Kenya and the World Bank initiated discussions for the 
introduction of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Among other things, the PRSP 
looked at reforming local governments in order to help them regain financial health and 
improve their ability to deliver public services for the urban poor. By 2000, the 
Government of Kenya had introduced a local government reform that included a 
participatory component called LASDAP (Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan). 
LASDAP invited people (as service users) to participate in forums organised by the local 
government. These forums identified priority services, which were later funded through 
annual grants made by the central government. Interestingly, the urban poor inhabiting 
slums were considered as one of the main target audiences for the reforms. This was a 
significant change as in the past slum communities were not seen as the responsibility of 
local governments. 
The LASDAP participatory process involved a number of steps implemented by local 
governments. First, each councillor (i.e. an elected political representative of an urban 
Ward) was expected to disseminate information among their constituencies about 
LASDAP. Then, councillors were required to organise consultative meetings within their 
Wards involving civil society organisations and residents.(1) The councillors then presented 
prioritised infrastructure projects agreed in the consultative meetings to the Nairobi City 
Council to secure approval and funding. At the end of these negotiations the councillors 
were then responsible for supervising the sucessful implementation of the approved 
projects. The reform, thus, placed councillors as the key actor leading the participatory 
process. However, by placing too much reliance on the councillors the reform process 
ignored the corrupt organisational culture within the Kenyan local government, which in 
turn undermined compliance with the LASDAP objectives. 
The context: Korogocho slum 
Nairobi‘s slums are the product of a historical process that started 100 years ago under the 
British rule. The city was planed by the White ruling elite to ensure spatial segregation 
between residents of different races. Interestingly, the city‘s layout did not change with 
independence and rural migrants settled in unplanned slums, which rapidly expanded city 
boundaries. By 2004, there were 177 slums, roughly 55 per cent of the city‘s total 
population, covering six per cent of the city‘s total residential area (Rweria 2004). These 
slums are densely populated areas characterised by inadequate housing and failed 
infrastructure.(2) Houses are made of corrugated iron sheets with dirt floors. Less than one 
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quarter of the houses have electricity, and water has to be sourced from private vendors. 
Less than half the residents have a pit latrine in the plot where they live; most residents pay 
for private toilets which offer better quality services. Many residents dispose of their solid 
waste by dumping it on the street or in vacant plots. As a result, slums have a high 
incidence of health problems, especially among children. A study found that child mortality 
rates in slums in Nairobi City are higher than in rural areas of Kenya (APHRC 2002: 113).  
Roads are determined by those who build structures, resulting in poorly planned and 
difficult to access communities. A combination of high unemployment among youth, bad 
lighting and poor road access results in high levels of violence. Despite hosting different 
ethnic groups slums are sites of considerable ethnic tension, which is often exploited by 
politicians. Overall, Nairobi‘s slums are a vivid example of the high levels of inequality in 
Kenya. 
This research project started in 2005, five years after LASDAP had been introduced. The 
research team selected Korogocho Ward, which hosts the fourth largest slum in Nairobi, as 
the best-fit research site.(3) Korogocho, with an estimated population of 100,000 people 
distributed across nine ―villages‖, which was given informally to civil servants (as a polictal 
reward) who then built semi-permanent shacks for rental by rural migrating populations.(4) 
As in other slums, the absence of adequate public services in Korogocho has opened the 
door for a myriad of informal providers, including private operators, landlords and 
community members. For example, there are sixteen private health clinics that vary in 
prices, quality and availability of services. There are more than ninety private primary 
schools offering both formal and informal (literacy-based) education. Thus, Korogocho 
was a good place to assess how LASDAP had been implemented.  
Another advantage of Korgocho was the fact that there was an youth movement, called 
Miss Koch, located there. Miss Koch had a broad membership that brought together youth 
from different ethnic groups in all the nine villages. They also organsied beauty peagants 
encouage community discussion on rape and gender-based violence. Miss Koch was 
interested in participating in the research as it would provide a useful platform to raise 
service delivery issues in the community. 
Role of councillors in the implementation of LASDAP 
The research started with a survey of one thousand residents to understadn citizen 
perceptions of the achievements of the local councilor, as well as LASDAP. The study 
found that 40 per cent of people interviewed did not know the councilors‘ name or what 
his role was. Only 27 per cent had heard of LASDAP before or knew what it was. Less 
than 13 per cent of people had attended a meeting organised by the councillor. 
Furthermore, only one per cent of people survyed had been invited to attend a LASDAP 
consultative meeting. Thus, Korogocho residents had no information about the LASDAP 
process. By controlling information on LASDAP, the councillor had full control over the 
'participatory' process. Only a few selected people were invited to take part in LASDAP 
meetings, and in most cases they represented the interests of the councillor. 
In February 2005, the research team attended a LASDAP consultative meeting in 
Korogocho and found that the organisers lacked knolwdge of the correct procedures to 
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involve citizens. The councillor who chaired the meeting tended to ignore citizens‘ 
demands and discussion was dominated by officials talking about irrelevant issues. The 
councillor ended this meeting when he felt his power was being contested by citizens‘ 
complaints for accountability. A member of an attending civil society organisation made 
the following statement about the meeting:  
―It is only the right stakeholders who are invited for the meetings. The discussion was 
dominated by the four councillors who had attended and the chairman hardly gave the 
other participants an opportunity to present their views. There were accusations and 
counter accusations over the status of the LASDAP monies. No written proposals were 
submitted. Instead, councillors and a few participants requested time to come up with 
proposals for their wards‘, (NGO, Korogocho, 2005). 
It was also found that during consultative meetings, the councillor was accused of corrupt 
deals, especially during the procurement and tendering of LASDAP projects. When this 
issue was raised with the LASDAP Desk Officer of Nairobi, he said:  
―There is a lot of political interference in the procurement and tendering for the 
implementation of the projects, reducing the quality of projects that have been 
implemented. Related to this is that the council officers on the ground have in some 
cases colluded with the implementing agents to defraud the council. The tendering and 
procurement process is slow and not transparent. Therefore other than delaying 
implementation of the prioritised projects, it is also open to abuse. Councillors have 
taken advantage of this to earn huge sums of money from the council. Any effort to 
change the process to prequalification of contracts which is less time consuming has 
been systematically opposed by the councillors‘, (Nairobi City Council, 2005).  
Thus, despite pledges for a reformed framework the LASDAP process was financing the 
rent-seeking enterprises of the councillor. This is similar to what Gaventa and Valderrama 
(1999) found in other participatory initiatives controlled by local governments; those who 
control the decision-making structures will inevitably define the space, actors, agendas and 
procedures to be followed. In the case of Nairobi, the lack of information regarding rules 
for citizen participation was a barrier for their effective involvement. Does this meant that 
LASDAP was a complete failure? To answer this question it is important to understand 
that LASDAP was the only public space where urban dwellers could engage with their 
elected councilors. Thus, the research team decided to focus on ways to encourage citizen 
engagement in LASDAP to improve service delivery. 
Strengthening LASDAP through citizen involvement 
The research team decided to follow an action research methodology in order to 
strengthen participation of Korogocho residents in the LASDAP process. This required 
their active collaboration in LASDAP, stressing the importance of co-learning as a primary 
aspect of the research process (Gilmore et al. 1986: 161). Following an open selection 
process, the research team hired 27 local youths to become co-researchers. The youths 
were selected based on their experience in community mobilisation activities, as well as 
having finished secondary education. The successful candidates were put through a 
rigorous two-week training programme on the qualities of a good community mobiliser, 
Chapter Seven 
Speaking Up: Citizen Demand for Accountability and Improved Services in a Nairobi Slum 97 
and the different stages of the LASDAP process (preparation, consultation, design and 
approval, finalisation and the implementation stage).  
The team started working on the dissemination of basic information regarding LASDAP. 
Vernacular radio stations disseminated information by inviting co-researchers to answer 
questions regarding LASDAP. Once there was a buzz going around the area, co-
researchers were divided into pairs and assigned to villages according to their place of 
residence, where they were required to visit religious, youth and cultural groups. The co-
rsearchers attended group meetings, and encouraged residents to ask questions regarding 
corruption in the provision of services. The first break-through took place when women 
with a cultural group complained that a team working for the councillor was unaccountable 
in the provision of scholarships was charging parents who wanted to apply for them. The 
woman said that the councillor had told her that:  
―If you don‘t want to pay for the form, saying its your ‗right‘ to receive the bursary 
funds, there is no need for you to confirm if you have been lucky or not‘, (Woman, 
Korogocho, 2005). 
The research team investigated this issue and found that the charged parents for applying 
for the scholarships. Despite this, most of the Ksh 300,000 (approximately €3,000) funds 
allocated for the scholarships had been given to ghost students. These findings were 
discussed in all villages across Korogocho and parents agreed to complain to the councillor 
about this. This was the first time that residents had demanded accountability for a service 
provided by the Nairobi City Council. The councillor retaliated by complaining to the area 
elders that the research team wanted to take over their jobs. However, soon the tension 
was rising as the challenge was itnerpreted as lack of respect from the youths to the elders 
of the area. It took several meetings to reassure the elders, the Chief and the councillor that 
the intention of the research was to work in partnership and make LASDAP more 
accountable, rather that to challenge them.  
The debate regarding the role of the councillor in the allocation of the scholarships 
improved the status of co-researchers, and residents started paying attention to what they 
were saying. Soon after, the discussions grew into village barazas (or village meetings) where 
interested residents, as well as members of groups, participated. The barazas were the first 
step in the process of citizen empowerment by making people aware of the possibilities for 
collective action. The work took almost three months of active engagement and it was 
possible because of the leadership of Miss Koch and the enthusiasm of the co-researchers. 
The barazas addressed all type of issues, including sensitive topics such as corrupt practices 
by the councillor, the unfair treatment of some residents by their landlords, and tensions 
between the elders and the young. The barazas became a space where residents not only 
talked about LASDAP, but started reflecting about services in the area. These debates 
involved people of different religion, sex, age and ethnicity, to discuss their needs for 
service delivery.  
At the end of 2005, residents who had attended the village-barazas came together in a 
Korogocho workshop, which aimed to address specific issues related to LASDAP. Two 
interesting reflections came from the workshop. First, the participation of residents could 
not happen without a formal structure that synthesised their demands. Second, the 
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discussions were to be restricted to residents and were not to include the councillor. This 
led to the establishment of a community body that would enable residents to engage 
formally in the LASDAP process. At the end of the workshop, the participants elected 28 
people (representing women, elders, youth and physically-challenged people) living in 
Korogocho. The body was named the Korogocho Residents Association (KRA). The KRA 
focused on a single goal: to monitor the implementation of LASDAP. Three office bearers 
were elected: a chairperson, a general secretary and an organising secretary. The 
participants of the workshop agreed that it was necessary to register the KRA as a formal 
community organisation under the Ministry of Social Services. This was no simple task as 
members worked on a voluntary basis, despite their extensive family and employment 
commitments.  
KRA action plan 
By January 2006, the KRA had developed a plan for action, which included four 
components: (1) establishment of what had happened to previous LASDAP projects; (2) 
directory of services for the area; (3) a general meeting to establish LASDAP priorities; and 
(4) participation in LASDAP Consultative Meetings.  
First, the KRA and the research team started by collecting information on approved 
LASDAP projects for Korogocho from 2002 to 2006. This was the beginning of an 
accountability process of how funds had been allocated through LASDAP. It was found 
that Korogocho had been awarded nine LASDAP projects valued at Ksh 17.3 million 
(around €173,000) from 2002/03 to 2005/06. Table 1 below shows a list, and the 
implementation status, of these approved projects. 
The report showed that only two of the projects approved had been completed in five 
years (student scholarships and rehabilitation of the road), despite the fact that the money 
for all projects had been given by the Nairobi City Council. Another corruption scandal 
was unearthed during the writing of the report regarding the rehabilitation of the road. It 
was found that the contractor had been paid for the rehabilitation of the road despite the 
fact that the work had not been finished. This was because the construction company that 
won the project belonged to the councillor of a neighbouring location. Because of this, the 
local councillor had not complained about the poor work done, nor had he pressed the 
contractor to finish the work on time. Thus, both projects implemented were linked to 
corruption scandals involving the councillor. 
Not longer after the report was completed, rumours started circulating that the KRA 
offices were going to be set on fire because of the work they were doing. After lengthy 
discussions between KRA, Miss Koch and the research team, it was agreed that the threat 
was to be reported to the police, and that it would be used as an example in the discussion 
groups as to how intimidation mechanisms kept people from getting adequate services. 
Support for the work done by the KRA grew, and the offices were not harmed.  
 
 
Chapter Seven 
Speaking Up: Citizen Demand for Accountability and Improved Services in a Nairobi Slum 99 
Table 1 
LASDAP Approved Projects (2002–2007) for Korogocho Location 
Project Name 
LASDAP 
cycle 
Awarded 
budget 
(Ksh) 
Completio
n (%) 
Remarks 
Public toilets and 
water/sanitation infrastructure 
2002/03 1,500,000 None 
Awarded contractor, 
project never started 
Electricity supply and public 
lighting infrastructure 
2002/04 2,500,000 None 
Awarded contractor, 
yet to start the work 
Rehabilitation of road 2003/04 1,500,000 80% 
Under 
implementation 
Scholarships for poor 
students 
2004/05 300,000 100% 
Bursary award 
completed 
Enhancement Nyunyumu 
Primary school 
2004/05 5,000,000 20% 
Under 
implementation 
Scholarship Fund 2005/06 500,000 None 
Under 
implementation 
Construction of classroom at 
St Daniels Primary school 
2005/06 1,000,000 None Awarded contractor 
Construction of perimeter 
fencing at St Daniels, 
Comboni and Ngunyumu 
Primary schools 
2005/06 1,500,000 None 
Under 
implementation only 
for Ngunyumu school 
Electricity supply and public 
lighting infrastructure 
construction/enhancement 
2006/07 3,500,000 None Design stage 
Nine approved LASDAP 
projects 
2002-06 17,300,000 17% 
Seven projects are 
still under 
implementation 
Source: Nairobi City Council, 2006. 
 
Dissemination of the report findings was important for a number of reasons. First, it 
provided tangible evidence for residents of how corrupt practices orchestrated by the 
councillor were stopping the area‘s development. Second, the report gave residents a clear 
idea of how important LASDAP projects could have been for their welfare. Finally, it 
provided an opportunity for the community to work together to improve the situation. 
Following discussions in a general meeting, residents decided that the KRA would file a 
complaint with the Investigation and Information Department of the Nairobi City Council, 
the only body able to investigate LASDAP. After waiting for two months for a response, 
the KRA decided to start a petition requesting the Town Clerk to implement all approved 
LASDAP projects in Korogocho (with more 3000 signatures). Again, there was no 
response. Miss Koch approached a community lawyer who agreed to take the case pro bono, 
and to take legal action against Nairobi City Council for its failure to fully implement the 
approved LASDAP projects. 
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Second, the KRA and research team started working on a directory of services to help 
residents to plan for service priorities. The directory covered schools, health facilities, 
public toilets, water points, street lights, security providers, roads, drains and garbage 
disposal. This work demonstrated that the majority of service providers were private 
developers and community organisations that had invested in infrastructure and charged 
fees to residents for their use. In some cases, the owners of buildings provided toilets and 
drainage systems to their tenants. The only services provided by the Nairobi City Council 
were two primary schools, a poorly built road and a few working street lights in the area. 
The report helped residents to visualise the service gaps and understand what was shared 
among several villages and which areas were in need of improvement. 
Third, the directory of services was presented during a general meeting where service 
priorities were discussed. This was followed by a ranking exercise that evaluated each 
service against others giving them equal chances of selection based on the participants‘ 
priorities. During this forum, it was agreed that four projects would be proposed in the 
coming LASDAP consultative meeting to take place in November 2006. These were: 
(i) Establishment of a health clinic by Nairobi City Council; 
(ii) Creation of a vocational training centre for youth; 
(iii) Access roads within Korogocho to be improved; and 
(iv) Increased number of working streetlights to improve security in the area. 
Finally, by the end of 2006 the KRA prepared for the coming consultative meeting. Over 
300 residents attended the LASDAP consultative meeting. The fact that the Korogocho 
residents now knew the rules and regulations of LASDAP obliged the councillor to 
negotiate with them openly instead of using his traditional practices of intimidation and 
manipulation. In this way, the residents were able to present their own priorities for 
LASDAP funds and, more importantly, to select their own representatives for other 
activities regarding the City Council. This was the culmination of a two-year research 
process involving data collection, a collective debate on possible solutions, plans of action, 
analysis and reflection on the findings to strengthen the LASDAP process.  
CONCLUSION 
The Korogocho case shows that opening participatory spaces for citizen engagement is a 
radical change to traditional forms of state organisation, and for such reforms to work 
public officers need to be flexible and responsive to citizen needs. The reforms also need 
to establish appropriate incentive structures to motivate street-level bureaucrats, as well as 
to build skills to understand, and work with, fractured low-income urban communities. All 
of these elements were absent in the LASDAP reform. As a result, LASDAP 
implementation became a rent-seeking enterprise, which simply reinforced poor service 
delivery, and denied any opportunities for the involvement of Korogocho residents. 
Nevertheless, LASDAP remained the only space where slum dwellers were recognised as 
having service rights by the Nairobi City Council (NCC).  
The action research methodology was successful in that it helped residents to address their 
internal differences and build consensus with regard to the priority services that needed to 
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be improved within their community. The LASDAP process was taken seriously when 
residents realised that by not engaging with the NCC they were worse off, after which it 
was difficult for local government officers to return to their corrupt practices. Residents 
also engaged in a public campaign and a court case that requested the implementation of 
approved LASDAP projects. After two years, the NCC responded to the demands by 
assigning new contractors to build streetlight infrastructure in areas identified as dangerous 
by residents.  
In summary, this paper has argued that a dynamic information dissemination process 
combined with support for citizen-led monitoring improved the implementation of a local 
government reform. Information changed the attitude of residents regarding the reform: it 
motivated them to act on corruption when they understood the effect that it was having on 
their lives. This motivation was the backbone for their participation as it allowed residents 
to overcome significant differences across age, sex and ethnicity groups. Citizen-led 
monitoring made it difficult for local government officers to go back to corrupt practices, 
eventually leading into a more cooperative relationship between residents and their local 
government. This study suggests that supporting these two elements might be a way of 
having a real impact on improving performance on local governments. 
Acronyms 
KRA   Korogocho Residents Association    
LASDAP  Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan   
NCC   Nairobi City Council 
Endnotes 
1. The Omamo report of the commission of inquiry on local authorities in Kenya observed that the 
human resource management of the LA has been characterised by poorly trained staff, overstaffing 
and inexperienced management (GOK 1995). 
2. . UNHSP (2003) estimated Nairobi had a population of 2.8 million in 2003, and would 
experience an annual growth of 2.14% for the next five years. 
3. Korogocho is one of the 55 electoral areas that comprise Nairobi City. The area is represented by 
an elected councillor, who is responsible for the implementation of LASDAP. 
4. Only ten percent of the owners of the housign structures live in Korogocho. The remaining 
owners live outside the settlement and use intermediaries to collect rent. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
When Participation and Empowerment Are 
Not Enough: Water Governance and Social 
Transformation in the Lagos São João River 
Basin, Brazil  
Larissa Barbosa da Costa  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A great part of development literature suggests that participation, empowerment and 
changes in power relations are key elements in generating social transformation. The 
assumptions behind these ideas are that, by having access to political spaces and decision-
making, disadvantaged groups will have a say about matters that influence their lives and at 
the same time contribute to better public policies. It is also believed that processes of 
participation will enhance people‘s capabilities and skills, improving their position to 
bargain for access to resources and better life chances. Much is also said about changes in 
power relations. In this regard, participation and empowerment are considered processes in 
which marginalized groups can gain power and articulate their political struggles, 
challenging the status quo, eventually leading to transformation.  
This paper looks at such assumptions and reflects on participation, empowerment and 
social transformation in the context of water participatory governance in Brazil, using the 
Lagos São João river basin as a case study. Many participatory processes have brought 
social actors to the table, people have participated in decision making, improved their 
knowledge and skills and felt satisfaction for participating. However, the processes have 
rarely moved ahead in terms of generating critical reflection and challenging the status quo.  
Hence, this work elaborates on why, although participation and empowerment are 
necessary and positive, they may be insufficient to generate the desired transformation. My 
assumption is that participation generates changes, but change depends on what local 
actors perceive as desirable. If they are blind to the need for social transformation, they are 
unlikely to push for it. One aspect of this refers to how people make sense of reality and 
how this relates to learning. Analysing learning processes, it is possible to see why a critical 
understanding of power relations and context frequently fails to emerge during the 
participatory process. Thus, using transformative learning as a guide, I look at the 
blockages to critical reflection and consciousness in processes of change. 
This paper is based on fieldwork in the Lagos São João river basin, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
It uses a framework of power and transformative learning to analyse the data collected 
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through forty-four interviews, complemented by a collection of drawings and 
interpretations provided by the interviewees (1). The paper is organized in seven sections. 
The following three present the context, the conceptual framework and the case study. 
Section 5 explores how the different actors involved in the participatory management 
perceive change, and scrutinizes the assumption that participation and empowerment 
generate transformation. Section 6 elaborates on blockages and the reasons for them within 
the process of change toward transformation. The concluding section suggests a way 
forward, stressing the need for permanent critical reflection and vigilance in order to avoid 
a naïve, blinkered enthusiasm regarding participation. Lastly, it points to the need to move 
away from a ‗doing culture‘, which gives primacy mainly to action, instrumental knowledge 
and problem solving, and towards a more reflective ‗learning culture‘, aimed at generating 
deeper understanding of reality and people‘s role in the process of change. 
BACKGROUND: PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE IN BRAZIL 
Brazilian society is characterized by deep and structural inequality. The distance between 
people and the institutions that regulate their lives is a serious problem, generating 
exclusion and lack of access to services, support and resources. Moreover, it results in 
public policies that tend to favour only part of the population, generally the most 
advantaged, to the detriment of the poor. As a result, initiatives and policies that connect 
people and the public institutions are highly necessary (Gaventa 2002).   
In the last two decades, this situation has been changing. As part of the processes of 
democratization and decentralization, as well as a consequence of the development of civil 
society, some participatory policies have been created and implemented. The Municipal 
Councils of Health, Local Agendas 21 and Participatory Budgeting, for instance, are 
significant steps towards people‘s participation. In the environmental field, some 
innovative policies have also been introduced. The most comprehensive one is the 
National Water Policy, based on the Water Law of 1997.  
This law creates a participatory, integrated and decentralized water management system in 
Brazil aimed at promoting sustainable and efficient use of resources as well as the 
involvement of society in water care. Participation is seen as part of the trend towards 
state-society cooperation and also as an opportunity for people to exercise their citizenship 
rights and make decisions about water uses and conservation.  The law also establishes the 
river basin as the management unit and stimulates the creation of River Basin Committees 
(RBCs), in which the government shares decision-making with water users and civil society 
organizations. Since the 1990s, more than a 120 committees have been created, mobilizing 
10,000 institutions and organizations within the country. 
Although an interesting idea, participatory governance is not without challenges. On the 
one side, it can bring positive results in connecting people and governments, increasing 
transparency and accountability, creating opportunities for people to exercise citizen rights, 
shape policies and generate change (Cornwall 2002, Fung and Wright 2003, Gaventa 2004). 
On the other side, there is the risk that governance is not truly democratic, does not 
facilitate participation of excluded groups, and people have little power to make decisions. 
In the latter cases, unequal power relations are simply reproduced, not generating any 
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meaningful change in terms of inclusion (Cornwall 2002, Gaventa 2004). Thus, considering 
these possibilities and risks, understanding how participatory river basin management 
develops and what the outcomes are in terms of change and transformation is at the centre 
of this reflection.   
LINKING PARTICIPATION, EMPOWERMENT, NATURAL 
RESOURCES AND LEARNING FOR SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION  
(a) Participation, change and transformation 
Participation has become one of the most common and abused concepts in the 
development field. From the NGOs at the grassroots level and development aid agencies 
to governments and the World Bank, participation is considered a must. Thus, used widely 
and loosely in so many contexts, the meaning of participation as a concept has become 
completely blurred.  
One of the dilemmas involving participation is with regard to its purposes. One can debate 
whether participation is a means or an end, for efficiency or empowerment. On one side, 
there is the belief that participation is essential to make governance work well and 
development programs more effective and suitable to local people. In this sense, 
participation is framed as a means. On the other, participation is considered essential for 
emancipation and should be better framed as a right to be exercised by citizens as members 
of political communities. Thus, it has a political and transformative meaning; it is an end in 
itself (Hickey and Mohan 2005). 
Thus the why and how of participation in development varies a lot, but in the search for its 
transformational potential, a working definition is essential. The instrumental use of 
participation is, as Hickey and Mohan (2004) argue, tyranny. They alert us to the process of 
the depolitization and cooption of participation as a technical method rather than a process 
and political methodology of empowerment. In addition, they criticize the obsession about 
participation in projects at the local level and its consequent disconnection from the social, 
political and economic conditions that created poverty and exclusion. Lastly, investigating 
the history of participation in development, they remind us that in its origins the concept 
of participation was deeply connected to citizenship rights and a means of challenging 
subordination and marginalization (Hickey and Mohan 2004).  In light of this, they argue 
that ―the proper objective of participation is to ensure the transformation of existing 
development practices, and more radically, the social relations, institutional practice and 
capacity gaps which cause social exclusion‖ (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 13).  
Hence, in this paper participation is regarded as the process by which people gain access to 
decision-making about the issues that affect their lives. Moreover, it involves gaining power 
to articulate their own views and needs and to bargain for access and control over essential 
resources as well as to struggle against the forces that generate exclusion.  Furthermore, 
because participation is associated with social change and transformation (and these terms 
are commonly used interchangeably) it is important to differentiate them. I will refer to as 
change those processes that alter social and power relations as well as values and 
behaviours in a determined context, towards more inclusive practices. However, change 
refers to short-term outcomes, not yet in the level of the structures, indicating they could 
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be reversible. By social transformation, I mean a process of change that moves toward 
restructuring social relations, structural arrangements, perspectives and models of 
development in order to build more sustainable and fairer societies that put people at the 
centre of development. Transformation is a long-term process and involves, as a central 
issue, addressing social inequality.  
(b) Power and empowerment  
In aiming at generating social transformation through participatory processes, power is a 
central matter. Empowerment, as a process of gaining and building power to take control 
over one‘s life, especially for the poor, is considered a crucial issue.   
Several thinkers have proposed approaches to explore the nature of power, which can be 
understood as a zero or a variable sum game; as control over resources or over people‘s 
thinking and agendas; as something to be possessed by individuals or groups or to be 
exercised in every single relation in society (Mayo and Craig 1995). Thus, considering the 
different approaches to power, it becomes clear that power and thus empowerment 
comprise multiple dimensions.  
According to Rowlands (1995), empowerment refers to the process in which people 
become aware of power dynamics and develop capacities to gain and exercise power to 
control their lives and support others. Furthermore, empowerment involves changes at the 
personal level, that of close relationships and collective levels. On the first level, it is about 
developing a sense of self and individual confidence and capacity to overcome oppression. 
On the second, it relates to the abilities to negotiate and to influence relationships and 
decisions within them. The last, the collective feature, has to do with individuals working 
together to achieve higher impact, and includes collective political action, networking and 
also fostering cooperation instead of competition (Rowlands 1995). 
Understanding how change occurs through participation involves necessarily looking at 
power relations. Social interaction between individuals or groups is governed by the 
exercise of power. Thus, power determines who has voice or not or whose concerns and 
rights get priority in decision-making (Cornwall 2004, Veneklasen and Miller 2004).    
Veneklasen and Miller (2002) proposed a framework which identifies the sources and 
expression of power and hence is useful to examine empowerment:  
 Power over refers to power as a win-lose game. Repression, coercion, corruption, 
discrimination are some examples. Based on the use of force or embedded in 
social rules, power over may take different forms; visible, hidden or invisible.  
 Power with is related to the capacity to achieve together what would never be 
possible alone. Based on mutual support, solidarity and collaboration, power with 
helps building bridges across different interests to transform or reduce social 
conflict and promote equitable relations (Veneklasen and Miller 2002). 
 Power to refers to the unique potential of every person to shape his or her life and 
world. When it is based on mutual support, it opens up the possibilities of 
collective action. Power to may manifest itself in the pride one has in what one 
can do.  
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 Power within is the kind of power to be developed from inside and is based on self-
acceptance, respect and esteem. When internally enriched, power within can also 
unfold and extends to acceptance and respect of others as equals (Townsend et al. 
1999).  
(c) Participation and natural resources management 
In order to understand which changes take place through the river basin management 
process, it is important to draw attention to both the ecological and sociological dynamics. 
This requires looking at a larger landscape unit such as a watershed and at the historical, 
socioeconomic and political forces that influence the interactions between nature, people 
and the productive process, while at the same time considering that these relations are 
governed by variables of class, gender, age and ethnicity (Vernooy and Fajber 2006). 
In this regard, Vernooy and Fajber alert us to the difficulties of integrating social analysis in 
natural resources management, and call attention to the need to ―develop better 
understanding and awareness of the social and power relations that governs access, use and 
control over natural resources. This involves understanding the differences and inequities 
of social actors and is dependent on the local contexts‘, (Vernooy and Fajber 2006: 23). 
Therefore, looking at the positions of power and powerlessness, and creating room to 
address equity issues, emerge as essential steps towards transformation.   
(d) Transformative learning 
One last aspect of how people make sense of reality relates to learning. By looking at 
learning processes, it is possible to identify why a critical understanding of reality may not 
emerge during the participatory process. Thus, transformative learning has become a 
helpful concept in the context of this research. 
The transformative learning theory which has been developing since the 1970s is based on 
the works of Jack Mezirow. The core idea of this theory is that ―we make meanings out of 
the world through our experiences‖. In so doing, we develop ―frames of references‖ to 
understand reality, much of which is uncritically assimilated. These frames then become 
―habits of mind‖ expressed as points of view that shape the way we look at the world 
(Cranton and Roy 2003: 87).   
The definition of transformative learning by Mezirow refers to ―the process by which we 
transform our taken for granted frames of references (meaning perspectives, habits of 
mind, mind-sets) to make them more inclusive, discriminating, open, emotionally capable 
of change and reflective so they may generate beliefs and opinions that will prove more 
true or justified to guide actions take‖ (Mezirow 2000: 7-8).  
Such a process involves questioning previously uncritically assimilated assumptions, beliefs 
and perspectives, leading individuals and groups to become more aware of their own 
knowledge and values as well as critical of their validity (Mezirow 2000; Cranton and Roy 
2003). As transformative learning develops, it tends to set off changes in perceptions, 
attitudes and behaviours. Hence, it is emancipatory and, in changing the ways we construct 
reality, it has the potential to trigger action toward building a fair society (Percy 2005).  
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The centre of transformative learning theory rests on the process of transforming frames of 
reference through processes of critical reflection about our own and others‘ assumptions and 
beliefs. Thus, transformative learning links to participation and empowerment in the sense 
that critical reflection is essential to analyse different contexts, identify power relations, and 
understands one‘s position and roles in the process of change (Buchy 2007). Due to its 
potential of helping people to investigate and reframe their perspectives, transformative 
learning theory and processes have been adopted in many situations related to natural 
resources management, which gather different stakeholders and deal with conflicts 
(Leeuwis 2002; Percy 2005; Wals 2007).  
STUDY CASE: THE LAGOS SÃO JOÃO RIVER BASIN  
The process of decentralization of water management in Brazil has its roots in the late 
1980s and 1990s and culminated in 1997 with the creation of a new National Water Policy 
and Management System. This is a multi-level governance system involving deliberative 
councils at the national, state and river-basin levels (Abers and Kerk 2006). Here I will 
focus on the ground level, the River Basin Committees (RBCs).  
The RBC is a deliberative council composed of members of the federal, state and local 
governments, the private sector (water users: industrial enterprises, irrigators, fishing folk 
and others) and civil society organizations (grassroots organizations, environmental NGOs, 
neighbourhood associations, universities and others).  
Officially, the RBCs are responsible for encouraging discussion on issues related to the use 
of water resources, giving a voice to the actors in the river basin, managing conflicts, and 
elaborating and approving the River Basin Plan. In addition, they must implement the 
water user-fee mechanisms (pricing and charging system) and decide about the allocation 
of the resources generated. In practice, many committees develop other activities not 
legally specified in their terms of reference. The legal framework informing the creation of 
the RBC is certainly the base but, due to diverse contexts, political opportunities and 
members‘ choices, all RBCs are different and shaped according to how they understand 
their roles, possibilities and regional needs (Abers and Keck 2003).  
In 1999, Rio de Janeiro State approved the Water Resource State Policy, clearing the way 
for the creation of RBCs. At that moment, the Lagos São João region, which comprises 
thirteen municipalities and a population of half a million people, was facing serious 
environmental problems, especially in the Araruama Lagoon. Due to urban growth and a 
lack of investment in sanitation, in less than ten years the lagoon has all but collapsed. In 
1999-2000, the quality of water and the whole ecosystem were seriously affected and the 
aquatic life had almost disappeared. As a result, the local economy was also affected: the 
tourists stopped coming, property prices went down, the number of jobs decreased and the 
local fishing folk had their livelihood disrupted. Such events generated great upheaval and 
motivated local actors to engage with water and environmental issues.  
The first step toward participatory water management was the creation of Lagos São João 
Intermunicipal Consortium (CILSJ), an association of local governments aiming at 
improving regional environmental management. CILSJ was the seed of the future 
Committee which materialized five years later, in December 2004. The Lagos São João 
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RBC is composed by 54 members: 18 government representatives, 18 water users and 18 
civil society organizations‘ representatives. Its organizational structure consists of a general 
assembly, three sub-committees and nine technical advisory groups.  
The main objective of the Lagos São João RBC is to promote integrated environmental 
management and maintain the ecological integrity of rivers, lagoons and wetlands, while 
harmonizing human, environmental and economic needs, in order to guarantee clean water 
and sustainable multiple use for the benefit of present and future generations. Furthermore 
it has the task of managing conflicts and fostering society‘s involvement with water issues 
and care.  
MAKING SENSE OF CHANGE  
The social actors involved in participatory river basin management must make sense of the 
problems, solutions and changes in their context. In analysing their perceptions of what has 
or has not changed, my intention is to show how participation and empowerment are 
taking place and whether they are liable to generate transformation. Shifts or changes in 
power relations are a good indicator of overall change. Thus, I looked at people‘s 
perceptions on the four expressions of power: with, to, within and over. 
(a) What has changed?   
The reasons different local actors engage in participatory river basin management vary 
greatly. However, despite such diversity, from the beginning mobilization around water 
issues was seen as a strategic political opportunity to be heard and to influence decision-
making about the river basin management.  
Power with 
The most frequently expressed kind of power by those participating in river basin 
management was power with. Commenting on the main changes they see, respondents 
remarked that before the creation of the CILSJ/RBC, local actors acted alone and without 
any coordination. Furthermore, there was a strong feeling of distrust among people and 
institutions, and of frustration with regard to their capacity to address the local and regional 
problems. Besides, without CILSJ/RBC, local actors had no access to decision-making 
power, but together they were able to build such power. Power with refers to this feeling of 
being stronger as a group, and the examples provided by the interviewees suggest at least 
three different ways in which it was built: (a) strengthening bonds between peers; (b) 
enhancing the dialogue and cooperation among sectors; and (c) inspiring the creation of 
new participatory spaces.   
Motivated by the creation of the CILSJ/RBC, a few sector groups felt the need to organize 
better. In 1999, the NGOs formed a local NGO Forum, where they can discuss and 
develop their own views and claims before these are expressed in the RBC. Another 
example is REAJO, the local environmental educators‘ network, which was initiated by 
CILSJ but soon became autonomous and very active due to a feeling of identification and 
solidarity. Government officials also emphasized that the CILSJ/RBC were essential in 
establishing a collaborative relationship. 
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One member of this group illustrated the situation by saying that in the beginning, CILSJ 
(the big circle in the middle) coordinated the thirteen municipalities (the small circles) but 
as the process developed, the municipalities established their own relations with 
CILSJ/RBC and others. In the end, the figure of CILSJ was replaced by a network formed 
by people they know, trust and cooperate with. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Before 
 
After 
 
Interviewees among the fishing folk remarked that, by participating in CILSJ/RBC, fishers 
have achieved many of their goals. Some of them are now playing a leadership role in the 
state and national fishing community movement. Also, because they are more organized, 
they decided to try to get one of their leaders elected to the municipal parliament, aiming at 
influencing the local politics. Such an initiative is very positive as it demonstrates that the 
fishing folk are building bridges between levels, from local to national, and are attentive to 
other relevant political spaces where they can extend their influence.  
The CILSJ/RBC serves as leverage for the organization of local groups, which soon start 
to develop their own participatory process and contribute to a lively and rich process at the 
RBC level. Participants affirmed that the positive changes they see in the region would not 
have been possible without the CILSJ/RBC. Achievements such as the implementation of 
the domestic sewage treatment, the end of the extraction of shells from the Araruama 
Lagoon or the construction of a new bridge, resulted in significant improvements in 
sanitation and the recovery of the lagoon, having positive social and economic effects as 
well, but these were only made possible through concerted action and cooperation among 
the different sectors.  
One of the respondents illustrated the situation by noting that in the beginning different 
actors did not understand each other. However, they started to dialogue and search for a 
common ground. Different ‗languages‘ or discourses intersected, building bridges across 
different interests. As a result, the group was able to create a better environment and 
improve the quality of life in the region. 
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Figure 2 
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Because of the positive feelings about the participatory process, a great enthusiasm about 
participation has been spreading in the region. Apart from the new sector spaces 
mentioned before, there are other examples, such as the São João Protected Area council, 
municipal councils and the initiative to create an Intermunicipal Consortium to deal with 
health issues in the region.   
The maintenance of permanent spaces for dialogue and decision-making is very positive. 
As remarked by Cornwall, moving from ―large scale deliberative events to participatory 
advisory panels that meet regularly‖ is one of the ways to make meaningful participation 
more likely to happen (2004: 85-86). Also, because the actors meet regularly, they have 
developed a better understanding of the environmental dynamics and problems and 
improved their capacity to debate, find new solutions and make their decisions respected, 
which means they are developing political skills.  
Power to  
The second kind of power most expressed by participants in water governance was power to. 
Such power refers to the self-confidence to carry out new ideas and activities and to the 
capacity to see oneself in new positions and situations in the present or future, having a 
close relation to power with and within as well.  
One of the secrets of the success of the Lagos São João river basin management is the 
strong feeling of agency of some participants. Explaining how the RBC became so active, 
interviewees remarked that the talent of the Executive Secretary as a mediator was decisive. 
A few other people were also pointed out as key persons in the process. Thus, it is fair to 
say that the power to of some actors makes a difference and inspires others to do the same.  
In this case, power to can be observed in three main ways; participants are accepting new 
challenges, playing leadership roles, or extending their actions to new levels or political 
spaces. Initiatives such as forming new groups, pursuing studies, representing their groups 
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at the state, national or even international levels, or leading a new participatory councils are 
some positive examples.  
Power within 
Changes in relation to this subtle kind of power are usually less evident. In general, RBC 
participants expressed a sense of pride in what they are doing and achieving together; they 
also expressed feelings of satisfaction and self-fulfilment at being part of the participatory 
process. Participants said they feel stronger together; they have gained knowledge, 
professional and personal skills. Thus, it is possible to infer that self-confidence, self-
esteem and belief in the possibility of change are higher than before. However, how deep 
such changes are, how they come about for different groups or whether they are motivated 
solely by the participatory process is impossible to affirm.  
One dramatic story I heard in the field came from the fishing community. They said that 
after the collapse of the lagoon, losing their way of life and source of income, they almost 
collapsed as well. They sadly described the feeling of losing their dignity and sense of 
independence. Suddenly their livelihood was disrupted and this was the source of great 
despair. Hence, the recovery of the Araruama Lagoon has had a tremendous impact on 
their lives, helping them to rebuild not only their livelihood but also their sense of dignity.  
Power over  
Power over is, in general, a negative kind of power. It is manifested through hierarchical 
relationships, coercion, discrimination, corruption but also by such subtle means as social 
and cultural rules. Power over is observable when some voices are heard and others are 
not, or when some set the agenda or have their rights guaranteed first, for instance. In the 
case of RBC, an analysis of power over must be observed inside and outside the space, in 
the broader context.  
On one side, local actors feel there is a good degree of democracy and equal opportunities 
among them. Thus, the sectors represented have a voice and the chances to set and 
advance their agendas. On the other, it is a fact that power differences and conflicts exist. 
One example is in the disparities between countryside and coastal areas. Municipalities and 
civil society groups in the countryside site are less wealthy and organized than those at the 
coast. Thus, they have the feeling that the groups from the coast always advance their 
agendas first. The same parallels could be drawn about fishing folk and small farmers. Both 
groups are among the lowest income groups in the region. However, because fisheries are 
more organized they have benefited more. In this sense, it is possible to say that the groups 
within the RBC tend to replicate the regional disparities.  
Aware of different needs, RBC members are making efforts to address some of these 
issues, such as creating mechanisms to benefit the countryside region and the rural groups. 
One example is the allocation of revenues generated by the water fees in the countryside 
area as a sort of payment for their environmental services.  
Sector and class disparities also affect a group‘s capacity to participate. Government 
officials have financial support to participate, while civil society members do not. In 
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addition, among the civil society members there are people from different classes, who also 
feel the burden differently. Perhaps the greatest disparity among the RBC participants is in 
education. Among them, at least three-quarters have a high educational background, and 
one-quarter do not. This shows that the majority of participants come from the upper 
classes, and two-thirds are men. The differences arising demonstrate that participation in 
the RBC presents similar limitations to previous social, political and economic conditions.  
Another serious expression of power over reported by the RBC members is with regard to 
local and state politics. According to participants, local politics is very much based on 
clientelistic relations. Stories about how local governments and politicians avoid providing 
good public services in order to keep the population dependent on their favours were 
frequently voiced. However, participants do agree that even the negative local political 
game had its space slightly reduced since the RBC was implemented.  
One drawing presented and interpreted by a CILSJ/RBC member expressed issues of power 
over. For the author, ‗before‘ we could see ‗dark figures‘ dominating the scene, they 
represent powerful politicians and groups profiting from environmental exploitation. At 
the same time, the ‗little green and blues figures‘ in the bottom, the ones protecting the 
environment, were weak and lacking coordination. ‗After‘ the same elements are still 
present in the scene; however, the balance of power has changed. The ‗powerful‘ have lost 
space and the ‗blues and greens‘ became more organized and stronger. 
 
Figure 3 
 
Before 
 
After 
 
(b) What has not changed? 
Talking about what has not changed was more difficult for the respondents. In this regard, 
three kinds of answers were raised. First, respondents analysed the participatory process, 
drawing attention to practical aspects and strategies for improving it. A second group of 
concerns wishes for the future but are still pretty well focused on practical matters. The 
third set of ideas pointed to more structural problems. One of the respondents, for 
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instance, strongly raised the need to open the ‗black box‘ of the social agenda with regard 
to environmental issues; another voiced the necessity to empower the poor; some raised 
cronyism in local politics. Such concerns refer to social inequalities, power differences, and 
the relation between humans, nature and development.  
Instrumental participation  
Although a positive participatory process is going on in the river basin, participation is still 
limited to a small number of people and, to a great extent, understood as a means to achieve 
efficiency and improved river basin management instead of a process of political 
consciousness. The involvement and empowerment of marginalized populations is not 
embraced as a goal of the RBC. 
In general, participants value participation and see it as an opportunity to democratize the 
management system, pursue their agendas and build commitment, but they rarely perceive 
it as an end in itself or as a right that will bring people into the political process and 
enhance their capabilities to challenge social structures. Concerns about efficiency, action 
and conservation are at the centre while empowerment is a still a marginal concern.  
Thus, considering that participation as transformation seeks to change development 
practices and patterns of exclusion (Hickey and Mohan 2004), it can be said that the 
current understanding of participation within the scope of the river basin management is 
more instrumental than transformative. 
River basin management and development models 
As the RBC is a participatory space which has the mandate to deal with river basin 
management, it tends to focus on that while missing the broader context in which the 
social and environmental issues are immersed and shaped. Environmental discourses on 
sustainable development underlying the water management system in Brazil rely on the 
idea of harmonization of human, environmental and economic needs as well as on 
technical approaches, to the detriment of a more critical reflection on models of 
development. The main causes of degradation and depletion of natural resources are linked 
to social and economic issues. Thus, tackling inequality should be part of natural resources 
management (Buchy and Subba 2003).  
Participants rarely expressed opinions or reflections about the underlying values and 
discourses informing the water management system in Brazil. This reveals that RBC 
participants take the benefits of participatory river basin management and sustainable 
development models for granted without critically looking at the origin of this discourse. 
Hence, management receives more attention, while social transformation is still a second-
degree concern.  
Environmental and social issues 
Asked about how the RBC deals with environmental and social issues, the great majority 
demonstrated that they recognized the importance of and the relationship between social 
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and environmental issues. However, social issues are perceived as not being part of the 
terms of reference of the RBC.  
In general, interviewees say that social issues and social analysis are relevant, but at the 
same time they do not incorporate them into the way they look at the reality. Thus, it is 
possible to say that there is a primacy of the environmental over the social among the 
participants and in the way the RBC develops. Such primacy shapes the way they frame 
problems and solutions, and by leaving aside the social, they run the risk of making certain 
marginalized groups worse off or of reinforcing the current status quo positions. 
Impressions about the local people  
During interviews, I noticed that respondents – the majority are the elected representatives 
of different sectors or local groups in the RBC – referred to the local population in rather 
vague terms. Many adjectives and qualities were attributed: individualist, ignorant, have no 
culture of participation, just want to receive things, exploited by the politicians, victims, 
poor and so on. Such comments were expressed both as critique and as demonstrations of 
solidarity. Human beings were also described as predatory or self-interested by nature, and 
concerns about the rapid growth in population came up many times as well. This suggests 
two things. Firstly, there are many unexplored and unconscious assumptions and beliefs 
about local people and their relations with the environment. Secondly, groups of people are 
still considered homogeneous entities ignoring social geographical and gender difference 
(among others).  
In the context of natural resources management, it is very common to overlook social 
differentiation and social analysis (Vernooy and Fajber 2006). This is still the case in the 
Lagos São João river basin. As a result, the process tends to fail in understanding and 
addressing differences and inequities among local people, running the risk of reinforcing 
current patterns of exclusion. 
Gender issues 
Gender was a topic almost absent from the interviews, and gender relations were not raised 
or perceived as problematic. Nonetheless, if we examine the composition of the RBC, the 
great majority are men. Among the 44 interviewees, less than one-third were women, and 
for the most part they were carrying out activities considered ‗more suitable‘ for women. 
Similarly, as gender did not emerge as a concern among the RBC participants, gender 
analysis in the river basin management is not even on the horizon.  
A reflection about how gender relates to river basin management, whether internal or 
external to the RBC, is still lacking, and it could be said that there seems to be a case of 
almost complete gender blindness. 
(c) Putting changes into perspective and looking at assumptions on 
participation and empowerment  
According to the perceptions of those involved, participatory river basin management in 
Lagos São João is a lively process. It is evident that different groups and actors do not 
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always look at change in the same way or agree on what has to be changed. Nevertheless, 
what comes up clearly in the analysis is that they share the feeling and understanding that 
changes are taking place as a result of the participatory management and, as a whole, they 
consider these changes positive.  
Furthermore, looking at participation, empowerment and changes in power relations, it is 
visible that the process has contributed to increase participants‘ power and has led to a 
more democratic, collaborative and inclusive form of decision-making and interaction 
between state and society. This interaction has engaged different actors in the process, 
including some disadvantaged groups, and enabled the RBC to implement the water policy, 
to take measures to recover the health of the Araruama Lagoon and guarantee significant 
investments in sanitation, generating social and environmental benefits.  
Nevertheless, there is a lot that has not changed relative to how participants perceive 
reality, problems and solutions. Their understandings of participation, social and 
environmental relations, patterns of development and gender relations do not seem to 
show great modifications. This suggests that a corresponding awareness and critical 
thinking about the broader power relationships and social issues present in the river basin 
did not take place. 
Analysis of the changes (and the absence of certain changes) leads to reflection on popular 
assumptions about participation and empowerment. It demonstrates that although they are 
essential and positive they are not sufficient to generate social transformation. Participation 
creates chances for people to have a say, to influence the agenda and to have access to 
decision making. However, the direction changes take depends on what local actors 
perceive as necessary. When they are not awake to the need for social transformation, they 
are prone to be satisfied with the immediate.  
Another common assumption regarding participation and empowerment is that they are 
accompanied by building consciousness and the capacity to critically assess reality, 
perceiving one‘s own power and carrying out political struggles. However, I would like to 
argue that this might not be always true. In cases of participatory governance which brings 
together diverse stakeholders, the powerful may not see the extension of their own power, 
and the powerless may not become more conscious of their own condition and feel 
encouraged to challenge the status quo. Putting changes into perspective, it is possible to 
say that in the case described here, there has been change but not transformation.  
BLOCKAGES AND LIMITATIONS TO TRANSFORMATION   
Three kinds of blockages to transformation seem to occur:   
(a) „Uncritical‟ participation  
A great enthusiam for the idea of participation and  participatory governance was 
expressed by the participants. In general, respondents attributed all the good results they 
have achieved to the participatory process, and it is perceptible that participation is taken 
for granted as positive and valuable.  
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The fact that the RBC has achieved many victories seems to have created an over-
optimism about, or even a fascination for, participation. Because of this enthusiam, 
participants tend not to reflect critically on possible contradictions and pitfalls or to see 
problems with participation and its outcomes.  
Few respondents, for instance, expressed reflections about who is participating and who is 
overlooked. However, looking at who the most active members are, it becomes clear that 
the participation of fishing folk, rural communities and the urban poor is still limited if 
compared with government and NGO participation. Furthermore, observation of the 
educational background and gender among interviewees reveals clear disparities. Without 
reflecting on the problems of participation, RBC participants disregard or fail to see 
features, practices and behaviours that reinforce exclusion from the process and, 
consequently, they cannot address them.  
Further, because RBC members want to strengthen and legitimize the RBC as the proper 
space for debates and decision making, they may ignore ‗protests‘ coming from ‗outside‘. A 
few times, I heard phases such as, ‗people like to complain but they do not want to 
participate‘ or ‗certain people, when they have their interest defeated, just abandon the 
discussion‘, but little attention was being paid to the meaning of such positions. For 
instance, fishing folks or rural groups may disagree with some environmental laws or 
restrictions and resist participating in order to avoid having to comply with them. Other 
groups may simply have no interest in participating. However, participation cannot be 
treated as an obligation, and being attentive to such voices from ‗outside‘ and 
understanding what they are saying is important.  
Other elements in the broader context also affect participation. Almost all interviewees 
reported cases and stories of political clientelism in the region. Although such practices 
directly influence people‘s ability to participate, they are still perceived as a problem 
external to the RBC.  
Whereas it was voiced many times that people ‗lack of a culture of participation‘, this 
should not be understood as people‘s own fault but rather the result of broader power 
dynamics in which, for example, clientelistic relations may nullify the transformative 
potential of participatory governance (Hickey and Mohan 2004). Thus, recognizing such 
relationships as a problem to be tackled by the RBC is important, and a deeper analysis of 
power relations and constraints to participation and change needed.  
It is clear that participation has generated empowerment and change to a great extent. 
However, to take the benefits for granted without considering contradictions and pitfalls 
emerges as a blockage. There are numerous examples of participatory processes used to 
conserve and maintain the status quo (Hickey and Mohan 2005, Cornwall and Coelho 
2006). Therefore, it is necessary that RBC members be concious and attentive to power 
differences, constraints on the participation of disadvantaged groups, cooptation and 
conflicts of interest.  
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(b) Focus on environmental conservation and management instead of 
people  
A focus on environmental conservation and management in the scope of the river basin 
management is quite clear. Explaining the purposes of the the RBC, the majority of 
interviewees mentioned that the goal is to restore and conserve the environment and to 
rationalize the use of natural resources. Looking at the River Basin Plan, the main 
document orienting interventions in the river basin, a focus on the biophysical aspects of 
the river basin management is much stressed as well.  
Participatory governance processes ‗have given voice to the voiceless and created a space 
for a meaningful contribution from social sciences in natural resources management‘ 
(Buchy and Subba 2003: 323). However, a focus on restoration and conservation is still 
dominant, preventing attention to people and to how they may benefit differently from 
this. 
Issues such as social justice, equity, income and resource distribution, for instance, were 
very rarely mentioned and, in general, are not considered as part of the RBC‘s 
responsibilities. It is not that the participants think these are unimportant. The point is that 
those principles, criteria and frameworks are not perceived as the core ‗business‘ of the 
RBC or fully incorporated into analyses of problems and solutions. Thus, addressing social 
inequality does not emerge as an issue. 
One aspect that may influence RBC members‘ perceptions is their educational and 
professional background. As Mezirow (2000) argues, much of what we know and believe is 
influenced by context and biography. Education and professional experience definitely play 
a role in shaping our frames of reference. Analysing the educational background of the 
interviewees, the great majority have a background in natural sciences and engineering, 
while very few have graduated in social sciences, mainly in pedagogy.  
The focus on biophysical and technical approaches is still the dominant paradigm and, as 
the RBC has the mandate to deal with environmental issues, it tends to attract 
professionals with this kind of expertise. The same can be seen in the government 
environmental agencies and environmentalist NGOs. The situation can be related to what 
Buchy and Subba (2003: 324) call a ‗skewed professional culture‘ which gives primacy to 
the environment over the social. It may also point to a lack of skills to deal with 
participatory processes in relation to social issues, explaining why RBC members are not 
more advanced in their understanding of social and power dynamics. In addition, RBC 
members seem to have little awareness about the discourses, values and frames they use. 
For instance, no reflection on the water management system in Brazil or on environmental 
management itself was stated during the interviews. Thus, a critical understanding of the 
rationale behind those models and the risk they present (of reinforcing exclusion) do not 
have the chance to emerge.   
The basis of landscape management can be traced back to what Adams (2003) called ‗the 
colonial mind‘. Based on the ideas of the European Enlightment, the colonial mind is the 
term used to describe the colonial rationality operating within social, cultural, political, 
models of production and economic relations as well as regulating the interaction between 
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humans and nature (Adam 2003). Therefore, principles such as human dominance over 
nature, supremacy of techno-scientific knowledge, and development as modernization and 
progress were translated into a series of assumptions and practices that came to regulate  
human-nature relations. Among them is the notion that humans and nature are separate 
and that the human engagement with nature has to be regulated by bureaucratic control 
and external rules and mechanisms. The creation of  the term population as an ‗aggregate‘, 
supressing its differences and qualities and reinforcing the myth of ‗population growth‘, has 
also long served the environmental discourse as a justification for control (Dryzek 1997). 
In Brazil, the colonial past has added the issues of a strongly divided class society and of an 
elite that sees itself as above the law. Thus, it is important to take into account that the 
state and laws may also operate a logic of elite control over the poor.  
An issue stressed during the interviews is that public policies, including environmental 
ones, rarely address social concerns. In the case of the RBC, for example, the focus on 
conservation and management has embedded deficiencies that seriouly constrain the 
process of change and transformation such as: (1) disconnection between the social and the 
environmental issues and the lack of skills to carry out social analysis; and (2) lack of 
engagement with more inclusive perspectives and responsibilities aimed at addressing 
inequality. Such constraints point to the need for a critical reflection about environmental 
management and its purposes and principles, in order to move toward more inclusive 
practices. 
(c) The focus on doing instead of on learning 
Participatory river basin management is a process clearly focused on doing instead of 
learning, in the sense that it is very goal and problem-solving oriented. In general, RBC 
participants associate their achievement to practices such as ‗moving things ahead‘ or ‗what 
is decided is implemented‘ and argue that concrete action is what is needed. In this sense, 
doing was voiced as a very strong value.  
Action, efficiency and concrete solutions are positive and necessary but, because the 
process is too focused on them, participants tend not to dedicate time or set strategies to 
learn systematically. Moreover, they do not create chances to investigate their own learning, 
values and assumptions. As a result, the group does not reflect on why they do things in a 
certain way, what could be different or what is missing. 
Learning can result from many different types of interaction and may enrich the 
participants and the process. However, to achieve higher levels of learning – critical and 
transformative learning – requires more than just increasing people‘s knowledge. They 
need a clear purpose to learn more systematically and consciously as well as to develop the 
critical thinking capacities that allow the process cyclically to move to a different level 
(Buchy and Ahmed 2007).  
Analysing the learning processes involved in the river basin management, it is noticeable 
that such processes favour especially instrumental knowledge. This means that the majority 
of learning opportunities are related to practical issues and may offer only limited chances 
to generate open reflection.  
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Regarding what participants have learned through participating in river basin management, 
two sets of answers came up; instrumental knowledge (technical knowledge and know-
how) and communicative knowledge (social skills).  
Respondents remarked that they have learned a lot about the river basin, environmental 
problems and impacts, technical terms and concepts related to water management, 
engineering, conservation and others. In other words, they have acquired knowledge that 
helps them to observe and control the environment (social and natural), make plans and 
take action (Cranton and Roy 2005). However, since we know that ‗it is easier to learn 
about environmental issues than about power relations or institutional relations of 
management‘ (quoted in Buchy and Ahmed 2007), this may not be enough to generate new 
knowledge or forms of constructing knowledge.  
Communicative knowledge, based on the need to understand each other in order to 
interpret intentions values and beliefs (Cranton and Roy 2005) was present, according to 
most of the interviewees. Such learning involves the development of personal abilities such 
as listening, respecting different points of view and kinds of knowledge, building, 
negotiating agreements, and respecting the group decisions. Such skills are very relevant 
and may be the ones supporting the changes taking place in terms of power with and power to. 
Thus communicative knowledge, which connects worldviews and facilitates new 
knowledge to emerge, seems to happen to some extent. However, considering what has 
not changed, it can be said that the process is still in its early stages and has limitations in 
generating inclusiveness and solidarity.  
With regard to emancipatory learning, a step that requires that one starts questioning 
instrumental and communicative knowledge and becoming critical about oneself and the 
social and cultural context (Cranton and Roy 2005), I could identify little evidence for this 
going on. Some interviewees demonstrated they have opened their minds to new issues and 
interpretations or showed a strong critical capacity, but questioning assumptions in order 
to build new perspectives was rare. This represents another blockage of transformation. 
Stimulating reflection and critical reflection would require that the RBC dedicate more time 
and resources to learning as well as to developing and implementing learning strategies. In 
the case of transformative learning, this would require facilitation and the 
institutionalization of learning as an explicit objective in the process (Buchy and Ahmed 
2007). 
The focus on doing limits the learning process. Thus, different kinds of knowledge and 
skills tend not to be developed, and the group does not move towards more critical 
understanding of reality, of their own roles and assumptions, and takes for granted frames 
of reference. As a result, the process of change does not proceed towards transformation.  
CONCLUSIONS AND WAYS FORWARD 
Looking at participation and empowerment, change and transformation in the context of 
participatory management in the Lagos São João river basin, it can be said that the process 
is very lively and challenging. Participatory governance, i.e., gathering government, civil 
society organizations and users around water issues, has created chances for people to have 
a say, to participate in decision-making and to alter power relations. As a result, positive 
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changes are taking place in the region. While this may be true, there is a lot that has not 
transformed, however. This reveals the limitations of participation and empowerment and 
points to the blockages in the process.  
Why is it that participation and empowerment, although essential and positive, are not 
enough to generate transformation? A classic answer would draw attention to structural 
factors such as social inequality and power differentials, which are doubtless the most 
powerful barriers to transformation. Even so, I would like to add more elements to the 
explanation. 
This analysis departed from the assumption that participation generates changes. However, 
the direction of change depends on what social actors perceive as desirable or necessary. I 
would like to argue that one reason participation and empowerment are insufficient is 
because a move towards transformation requires a new understanding of reality, and this 
does not easily or automatically emerge from the participatory process. Transforming ideas, 
assumptions and beliefs about the environment, the relations between people and nature, 
about wealth and poverty, about the colonial and indigenous mind, or about the role each 
person has in the process of change is a path to be constructed – a path requiring new ways 
of carrying out the process of change and new worldviews in order to see what has to be 
changed. 
In this sense, transformative learning, defined as ‗the process by which we transform our 
taken-for-granted frames of references (meaning perspectives, habits of mind, mind-sets) 
to make them more inclusive, discriminating, open, emotionally capable of change and 
reflective so they may generate beliefs and opinions that will prove more true or justified to 
guide actions take‘ (Mezirow, 2000: 7-8), turns out to be essential. Hence, I would suggest 
that, in the case of participatory management in Lagos São João river basin, an engagement 
with a transformative learning process could make a great contribution to overcoming 
some of the limitations and blockages preventing the process of transformation.  
Participation as tyranny has been debated, and denounced, but the power of the idea of 
participation together with the enthusiasm, the idealism and the many positive results it 
generates, still easily seduces practitioners, moving them away from looking critically at 
participatory processes and identifying their contradictions. Participation itself is not the 
problem. On the contrary, it tends to be part of the solution, but to become involved in 
such processes requires a permanent critical reflection and vigilance in order to avoid a 
naïve, blinkered enthusiasm.    
The ways forward also point to the need to mainstream social analysis in environmental 
analysis and natural resources management. That certainly calls for a deep cultural change 
as well as the development of special skills among the actors involved. An effective move 
in this direction would require that public policies truly recognize such a need and stimulate 
the shift. This may be still a long way off, but it can be started by the ones carrying out 
participatory natural resources management such as Lagos São João RBC. The 
implementation of water governance in Brazil has proved that important reflections, ideas, 
practices and innovations have been created and proposed by local groups and creative 
river basin committees. Thus, the possibility is there.      
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Lastly, moving towards transformation means moving away from a ‗doing culture‘, which 
gives primacy mainly to action, instrumental knowledge and problem solving, and towards 
a more reflective ‗learning culture‘, aimed at generating deeper understanding of reality and 
one‘s role in the process of change. This represents another profound change demanding 
explicit institutional commitment with learning and capacity building and challenging us to  
‗integrate transformative learning theory, concepts, tools and approaches to our way of 
working‘ (Buchy and Ahmed 2007:15).   
Endnote 
1.The fieldwork was conducted at the end of 2007, in the Lagos São João river basin, Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil. During the period, the author visited 11 of the 13 municipalities in the 
watershed and interacted with members of the River Basin Committee from all sectors: 
local, state and federal government, water users and civil society organizations. The 
selection of interviewees reflected the different sectors represented in the Committee. 
Preference was given to the representatives – appointed by the government (local, state and 
federal) or elected by their peers (civil society organizations and water users) – as well as 
participants in the Subcommittees or Advisory Technical Groups. The category and 
number of the interviewees were: Executive Secretary (5) / Government – Local (8), State level 
(3), Federal level (3) / Water Users – Private Water Company (1), Fishers‘ Association (11), 
small farmers (5) / Civil Society Organizations – NGOs (8), totalling 44 interviewees. Aiming 
at allowing people to express their perceptions in different ways, I also used drawings as a 
method of data collection. All of these were elaborated and described by the ‗authors‘ 
themselves which provided important insights in the data analysis. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Engaging Indigenous Governance in 
Partnerships for Conservation: Lessons from 
Selva De Matavén, Colombian Amazon 
Eloisa Berman-Arévalo 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Indigenous peoples and partnerships for conservation in indigenous 
Amazonia 
Indigenous peoples in Latin America, their territories, knowledge and practices have 
assumed a key role in global efforts for global environmental protection (Ulloa 2005, p. 
97), particularly for the conservation of tropical forest biodiversity (Conklin, 1997; Escobar 
1998). Linking notions of territory, autonomy, tradition and conservation (van Cott 2001; 
Offen 2003), indigenous movements have borrowed and transformed elements from 
global environmental discourses, incorporating them into the framing of their struggles for 
the recognition of territorial, political and cultural self-determination (Ulloa 2004; Jackson 
and Warren 2005). The participation of indigenous peoples in environmental politics and 
new types of global environmental governance (Brosius 1999; Dove 2006; Lemos and 
Agrawal 2006) has played a major role in shaping their processes of ‗political re-
organization‘ (Nagel and Snipp 1993), as well as the contents and forms of implementation 
of indigenous projects of articulation with ‗pluri-national‘ states (Andolina et al. 2005, p. 
681).  
Widespread democratic transformations of Latin American states, exemplified by the 
drafting of ‗green‘ and ‗multicultural‘ constitutions during the 1990s (Assies 2000: 3; van 
Cott 2001), resulted in new policy and legal prescriptions integrating environmental 
protection, indigenous self-determination, and administrative decentralization (Brackelaire 
2000, p. 46). In Colombia, the Political Constitution of 1991 (CPC-91) and subsequent 
legislation granted semi-autonomous status to indigenous territories, which today 
constitute 25% of the national territory and more than 80% of its forest areas, recognized 
under the figure of resguardos  (Van der Hammen 2003, p. 7). This process implied the 
insertion of indigenous peoples into the political-administrative structure of the Colombian 
state and the attribution of public management functions, including territorial and 
environmental management, to new forms of indigenous government. Parallel to the 
strengthening of civil society actors and the weakening of the state, the devolution of 
public functions has been accompanied by the support of NGOs, different state 
institutions and international donors, which have formed partnerships with local – often 
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newly created – indigenous organizations. Partnerships with Amazonian indigenous 
peoples often materialize as projects for conservation and sustainable development (Dove 
2006; Ros-Tonen et al. 2007), while also providing technical, political and financial support 
to indigenous territorial claims and political processes (Offen 2003; Perreault 2001, 2003; 
Andolina et al. 2005). Thus, these collaborative initiatives have become dynamic arenas 
where the mutual influence between environmental and developmental interventions and 
indigenous governance is negotiated.  
This chapter discusses the case of Selva de Matavén in the Colombian Amazon, a 2 
million-ha resguardo where a dynamic partnership process has been taking place for the 
past 10 years (1998–2008), integrating territorial protection, natural resource management 
and consolidation of indigenous self-government. Its aim is to provide a nuanced view of 
partnership formation and development, its conflicts and accomplishments. In contrast to 
common representations of such alliances between conservationists and indigenous 
peoples, this account situates partnerships in an arena of constant negotiations and shifting 
power relations between participating actors. From this analysis derives the second main 
aim of the chapter, namely to discuss some of the implications of the partnership process 
for indigenous governance, which is addressed by the creation and consolidation of a new 
form of indigenous organization.   
After a discussion of the concepts of ‗partnerships‘, ‗devolution‘ and ‗indigenous 
governance‘, I explain the methodology and provide basic information about the territory 
referred to. Then a history of the partnership process is laid out, specifying how it emerged, 
its diverse composition, objectives and actions, the emergence of conflicts and tensions, as 
well as its accomplishments. Finally, the interplay between the partnership process and 
indigenous governance is analysed, discussing the ways in which the partnership played a 
fundamental role in shaping different dimensions of local governance, with often 
ambivalent and contradictory outcomes. 
PARTNERSHIPS, DEVOLUTION AND INDIGENOUS GOVERNANCE 
Partnerships  
Understood broadly as ―more or less formal arrangements between two or more parties 
from various sectors (government, civil society and/or private sector) around (at least 
partly) shared goals, in the expectation that each party will gain from the arrangement‖ 
(Ros Tonen et al. 2007, p. 5), partnerships integrating environmental and local 
development objectives have been advocated in development policy circles. They are seen 
as an effective response to decentralization and territorial devolution and to the increasing 
number of relevant actors in environmental governance (Fisher et al. 2005; Ros-Tonen et 
al. 2007). Furthermore, collaborative initiatives have become a common strategy for acting 
upon complex socio-environmental problems that cross traditional political and agency 
boundaries (Fisher et al. 2005), for enhancing ―good governance‖ and for the integration 
of local development, social justice and environmental agendas (Ros-Tonen et al. 2007). 
Aligned with governance-oriented analyses, the United Nations Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Peoples (UNPFII) strongly advocates partnerships between development 
actors and indigenous peoples, based on the need to engage the latter in increasing trends 
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towards ―participatory governance‖ (UNPFII 2005). Addressing questions of political 
agency and ―indigenous empowerment‖, the Guidelines for Engaging Indigenous Peoples 
(UNPFII Workshop ―Engaging the marginalized‖, Brisbane, Australia, 15 August 2005) 
emphasize the need for indigenous peoples‘ participation in decision-making, respect for 
their chosen forms of representation, recognition of their cultural diversity, and the 
development of sustainable partnerships, targeted at achieving long-term objectives (ibid: 4, 
5).  
Adopting a more critical perspective, Ros-Tonen et al. (2007), in a review of partnerships 
for forest management in Latin America, recognize that the ―warm and positive 
connotation‖ of the term may ―mask power asymmetries and exploitative relations‖, 
resulting in the use of partnerships as symbols of good intentions by powerful actors (ibid: 
5). Indeed, substantial literature on conservation-oriented partnerships involving 
indigenous peoples poses sharp critiques on ‖top-down‖ conservation initiatives under the 
rhetoric of ―partnerships‖, ―participation‖ and ―integrated conservation and development‖ 
(Colchester 1996; Chapin 2004; Chernela 2005). Some scholars have framed the analysis in 
terms of Foucaultian ―governmentality‖, arguing that conservation agendas pursue 
indigenous peoples‘ internalization of state control (Bryant 2002).   
On a middle ground that recognizes partnerships‘ potential for fair and sustainable 
environmental management while undertaking critical academic analyses, Ros-Tonen et al. 
(2007) point out major risks that emerge in partnership relations, generally associated with 
a failure to reconcile multiple interests and power imbalances or to accomplish both 
sustainable management and social justice. Challenges and conflicts include diverging 
interests, power asymmetries, perverse use of partnership ―framing‖, exclusion of crucial 
social actors, negation of social and ecological dynamism and unpredictability, and adverse 
effects on local governance structures, among others (ibid: 21). With respect to this last 
aspect, Brook (2005, 2007) asserts that, while providing instrumental support to indigenous 
peoples‘ struggles for territorial recognition, institutional strengthening and capacity-
building, multi-scale development initiatives increase pressure on village governance 
structures (2007, p. 225). Indeed, initiatives that are driven by external actors and lack local 
appropriation can undermine the capabilities of local institutions and create dependencies, 
and their results in terms of indigenous ―empowerment‖ and improved organizational and 
technical capacities are often problematic and contradictory (Morsello and Adger 2007, p. 
157).    
In terms of its composition, the Matavén process has a multi-scale, multi-sector nature, 
with actors bringing together different kinds of skills and resources including political 
power, funding, management capacity, technical expertise and local knowledge. Actors 
include international donor governments and multilateral agencies, national and local 
government entities with different functions and objectives, research institutes, national 
NGOs, regional and national indigenous organizations, and an emerging local indigenous 
organization as a body for self- government. Further, partnerships in this research are 
conceived as dynamic processes where composition, scope, objectives and implementation 
mechanisms are constantly shifting according to dynamic power relations between actors 
and on opportunities and priorities that emerge at given moments. Finally, the partnership 
process analysed here includes conservation objectives, but cannot be understood as a 
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partnership for conservation or environmental management alone. As will be shown 
below, the Matavén partnership process incorporated environmental discourses and actions 
but was fundamentally aimed at the implementation of collective territorial rights under the 
post-constitutional legal framework.  
Devolution and indigenous governance 
Broadly defined as ―the transfer of decision-making powers from the central state to local 
actors, such as indigenous populations, local community organizations or organized groups 
of forest users‖ (Ros-Tonen et al. 2007, p. 16), devolution of territorial rights to indigenous 
peoples has been extensively analysed in relation to shifts in natural resource management 
and the incorporation of new local actors in global environmental governance (Edmunds 
and Wollenberg 2003; Ros-Tonen et al. 2007). In this sense, devolution is thought to go 
hand-in-hand with multi-actor collaborative initiatives, as local communities join the 
growing diversity of actors that have a stake in environmental governance, including NGO 
networks, international donors and private corporations.   
Within the forest management literature, Edmunds and Wollenberg (2001, p. 4) have 
recognized the unbalanced emphasis on the achievement of environmental objectives in 
analyses of devolution and collaborative initiatives, proposing to look instead at the extent 
to which devolution can enhance local communities‘ self determination and economic 
opportunities. 
In the case of indigenous peoples in Colombia and other Latin American countries, 
devolution occurs in the context of historical shifts in the relations between indigenous 
peoples, the nation state and non-governmental actors at multiple scales, brought about by 
widespread democratic transformations during the 1980s and 1990s. The Colombian 
constitution generated a fundamentally political process which implied profound 
transformations in indigenous governance structures and practices. Therefore, while an 
environmental governance perspective provides the global institutional and policy context 
for understanding devolution in relation to conservation-oriented partnerships, it is the 
ongoing transformations in indigenous governance (Smith and Dobson 2003; Smith 2005) 
that, in practice, shape partnership negotiation and implementation. 
While recognizing that the concept of ―governance‖ as applied to indigenous peoples 
needs to be problematized and investigated in relation to context-specific situations (Smith 
2005, p. 16), a broad definition of the term is adopted. Following Dodson and Smith, 
governance (as applied to the local level) is understood as the ―structures, processes and 
institutions (formal and informal) through which a group, community or society makes 
decisions, distributes and exercises authority and power, determines strategic goals, 
organizes corporate, group and individual behavior, develops rules and assigns 
responsibilities‖ (2003, p. 2). Indigenous governance emphasizes topics that are particularly 
relevant in indigenous contexts, such as engagement with the wider ―governance 
environment‖ (Dodson and Smith 2003; Martin, 2003; Smith, 2005), questions of 
autonomy and self-determination, cultural adequacy and legitimacy, identity, representation 
and forms of authority (Smith 2005).   
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I use Smith‘s proposed preconditions for ―strong‖ indigenous governance (2005)  as 
reference points to analyse partnership influence, understanding that there are culturally-
specific conceptions of law, leadership, representation and participation, and that culturally-
based values inform local evaluations of what constitutes ―good‖, ―strong‖ or ―legitimate‖ 
governance‖ (Smith 2005, p. 12).  
Smith (2005, p. 13) proposes the following conditions for strong indigenous governance: 
(a) power (de facto sovereignty or self-rule): officially acknowledged and de-facto 
authority and decision-making power over strategic matters (making and exercising laws, 
resource allocation, dispute resolution and related governing processes); 
(b) resources: the economic, cultural, human and natural resources needed for the 
establishment and implementation of governance structures; 
(c) effective governing institutions and accountability (capable bureaucracies, effective 
mechanisms for decision-making and dispute-resolution, non-politicized representation, 
prevention of corruption and opportunistic behaviour);   
(d) legitimacy and ―culture match‖: the ability to wield power and authority in 
conformity with indigenous conceptions, shared beliefs and agreed rules. 
Indigenous organizations occupy a central place in governance analyses, given their central 
role as ―cultural brokers‖ with the wider governance environment (Sawchuk 1998; 
McDaniel, 2003; Smith 2005, p. 20). In this paper, indigenous governance is addressed in 
relation to the creation and evolution of a new indigenous organization in the partnership 
context.  
METHODOLOGY 
This project is based on a case study, assuming that similar conditions can be found in 
multi-sector partnerships in indigenous territories throughout Latin America. The research 
covers a period of nine years, from 1998 to 2007, but this chapter focuses on the period 
between 1998 and 2004. 
Research was based on the combination of ethnographic methods and discourse analysis. 
Qualitative techniques were used, including participant observation, open interviews, semi-
structured interviews and analysis of institutional documents. Data analysis combined 
ethnographic narratives, open coding and categorizing, and actor-centred discourse 
analysis. Three main bodies of data were used: field notes taken during field visits and 
workshops in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007; semi-structured and open interviews with 
indigenous leaders, community members and representatives of NGOs, states and donor 
agencies; and written documents, including projects, reports, evaluations, planning 
exercises, correspondence, and workshop, meeting and assembly minutes.   
More recent data was gathered during four months between March and June 2007. One 
month was spent in the Matavén area, where I attended the General Assembly of the 
indigenous organization ACATISEMA and spent three weeks in Piaroa communities in the 
Orinoco zone. During that time, I was a ―participant observer‖, had informal 
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conversations with project workers and community members, and conducted in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with indigenous leaders. Written documents and publications 
were obtained from institutional archives and documentation centres in the National Parks 
Unit, the GAIA Foundation, Eco-fondo and Tropenbos. In Bogotá, I conducted 13 
interviews with representatives of national NGOs, international donors and state 
representatives who were involved in Matavén at different moments since 1997. 
SELVA DE MATAVÉN 
Selva de Matavén refers to a territory of 1,849,613 ha1 located in a transitional area between 
the Colombian Orinoquia and Amazonia Regions, along the Colombian-Venezuelan 
border (Map 1). The area is highly heterogeneous, covered by a mosaic of ecosystems that 
form a zone of ―rapid environmental transition‖ between the Amazonian rainforest and 
the savannahs of the western Orinoco watershed (Hernández et al. 1992), also 
incorporating elements of the Guyana Shield Formation that lies to the east. 
 
Map 1  
Selva de Matavén 
 
Source: Etnollano/COAMA 2000, http://www.etnollano.org/ 
 
Although it is part of the Orinoco river watershed, from a bio-geographical perspective the 
Matavén forest is part of the Colombian Amazon (Hurtado-Guerra 1992, in Loboguerrero 
et al. 2000). Geologically, it is part of the Pre-Cambrian formation of the Guyana Shield. 
Due to its condition as a zone of encounter between Orinoco savannahs, Amazonian 
forests and Guyana Shield formations, Matavén presents a high diversity of habitat and 
ecosystems. Besides several forest types, there is a notable presence of savannah enclaves 
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in the north and north-eastern portions, enormous, Pre-Cambrian rocks known as inselbergs, 
and extensive flood lands in the Orinoco and Guaviare floodplains to the east and south 
respectively. 
The Selva de Matavén is part of the Department of Vichada, which until 1991 was in the 
category of National Territories created by the Constitution of 1886. These extensive, 
largely uninhabited, areas were isolated from national centres of power and administered 
directly by the national government; they constituted the country‘s colonization frontiers to 
the south and east.  
According to the most recent local census, there are 149 communities in the Great 
Resguardo of Matavén, with 12,052 inhabitants (Programa Amazónico 2004), an average of 
70 inhabitants per community. Matavén‘s people ascribe to six different ethnic groups, 
namely Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Piapoco, Curripaco and Cubeo. There are additionally 
approximately 120 small campesino farms, with a population not above 400.  
Until the creation of the Great Resguardo of Selva de Matavén in 2003, the area was 
divided in 16 small resguardos titled between 1984 and 1987. These created a belt of legal 
protection around the un-titled centre, which was open in its western flank (Map 2). Today, 
previous resguardos are known as sectors, which organize the internal redistribution of the 
Great Resguardo‘s public budget and are still present in local people‘s territorial 
identification and in the recognition of the Governor of Cabildo, the authority responsible 
for the former resguardos.  
THE STORY OF THE MATAVÉN PARTNERSHIP PROCESS 
Antecedents and partner recruitment 
The appearance of both an indigenous organizational process and a multi-sector 
partnership at the level of the Matavén Forest started at the end of the 1990s, aided by 
NGO involvement and the emergence of objectives related to territorial protection and 
biodiversity conservation. 
With the support of regional and national indigenous organizations, the various ethnic 
groups and geographical zones had succeeded in obtaining the legal recognition of 
resguardos during the mid 1980s (GEF 2001). Within a nation-wide ―territorial- turn‖ (Offen 
2003) in indigenous peoples‘ political processes in the early 1990s, ―territory‖ became part 
of local organizations‘ discourses. However, it was in the context of NGO involvement 
that the legalization of a common area to the 16 resguardos became an objective for political 
mobilization.  
Since 1983, the national NGO Etnollano has been working in the entire belt of 16 
resguardos in a wide range of community-based development projects (Etnollano-GEF 
2005). Etnollano‘s strongest work has consisted in community-based health initiatives and 
the parallel strengthening of river-based Health Promoters Associations, a new form of 
organization created as a response to Etnollano‘s work. Discussions around food security, 
culture and livelihoods carried out with health promoters led to concerns over territorial 
threats to the unprotected area circled by the 16 resguardos, which started to be referred to 
 PARTICIPATION FOR WHAT: SOCIAL CHANGE OR SOCIAL CONTROL? 
132 Larissa Barbosa da Costa 
as the ‗Heart of the Forest‘ or ‗Heart of Health‘ in project documents and publications and 
discussions between Etnollano and local leaders (Loboguerrero et al. 2000).  
 
Map 2 
Selva de Matavén. Belt of indigenous resguardos 1998 
 
Source: Etnollano/ COAMA 2000, http://www.etnollano.org/ 
 
As the scope of the process expanded from community-based health to territorial 
protection and conservation, the need to recruit support from strategic public institutions 
and international donors became evident. The Etnollano Foundation had been in the area 
for more than 10 years, had shown financial and technical capacity to support local 
projects, had excellent relations with local organizations and was well-positioned among 
international donors. Thus, Etnollano took it to its hands to officially ―launch‖ the 
Matavén initiative and stimulate the formation of a multi-sector partnership for the 
protection of the central area of Matavén.  
Attracting partners involved the development of representations of the process, the area 
and its people that would serve the strategic purpose of recruitment. Framing was directed 
by Etnollano, which integrated indigenous leaders‘ self-representations, its own 
perspectives and global discourses linking biodiversity conservation, multi-culturalism and 
indigenous territorial autonomy.  
The idea of titling the central area was presented as a local request based on indigenous 
people‘s realization of the importance of its conservation. A first official request for the 
protection of territory was presented in October 1998 ―by a group of indigenous leaders 
and promoters of Matavén (…) to the national government that the central area be given 
to them as a conservation zone under the ownership and management of an association of the 
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16 surrounding resguardos‖ (Loboguerrero et al. 2000, p. 28). In this way, the process was 
presented as a rare case in which, by local initiative, protected area status was requested for 
an indigenous territory. 
Framed in such a way, the process was attractive to public institutions with environmental 
and sustainable development objectives, as well as to international donors endorsing 
community-based and participatory approaches to conservation and development (Ulloa 
2004). Partner recruitment under the leadership of Etnollano resulted in a very strong and 
diverse set of actors representing different scales of government and civil society, with 
different functions and interests. The Matavén Group, later the Institutional Support 
Group (GIA), was formed in 1998 in order to ―coordinate efforts for the creation of the 
new resguardo and of an indigenous government to administer it‖ (Etnollano/GEF, 2005). 
Its members included the National Parks Unit, the governmental National Plan for 
Alternative Development (PNDA-Plante),2 the Organization of Amazonian Indigenous 
Peoples of Colombia (OPIAC), the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia 
(ONIC), the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCORA),3 the Departmental 
Government of Vichada and the Etnollano Foundation. In subsequent years, the 
Colombian Institute for Anthropology and History (ICANH), the Defensoría del Pueblo 
(Peoples‘ Defense),4 the Municipality of Cumaribo and regional environmental authority 
Corporinoquia entered and exited the process.  
Partnership objectives and actions 
During 1999 and 2000, partnership actions revolved around the definition of the most 
appropriate mechanism for territorial protection and the most suitable form of 
organization to represent and administer the common area, as a first step towards self-
government (Mora et al. 2002, p. 15). Plante, the National Parks Unit and Etnollano 
supported local workshops and meetings, consultations with external experts and inter-
partner discussions, as a result of which, by the end of 2000, indigenous leaders had 
decided to request a common-use resguardo to the INCORA as a legal protection category for 
the central forest. In a parallel manner, an organization integrating the 16 resguardos was 
being formed which, as was decided between indigenous leaders and non-indigenous 
partners, aimed at becoming an Association of Traditional Indigenous Authorities (AATI), 
recognized as a public authority in Decree 1088 of 1993.  
Besides supporting the titling process through legal and bureaucratic transactions and 
political lobbying in Bogotá, partners worked at the community level implementing project 
components in community-based natural resource management and sustainable 
production. Funds for these activities were provided by international donors, including the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and 
the Royal Dutch Embassy.  
The start of an Etnollano/Global Environmental Facility (GEF)/World Bank project in 
2001 intensified activities at the local level, accelerated the fulfillment of titling 
requirements, and put particular emphasis on an ―organizational strength‖ component, 
which soon led to the official creation of the Association of Cabildos and Traditional 
Authorities of Matavén (ACATISEMA) in August 2001. The ―GEF project‖ became the 
main source of funding for the overall Matavén process, covering the costs of inter-
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institutional meetings, local assemblies and operation costs of most activities implemented 
in the partnership context.  
Legalization of the Great Resguardo of Matavén in 2003 was the culmination of five years of 
collaborative action. The end of the Etnollano/GEF/WB project in 2004 marked the end 
of Etnollano‘s involvement, giving way to the start of a new phase. After 2004, in a change 
that marked the history of partnerships in Matavén, ACATISEMA initiated the direct 
implementation of a three-year project funded by the Royal Dutch Embassy. Since 2004, 
involvement of non-indigenous organizations in Matavén has been limited to financial and 
administrative support, with project decision-making and implementation officially in the 
hands of ACATISEMA and a group of consultants. 
Conflicts and tensions 
Throughout the process, actors were constantly negotiating their power, ultimately 
expressed in their ability to influence discourses and project contents and gain legitimacy 
for their own participation. Successful bargaining was dependent on the support recruited 
from the other parties, particularly from indigenous leaders and ACATISEMA, which soon 
became a powerful broker between communities and non-indigenous partners. 
Every one of the participants was able to exercise some degree of power, thus influencing 
the evolution of the partnership process. Interestingly, power relations were seldom 
negotiated in relation to partnership objectives and basic discourse components, which 
were generally agreed upon. Instead, conflicts and tensions emerged in actual partnership 
implementation. Throughout the process, conflicts occurred both between state and non-
governmental actors and between indigenous leaders and non-indigenous partners. In the 
first case, conflicts were related to individual organizations gaining more influence over 
indigenous leaders, which could have negative repercussions for other partners‘ work. This 
type of conflict occurred when, for instance, a Plante project was implemented in 2000 
through a new Indigenous Operative Committee, an organization which, according to 
Etnollano and the National Parks Unit, lacked local legitimacy and was highly corrupt. 
Later, when Etnollano started implementing the GEF project and managed to gain leaders‘ 
support through its focus on organizational strength, Plante interventions were 
systematically opposed by leaders.  
Conflicts between indigenous leaders and non-indigenous partners were related to 
accusations of top-down approaches and of monopoly over administrative and budget 
management decisions, as occurred between the Etnollano Foundation and certain 
ACATISEMA leaders. In addition, the process was always accompanied by a lack of trust 
in non-indigenous partners. Accusations of ―hidden agendas‖ gained strength at particular 
moments, often instigated by the higher-level indigenous organizations ONIC and OPIAC 
which constantly highlighted the need to protect indigenous autonomy and prevent 
―imperialist‖ interventions. Conflicts of this sort were particularly relevant for the National 
Parks Unit, often accused of wanting to impose a National Park and of being an agent of 
the Colombian state‘s militarist and neo-liberal policies. The Etnollano Foundation was 
also subject to this type of accusation at the start of the GEF project, when leaders were 
suspicious of the World Bank‘s intentions, given its well-known support for neo-liberal 
reforms and the privatization of natural resources.  
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Accomplishments and synergies 
Partners in the process shared a solid common ground with respect to partnership 
objectives and discourses. All actors were interested in territorial protection, in the 
consolidation of local indigenous government and in supporting sustainable production 
and community-based natural resource management. All actors shared conceptions of the 
process as an ―indigenous initiative‖, in which unilateral impositions were out of the 
question. Although the participation of non-indigenous organizations was enabled by the 
overarching idea of biodiversity conservation as a global concern, there was a common 
political understanding that favoured indigenous rights over conservationist solutions that 
threatened local autonomy.  
Collaborative efforts between the core partners resulted in the accomplishment of the 
partnership‘s main objective, the titling of 918,000 additional hectares of forest land and 
the creation, in June 2003, of the Great Resguardo of Selva de Matavén. With respect to 
this objective, the partnership was a tremendous success in efficiently using each actor‘s 
particular strength and expertise. On the other hand, the partnership succeeded in creating 
a viable scheme of territorial administration, through the consolidation of an indigenous 
government body that united all ethnic groups and previous resguardo authorities. With 
different degrees of involvement, all non-indigenous partners supported the creation and 
strengthening of ACATISEMA, in its administrative and technical capacities, its 
negotiations with local and regional governments and its village-level democratic decision-
making.    
In terms of conservation, successful inter-sectoral and multi-scale mobilization for 
territorial protection has been the most visible achievement of the partnership. Besides the 
titling of the Heart of the Forest, ACATISEMA and non-indigenous partners have 
coordinated actions to address a number of external environmental threats that have 
emerged throughout the years. These have included gold and titanium mining, commercial 
fishing and oil exploration, and responses have ranged from community mobilization to 
legal action at the national level.  
Besides these main accomplishments, consistent efforts were made to agree on a 
conceptual basis within which to frame the process. After two years of collaboration, 
partners in the Institutional Support Group adopted the notion of territorial ordering, a broad 
concept that permitted increased flexibility in the definition of project objectives and 
activities, allowing all of the actors in the partnership to reconcile project aims with their 
own specific interests. Conceived since the CPC-91 as a process of ―territorial planning 
based on the incorporation of socio-cultural, political, economic and environmental 
variables‖ (Borja 1998, pp. 17-18), territorial ordering was being used in indigenous contexts 
as an instrument of participatory planning for self-determination and articulation with the 
state (Echeverry 2000; Franky, 2001). This could include cultural strengthening, self-
government, territorial protection, sustainable development, natural resource management, 
and administrative articulation with local and regional governments, among others.  
Framing in terms of territorial ordering signalled a shift away from strictly conservation and 
development aims towards increased emphasis on a process of indigenous political 
organization. This shift was a consequence of a crucial development during the partnership 
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process, the increase in ACATISEMA‘s negotiating power. Representing a form of 
indigenous government, ACATISEMA members were aware of their power to legitimize 
or discredit external involvement and act as strategic brokers between communities and 
non-indigenous partners. Their strengthening in partnership negotiations became the 
driving force of shifts in power relations and of subsequent changes in partnership 
characteristics.  
Matavén: a success story? 
As can be concluded from the previous section, the Matavén process possesses many of 
the attributes that would make it a ―success story‖ as a partnership integrating 
environmental and social agendas. According to Fischer et al. (2005, p. 12) key attributes of 
this type of coalition, conceived as the main reasons for their widespread implementation, 
include their ―broad inclusivity of stakeholders‖, ―problem-solving orientation‖, 
―integrative perspectives‖, ―informality and flexibility‖ and ―non-proprietary‖ nature. The 
Matavén partnership had all these prerequisites, and whether directly attributable to them 
or not, it did accomplish important concrete objectives. However, the Matavén process 
was also a complex arena for constant negotiations of power and meanings among 
participating actors. Indeed, despite the apparent success in enhancing ―indigenous 
empowerment‖, ACATISEMA‘s consolidation is marked by contradictions, given its 
emergence in response to non-indigenous discourses and project needs, its dependency on 
project resources and its questionable legitimacy and representativeness at the community 
level. Some of the implications of reliance on partnerships for indigenous governance are 
discussed in the following section. 
PARTNERSHIPS AND INDIGENOUS GOVERNANCE 
The following section discusses how the dynamics of partnership relations and the 
partnership-oriented development of an indigenous organization influenced the 
enhancement of strong indigenous governance in each of its constitutive elements (Smith 
2005, p. 13). It should be noted that this is by no means an overall assessment of 
governance dynamics in Matavén. Instead, it centres on only one level of indigenous 
governance, the organization, whose development is analysed only in the context of a 
particular form of ―wider governance environment‖, the partnership process.  
Power (de facto sovereignty or self-rule) 
Arguably, it is in the dimension of power that the partnership process had the most 
significant positive impact. Partnership objectives related to self-government and 
―territorial consolidation‖ aimed principally at strengthening indigenous sovereignty, which 
was carried out by the legal protection of territory and support for a legally recognized 
form of authority. ACATISEMA emerged as a legally recognized form of self-government, 
which itself laid the grounds for effective recognition by external actors, guaranteeing the 
participation of indigenous leaders in consultation and decision-making in policies and 
programmes which concerned indigenous peoples in the area.  
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With regards to the politics of partnership relations, enhancement of ACATISEMA‘s 
decision-making power was evident. As a response to pressures by indigenous leaders, the 
GEF project included a specific ―organizational strength‖ component and dedicated 
substantial resources to ―prepare ACATISEMA to exercise its role as self-government, its 
social and political functions and the historical role they were playing‖ (Etnollano Director, 
written interview, July 2007). Also, active participation of ONIC and OPIAC contributed 
to a heightened political tone in partnership discussions, stressing ACATISEMA‘s 
responsibilities in protecting indigenous autonomy and preventing top-down interventions. 
Thus, indigenous representatives gained a strong political position to contest partners‘ 
proposals, request particular actions and lay out rules and principles for partners‘ 
interventions. ACATISEMA‘s ability to become the implementing agency for a one million 
Euro project financed by the Dutch Embassy in 2004,5 known locally as the ―Holland 
Project‖, was the apex of this process. Designed by ACATISEMA consultants and its 
General Coordinator, the project‘s central objective was: ―to enhance the organizational 
strength of ACATISEMA as articulating axis of territorial ordering and governance in the 
unified resguardo of Selva de Matavén‖ (Programa Amazónico 2004, p. 17; ACATISEMA, 
2004).  
In terms of project agendas, emphasis was given to enhancing the association‘s ability to 
conduct fair transactions with local and regional governments, particularly with regard to 
health, education and public budget allocation. Activities also aimed at increasing local 
planning and resource allocation capacities and developing local institutions for democratic 
decision-making, accountability and effective conduct of public affairs. As will be seen 
bellow, it is arguable whether these objectives were in fact accomplished.  
Decision-making power by indigenous leaders in partnership negotiations has been treated 
as an indicator of increased sovereignty and authority in relation to external actors, in this 
case non-indigenous partners. However, the extent to which the partnership process 
enhanced indigenous governance and empowerment has to be questioned with regard to 
the reliance on partners‘ material and technical resources, weak local legitimacy due to 
externally-oriented discourses and operations, and emphasis on short-term, individual 
benefit seeking to the detriment of long-term policies.  
Resources 
―During GEF, the Etnollano Foundation was like the breast that gave us the milk. We 
wanted to start letting it go, but we couldn‘t do it until we found another one, and then 
another one.‘ (Local leader, personal communication, 2 May 2007) 
Since its conception, ACATISEMA has depended on external partners and projects for its 
operations at the village, regional and national levels. Dependency has not only been about 
funding, which has indeed come mainly from international donors, but also about 
knowledge in the form of legal, technical and political expertise. 
At the local level, General Assemblies, the basis for the association‘s claims to be a 
representative and democratic government, have been entirely funded through partnership 
projects. Assemblies are the main mechanism for participatory planning and evaluation of 
programmes and projects carried out by the association in partnership with non-indigenous 
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organizations. They are also the space for the election of the association‘s Coordinating 
Committee (CoCo) and General Coordinator, and for the allocation of project jobs. 
Convening an assembly involves the transportation of committees from the different zones 
of Matavén and the provision of food and writing materials to assistants, whose number 
can range between 200 and 600 people. Between 1999 and 2003, the costs were covered 
individually or collaboratively by Etnollano, Plante and the National Parks Unit, which 
justified this spending as part of ―organizational strength‖ project components. Between 
2004 and 2007, the project funded by the Dutch Embassy and administered directly by 
ACATISEMA provided the basic budget for ACATISEMA‘s operations at different levels. 
At the regional level, political and administrative transactions with municipal and 
departmental governments involve the transportation of representatives of resguardo sectors 
and members of the CoCo to urban centres. Although sector representatives had used 
national budget allocations to cover these costs, this is officially an illegal practice and 
funds are often not readily available. Thus, budgets for large projects such as the GEF 
Project and the Holland Project inevitably included coverage of ―representation 
expenditures‖ for indigenous authorities. 
Knowledge is an invaluable resource provided by external organizations and consultants. 
The organization of local meetings and assemblies has always relied on the administrative 
and technical support of non-indigenous project practitioners, who have also been in 
charge of designing the budgets, ensuring adequate accounting and reporting back to 
donors. Further, assembly agendas and methodologies for collective decision-making and 
political participation have been notably based on ―western–style‖ practices. Indeed, before 
the Holland Project, each assembly was preceded by meetings of the Institutional Support 
Group (GIA) where the agenda and methodologies were prepared. In following 
workshops, the assembly agenda would be presented to members of the Coordinating 
Committee, who would be instructed on basic notions of participatory planning. Thus, 
participatory ―problem identification‖, construction of ―desired scenarios and possible 
solutions‖, reflections on ―community responsibilities‖ and drafting of ―proposals for 
partner‘s support‖, were often designed in advance by non-indigenous project staff who 
also led the exercises during the event.   
Legal and political support for negotiations with local and national governments, private 
companies and international actors was an important area for reliance on external partners 
and advisors. While the titling of the Great Resguardo required actions at multiple levels that 
could not be done by a local organization alone, dependence on partners has extended to 
the association‘s successful conduct of its functions as indigenous government. For 
instance, legal advice and technical expertise are needed for ensuring fair allocation of 
national budget resources, the fulfillment of departmental responsibilities in public 
education and appropriate health coverage by semi-private providers.  
In general, projects have become a sort of ―government budget‖ at the level of Matavén. 
They not only cover the association‘s operations, but demonstrate – both to local people 
and external actors – that it is capable of taking concrete actions on politically charged 
issues. In Matavén, these issues include territorial protection, education, health and 
income-generation. Without questioning their importance for local well-being, in political 
terms these issues are mainly areas in which ACATISEMA legitimizes its recently acquired 
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status as authority through the ―activization of commitments and presentation of relevant 
results‖ (Eidheim 1968, pp. 214-215, in Sawcuk 1998, p. 143). The speeches of two of 
ACATISEMA‘s General Coordinators in the 2007 assembly illustrate the previous points: 
All projects are welcome! We do need money because we are in an extreme poverty. The 
Coordinating Committee and Sector Representatives must move around, go here and 
there, organize meetings, you need money for that! (Juan Rodriguez, First coordinator of 
ACATISEMA, General Assembly 2007) 
Those matters that were not addressed with the Holland project will not be excluded. 
That‘s why we will keep looking for more resources, so that we can attend all the 
problems and things can level out. After this project, we can think of new paths. And the 
paths are more finances, to attend the things that are still needed. (Victor Yanave, 
current coordinator of ACATISEMA, General Assembly 2007) 
As Sawchuk (1998) has noted, control over key resources such as money, programmes, 
personnel and technical knowledge is a fundamental means of securing and enhancing a 
native organization‘s own political position and that of its individual members (1998, p. 
134). Provision of key resources in the hands of NGOs, government and international 
donors clearly hinders ACATISEMA‘s control over them. Although ACATISEMA has 
progressively gained power in deciding how resources are used, its access to them is 
nonetheless contingent upon non-indigenous organizations‘ involvement in the Matavén 
process. Failure to achieve partner‘s support could result in the Association‘s local discredit 
and a lack of capacity to carry out its basic functions. In addition, partnership dependency 
has resulted in indigenous leaders‘ strategic endorsement of discourses and actions aligned 
with donors‘ environmental conservation agendas. As will be discussed below, this has 
implications for the association‘s local legitimacy and ―culture match‖.     
Effective governing institutions and accountability 
It is clear that the emergence of ACATISEMA was a product of the partnership process. 
Besides being a legal requirement for the administration of a common resguardo, such a 
representative body was necessary for decision-making in partnerships and projects aimed 
at the whole multi-ethnic area. As such, its operations became inseparable from those of 
partners and projects. 
Partners‘ support for the new organization resulted in an increased focus on a small group 
of leaders who were given the power to decide on behalf of communities in project 
decision-making. This condition implied that leaders had to make substantial efforts to 
legitimize their new status towards local communities, which resulted in their use of 
partnership resources (projects funds, knowledge, jobs) to increase their local political 
support through handouts and short-term project benefits, often leaving aside long-term 
objectives. Further, ACATISEMA members became the most direct beneficiaries of 
partnership activities. ―Organizational strength‖ often came in the form of workshops and 
meetings in Bogotá or abroad, stipends and salaries, and leaders‘ exclusivity in deciding on 
project sites and indigenous staff.  
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Finally, the association‘s effectiveness and accountability was threatened by opportunistic 
benefit-seeking on the part of leaders and by a shift in partnership discussions from issues 
of collective importance to short-term administrative decisions. According to several 
interviewees, as ACATISEMA gained power in the partnership, a radical change in the 
nature of the discussions took place. Project decision-making became an arena for 
demonstrations of power and increasingly revolved around budget management, salaries 
and financial or political benefits for leaders or partners.  
―The members of the Coordinating Committee were getting paid and going on trips to 
‗decision-making meetings‘ financed by institutions. Obviously, the whole issue of the 
management of natural resources and project contents shifted attention. Talking about 
logging or the watershed was not relevant anymore. Now the discussion focused on how 
much they spent, whether they [were] reimbursed or not, who got drunk, who was 
making more money, the discussion was centered in the so-called ‘strengthening’, which is really about 
the administration of money… 
Assemblies and meetings focused on the presentation of project accounting and how 
they would negotiate their short-term interests…and very little about what they were 
really fighting for, the conservation and cultural topics… 
Until that moment (2000), there were serious discussions, there were clear goals. But 
later there were no real spaces for people to reflect upon the situation and see where 
they were heading with this process.‖ (Former GEF project coordinator, personal 
interview, 1 June 2007) 
The occurrence of individual benefit seeking and opportunism does not imply that the 
association lacked a political agenda. To doubt leaders‘ genuine interest in the territorial 
protection of Matavén, in local communities‘ well-being or in fair relationships with the 
Colombian state, would be to underestimate their understanding of their own history. 
However, this case shows that ―organizational strengthening‖ in the context of project 
negotiations and unequal access to project benefits can significantly undermine the 
effectiveness and accountability of indigenous organizations. 
Legitimacy and “culture match” 
As was discussed before, ACATISEMA‘s ―empowerment‖ occurred in the context of 
dependency on a partnership process based on western languages, knowledge and 
institutional arrangements. The association incorporated discourses on conservation, 
territory, culture and tradition in which the influence of Etnollano, the National Parks Unit 
and international donors was clear (ACATISEMA 2001). Its structure and operational 
mechanisms were based on western notions of democracy and efficient government and 
were designed to fit project administrative and political needs.  
Naturally, this influence can have important implications for the association‘s local 
legitimacy and ―culture match‖. Here I focus on just one aspect, namely the strategic 
endorsement of global environmental discourses and community-based conservation 
projects by ACATISEMA leaders, a strategy that works against both the association‘s local 
legitimacy and the generation of strong local initiatives related to natural resource use. 
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Despite a shift to more inclusive frames such as ―territorial ordering‖, environmental 
protection and natural resource management have always been important concepts 
embraced by the indigenous organization through the involvement of western partners. 
Donors and national organizations have justified their support to the process in terms of 
environmental objectives and have invariably included conservation components in their 
projects. On their part, indigenous leaders realized early that financial and technical support 
to ACATISEMA was made possible by framing the Matavén process in environmental 
terms and including local-level conservation initiatives in project agendas. This reliance on 
environmental discourses continues to exist, and leaders are increasingly open to 
communities about the strategic importance of having a conservationist image in order to 
guarantee funds to cover a broader set of local issues, as the following excerpt shows:   
―Because the Matavén Forest now has to finance itself, not wait until other institutions 
bring the money. For that, it will sell its image towards the international level as an area of 
conservation and protection of natural resources. With taking care and conserving, several 
agencies will finance us, and with that we can sustain ourselves, but in order for that to 
happen we have to design the development projects of the Matavén Forest.‘ (First 
ACATISEMA General Coordinator, Assembly 2007, own emphasis) 
The idea that local protection of natural resources is considered by the international 
community as a solution to global environmental problems carries the risk of generating 
perceptions of ―conservation‖ as a priority for external actors, not for local communities. 
Indeed, for many village members, conservation is ―project work‖ carried out because of 
external actors‘ interests and for ACATISEMA‘s benefit. The abrupt introduction of 
previously unfamiliar discourses of conservation and territorial ordering by the association 
has generated a locally perceived distance between village-level dynamics and the 
association‘s actions. Further, as local communities view ―conservation‖, ―participation‖, 
―resource management‖ or any other project activity as a priority for external actors and as 
the source of ACATISEMA‘s rapid increase of power, the potential of projects for 
generating strong community-level processes is greatly diminished.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The Matavén process presented many of the attributes suggested in policy circles for the 
successful conduct of partnerships and the accomplishment of both environmental and 
social justice objectives. Its composition was diverse, it focused on concrete objectives, it 
was flexible in its contents and discourses, and it integrated political, development and 
environmental aims. Furthermore, not only was the participation of indigenous 
representatives fundamental, but the strengthening of the indigenous political agency was 
in fact a central element in the partnership agenda. 
Indeed, the initiative was a ―success‖ in accomplishing several concrete objectives. The 
creation of the Great Resguardo, effective mobilization against external environmental 
threats and the creation and legal recognition of a common indigenous governing body for 
the new area were fundamental achievements. However, an in-depth analysis of the process 
suggests that ―outcomes‖ and ―attributes‖ may be underlined by contradictions and 
ambivalences, particularly in relation to the partnership‘s effects on local governance 
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dynamics. This chapter is based on a conception of partnerships as dynamic processes and 
of partnership development as the product of power relations and negotiations between 
actors. By using this analytical perspective, the importance of incorporating indigenous 
governance into the analysis became evident. In the case of Matavén, the creation of a new 
partnership-oriented indigenous organization, its increased influence in project 
negotiations, its political strategies and its relations with the village level were fundamental 
factors determining partnership relations and evolution.  
Using different dimensions of ―strong‖ indigenous governance as an analytical framework 
allowed for a more nuanced view on partnership influence on indigenous political 
strengthening. In Matavén, while ―indigenous power‖ or ―sovereignty‖ was enhanced vis-à-
vis external actors and threats, reliance on resources provided by international donors and 
national organizations undermined the effectiveness, accountability and ―culture-match‖ of 
the indigenous association. Indeed, the strengthening of indigenous self-government, 
carried out as a response to partnership needs and discourses, proved to be a significant 
hindrance to both indigenous ―empowerment‖ and the partnership‘s effective integration 
of environmental and social justice agendas.  
Endnotes 
1. Understood according to the definition by Martinez-Cobo and adopted by the United Nations 
(1986): ―Indigenous communities, peoples and Nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider 
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts 
of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, 
develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the 
basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems‘, (Martinez Cobo Study 1986, 5: para. 379). 
2. The indigenous resguardo is a legal figure that represents indigenous territories with collective 
property titles recognized by the state. Basic characteristics include that internal management and 
government corresponds to indigenous local authorities, and that they are inalienable, 
imprescriptible and non-seizable. It is a legal and socio-political institution for the autonomous 
management of indigenous territories and affairs (Rodriguez 2004). 
3. Definitions by Smith (2005) represent the Indigenous Community Governance ( ICG) Project of 
the Centre for Aboriginal Social and Economic Policy (Australian National University). The 
preconditions for strong inigenous governance adopted by the ICG Project are in turn based based 
on Steritt (2001, 2002), the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, and the Harvard 
Project on American Indian Economic Development (Smith 2005, p. 12f.). 
4. This area was recognized in 2003 as the Great Resguardo of Selva de Matavén, according to 
Resolution 37 of 22 July 2003 by INCODER. Numerous publications about Matavén mention an 
area of 2,150,000 ha, corresponding to the pre-existing 16 resguardos and the forested central area 
(Loboguerrero et al. 2000; Mora et al. 2002; Hyde-Hecker 2005). 
5. Created in 1996 to promote coca crop substitution and sustainable rural development in coca-
growing areas.  
6. Now Colombian Institute for Rural Development (INCODER), the main government body for 
rural development, in charge of collective titling of indigenous territories, 
7. The Defensoría Del Pueblo is a state institution created with the CPC-91, responsible for 
ensuring the effective implementation of human rights, through the following integrated actions: 
human rights education, human rights promotion, human rights defence and protection 
(www.defensoria.org.co). Its actions in Amazonia have aimed at the strengthening of the 
Chpater Eight 
Water Governance and Social Transformation in the Lagos São João River Basin, Brazil 143 
Colombian state through the consolidation of indigenous government, the defence of collective 
rights and the protection of territorial integrity of indigenous lands.  
8. Project ‗Fortalecimiento de la Autonomía comunitaria para la Vida, Territorio y Medio 
Ambiente- componente ACATISEMA‘ (‗Strengthening of Community Autonomy for Life, 
Territory and the Environment-ACATISEMA). 
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